Alan John Lenczner

The applicant brought a motion to consolidate or hear together two applications seeking the removal of a mayor and a councillor for alleged breaches of the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that one of the applications had already been fully argued and was no longer 'pending' as required by Rule 6.01.

Furthermore, the court held that the applications required individualized reviews of separate impugned votes, meaning there were no common material facts that would justify joinder or risk inconsistent judicial findings.

The applicant sought a declaration that a $10 million host community grant, received by the respondent municipality, was subject to a trust for the exclusive benefit of ratepayers of the former Hope Township (now Ward 2), and an accounting.

The municipality argued it was a contract, no trust was settled, or if it was, it violated the rule against perpetuities and the claim was statute-barred.

The court found the grant constituted a specific non-charitable purpose trust, properly constituted, but violated the vesting rule against perpetuities.

However, it was saved by s. 16(1) of the Perpetuities Act, converting it into a special power to appoint income and capital until April 12, 2022.

The municipality was found in breach of its trustee duties for not adhering to the trust's strict terms and was ordered to provide an accounting.

The claim was not statute-barred nor defeated by laches or acquiescence.

The successful defendants on a summary judgment motion sought substantial indemnity costs.

The plaintiffs, who were the responding parties to the costs motion, argued for no costs or, alternatively, partial indemnity with substantial reductions.

The court found no reason to depart from the usual rule that successful parties should be awarded costs.

However, it determined that substantial indemnity costs were not warranted as the plaintiffs' action, while unsuccessful, was not devoid of merit.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, applying principles of proportionality and reasonable expectations, and fixed the all-inclusive amount at $50,000, a reduction from the $72,128.46 partial indemnity initially claimed.

The appellants brought a motion to stay a trial judgment of $84.75 million and a subsequent appellate order pending their application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test, finding that the proposed appeal raised serious issues of public importance regarding an auditor's duty of care.

The court found that immediate enforcement of the judgment would cause irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favoured the appellants, who had offered acceptable security for the judgment through liability insurance and currency hedge contracts.

The motion for a stay was granted.

This endorsement addresses costs for several prior motions.

The plaintiffs (Nicholson Group) were awarded costs for a successful motion for leave to amend their statement of claim.

The Janza group and Horbatiuk defendants were awarded costs for their successful motions regarding abandoned motions and contempt proceedings.

Andrey Pinsky was awarded costs against the plaintiffs for successfully opposing an indemnity motion brought by Mr. Nicholson.

The court applied principles under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1), declining substantial indemnity where no egregious conduct was found.

The plaintiffs, owners of a fitness club, sued the defendants for alleged misrepresentations regarding the availability of parking spaces and for failing to provide adequate alternative parking during construction.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment.

The court found that the misrepresentation claims were barred by the 'four corners' clause in the lease agreement, the releases signed by the parties, and the expiry of the two-year limitation period, as there was no evidence of fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment.

The court also found no triable issue regarding the alternative parking, as the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence that membership cancellations were linked to parking issues.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the claims against the moving defendants were dismissed.

In a foreign judgment recognition and enforcement appeal, the Court held that an enforcing forum need not establish a real and substantial connection between itself and either the dispute or the judgment debtor.

The only jurisdictional prerequisite is that the foreign court issuing the judgment had proper jurisdiction under the real and substantial connection framework or traditional grounds.

The Court also held that traditional presence-based jurisdiction over a corporate defendant is established where the corporation carries on business in the province and is served there.

Questions about ultimate enforceability against related corporate entities were left for later procedural stages.

The non-party moving party sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing his appeal from a Master's order requiring the production of his post-marriage contract financial records.

The moving party argued the decision conflicted with established authority on assessing damages for breach of fiduciary duty and valuing a business using hindsight.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no conflict in legal principles and concluding the proposed appeal did not raise matters of such importance to warrant leave.

A request to stay the Master's order was also denied.

In an addendum to a previous decision allowing the appeal and restoring the Ontario Labour Relations Board's decision, the Court of Appeal clarified the timeline for an estoppel period.

Responding to a letter from the respondent's counsel, the court confirmed its intention that the new two-year estoppel period originally set by the OLRB would start again on the date of the court's decision.

The appellant unions appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed an Ontario Labour Relations Board ruling.

The Board had admitted a photocopy of the 1958 Sarnia Working Agreement into evidence as a business record and ancient document, finding it created province-wide bargaining rights binding the respondent employer.

The Board also found the unions were estopped from enforcing the agreement for two years due to representations made in 2000.

The Divisional Court ruled the document inadmissible and substituted a permanent estoppel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Divisional Court failed to show deference to the Board's evidentiary rulings and remedial discretion, restoring the Board's original decision.

Shareholders sought an order requiring the appointment of an auditor and the production of audited financial statements for certain fiscal years under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The applicants argued that a limitation period had not expired for the claim relating to audited financial statements for the 2011 fiscal year.

The court accepted that the limitation period for the 2011 claim had not expired but held that the application sought the appointment of an auditor rather than merely delivery of statements.

Because shareholders were aware by the statutory annual meeting deadlines that auditors had not been appointed, the limitation period for those claims began running in 2010 and 2011 and expired before the application was commenced in 2014.

The endorsement was revised only to clarify the limitation analysis, and the claims remained barred.

The appellants, a law firm and its partners, were sued for damages arising from the allegedly improper appointment of a lawyer as a committee of a client's person and estate, and from the allegedly negligent administration of the client's estate.

The appellants' professional liability insurer argued that the allegations constituted a single claim under the policy because they arose from 'related' errors, omissions, or negligent acts.

The application judge agreed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, finding that the two claims arose from errors, omissions, or negligent acts that were sufficiently different in nature and kind, and therefore were not 'related' within the meaning of the policy.

On a motion for a stay pending leave applications to the Supreme Court of Canada, the moving parties sought to suspend an order holding that Ontario had jurisdiction over an action to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment of approximately $9.51 billion.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test as modified for stays pending leave applications, requiring consideration not only of a serious issue but also of the merit and public importance requirements under s. 40(1) of the Supreme Court Act.

The court found serious questions concerning recognition and enforcement jurisdiction, enforcement against a non-party to the foreign judgment, and the possible role of corporate veil-piercing, all of which met the public importance threshold.

Although irreparable harm was shown only weakly, the balance of convenience and interests of justice favoured a temporary pause pending the Supreme Court of Canada’s leave determinations.

The motions were granted and the parties bore their own costs.

The appellants, indigenous Ecuadorian villagers, obtained a multi-billion dollar judgment in Ecuador against the respondent corporation for environmental pollution.

They brought an action in Ontario to recognize and enforce the judgment against the corporation and its Canadian subsidiary.

The motion judge found that Ontario had jurisdiction but stayed the action on his own initiative, finding the corporation had no assets in Ontario and the corporate veil of the subsidiary could not be pierced.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the stay, holding that the motion judge erred in granting an unrequested discretionary stay and prematurely deciding the merits of the enforcement action.

The Court dismissed the respondents' cross-appeal, confirming that a real and substantial connection between the subject matter of the litigation and Ontario is not required to establish jurisdiction for an action to enforce a foreign judgment.

The appellant, Inco Limited, appealed a costs order awarding it $1,766,000 following its successful defence of a class action at the Court of Appeal.

Inco argued it was entitled to over $5.3 million and that the trial judge erred by reducing its legal fees and applying a 50 per cent discount under s. 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's determination that the environmental tort class action raised novel points of law and involved matters of public interest.

The court upheld the trial judge's methodical and reasonable costs analysis.

The plaintiff grocery store sought an interlocutory injunction preventing the municipality from removing a lay-by used for valet parking on a public street during planned road improvements.

The court applied the test for interlocutory injunctions from RJR-MacDonald and held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favoured relief.

The alleged causes of action—injurious affection and an easement—could not support the requested injunction, as any remedy for injurious affection lay in damages before the municipal tribunal and no easement could exist over a public highway.

The court also held that potential economic losses from removal of the lay-by were compensable in damages and that municipal authority over public highways weighed heavily against judicial interference.

The moving party municipality sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision that ordered the return of $397,941 in disputed development charges to the respondent developer.

The developer had paid the development charges for two condominium towers based on the municipality's calculations before the building permits were issued, but the municipality later demanded additional charges for the second tower due to a phased rate increase.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the OMB's interpretation of the Development Charges Bylaw was reasonable and not open to substantial doubt, and that the case did not raise a point of law of sufficient general importance to warrant the court's attention.

PreMD retained Ogilvy Renault to manage its patent portfolio.

Ogilvy negligently failed to pay maintenance fees, causing two US patents to lapse.

PreMD's business ultimately failed, though the trial judge found the failure was due to lack of regulatory approval and market acceptance, not the lapsed patents.

The trial judge awarded PreMD $1,063,069 in reliance damages and mitigation expenses, rejecting claims for lost profits and broader reliance damages.

PreMD appealed, seeking $14.4 million in reliance damages for pre-contractual and post-contractual expenses.

Ogilvy cross-appealed the damages calculation and costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the additional expenses claimed by PreMD were not caused by the breach and would not have been recouped even if the patents had been maintained.

The appellants requested a suspension of the court's judgment released on June 10, 2013.

On consent of the respondent, the Court of Appeal for Ontario ordered that the judgment be suspended until June 25, 2013, to allow for an orderly winding-down of the operations of RX Processing Services Inc.

The appellants operated an online pharmacy selling prescription drugs to Americans, with a call center located in Ontario.

The Ontario College of Pharmacists sought an injunction to stop the appellants from selling drugs without accreditation and using restricted terms.

The application judge granted the injunction, finding the sales occurred in Ontario and the College had jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a purposive approach to the legislation confirmed the sales took place in Ontario and that there was a sufficient connection to ground the College's jurisdiction to protect the public interest.