Harold T. Rosenberg

The appellant, a mortgagee, appealed a motion judge's decision that granted priority to construction lien claimants over his registered third mortgage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the advances made by the mortgagee did not fall within the exceptions of s. 78(2) or s. 78(6) of the Construction Act.

The court held that advances must be "made in respect of" the mortgage and the intention to secure financing must operate prospectively to gain priority over liens.

The decision reinforces the general principle of priority for lien claimants and the onus on mortgagees to clearly fall within statutory exceptions.

The appellant, Forest Meadows Developments Inc., appealed an order dismissing its application for a declaration that the respondent, Narges Shahrasebi, breached an Agreement for Purchase and Sale (APS).

The core issue was whether the respondent had represented that she would not be able to close on the extended closing date of October 29, 2019, which the appellant argued constituted anticipatory breach.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding of fact that no such representation was made, and therefore, there was no anticipatory breach or reasonable reliance by the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed.

This motion, initiated by the Receiver, determined competing priorities under s.78 of the Construction Act between construction lien claimants (represented by Maxion Management Services Inc.) and a third-ranking mortgage held by Donald Dal Bianco.

The court found that Dal Bianco's mortgage, registered after the first lien arose and securing funds advanced between 2012 and 2015, did not qualify for priority as a "subsequent mortgage" under s.78(6) because the advances were not made "in respect of that mortgage." Furthermore, it was not a "building mortgage" under s.78(2) as it did not involve an intention to secure future financing.

The court emphasized the general priority of lien claimants and the mortgagee's burden to prove exceptions.

Consequently, the lien claimants were granted priority over the third mortgage.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of s. 178(1)(a.1)(i) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, specifically whether a debt arising from intentionally inflicted harm, including psychological harm, should be released upon bankruptcy.

The Registrar had found that the societal interest in releasing this debt was outweighed by the benefit of not releasing it, aligning with the purpose of the BIA to provide a fresh start to an honest but hapless debtor, not to release judgments for intentional harm.

The court agreed with the Registrar's reasoning and dismissed the appeal.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(a) and Rule 20 to dismiss the plaintiff's action.

The action claimed against the defendants under the trust provisions of the Construction Lien Act for interest and costs, and was also challenged on the basis of a limitation period.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the legal question of whether interest and costs are covered by the CLA trust was unsettled and required a full factual record at trial.

Similarly, on the limitations issue, the court determined there was a genuine issue requiring trial, particularly concerning the "appropriate means" element of discoverability under the Limitations Act, 2002.

This endorsement addresses costs for several prior motions.

The plaintiffs (Nicholson Group) were awarded costs for a successful motion for leave to amend their statement of claim.

The Janza group and Horbatiuk defendants were awarded costs for their successful motions regarding abandoned motions and contempt proceedings.

Andrey Pinsky was awarded costs against the plaintiffs for successfully opposing an indemnity motion brought by Mr. Nicholson.

The court applied principles under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1), declining substantial indemnity where no egregious conduct was found.