Andrew Wood

The plaintiff trucking company sued the defendants for $33,900 in unpaid invoices.

The defendants counterclaimed for the same amount, alleging the parties reached an oral resolution agreement to set off the debt against the defendants' share of profits from a joint venture involving excavated soil.

The court reviewed the documentary evidence, including text messages, and found the defendants failed to prove the existence of the alleged resolution agreement.

The plaintiff's claim was granted and the counterclaim was dismissed.

The applicant sought an order recognizing ownership of a narrow strip of land through adverse possession or, alternatively, under s. 37 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act due to lasting improvements made under the belief of ownership.

The respondent sought dismissal and removal of structures.

The court found insufficient evidence to establish adverse possession, as it could not reliably determine the effective boundary before 1996 renovations.

However, the court granted the applicant title to the disputed area under s. 37, finding that lasting improvements were made under an honest belief of ownership and that the balance of convenience favored the applicant retaining the land.

The respondent was entitled to compensation for the land, and the parties were encouraged to negotiate the amount.

Costs were ordered to be borne by each party.

The moving party, a residential property owner, brought a motion under section 47 of the Construction Lien Act to discharge two construction liens registered against her property by a subcontractor and an equipment rental company.

The moving party argued the liens were out of time under the 45-day preservation deadline of the old Construction Lien Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding triable issues regarding whether the old Act or the new Construction Act (with a 60-day deadline) applied, and when the lien claimants last supplied services and materials to the improvement.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's order denying the production of a non-party employee's personnel file.

The plaintiff alleged the employee who worked on its machinery was impaired by alcohol and sought the file for relevance.

The Master denied the request based on proportionality and the employee's privacy interests.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Master's balancing of the marginal relevance of the file against the profound intrusion into the non-party employee's sensitive health and privacy information.

This motion, initiated by the Receiver, determined competing priorities under s.78 of the Construction Act between construction lien claimants (represented by Maxion Management Services Inc.) and a third-ranking mortgage held by Donald Dal Bianco.

The court found that Dal Bianco's mortgage, registered after the first lien arose and securing funds advanced between 2012 and 2015, did not qualify for priority as a "subsequent mortgage" under s.78(6) because the advances were not made "in respect of that mortgage." Furthermore, it was not a "building mortgage" under s.78(2) as it did not involve an intention to secure future financing.

The court emphasized the general priority of lien claimants and the mortgagee's burden to prove exceptions.

Consequently, the lien claimants were granted priority over the third mortgage.

The appellants appealed from an order granting the respondent's application for a warrant to remove signs placed on trailers bordering Highway 400.

The signs violated the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act as they were within 400 metres of the highway.

The appellants challenged the application on grounds that the respondent cited incorrect subsections of the Act and that the authorization to remove the signs was deficient in not specifying which signs were subject to removal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the erroneous subsection reference was a mere irregularity that did not vitiate the authority of the direction, and that the deficiency in the authorization could be remedied by issuing a supplementary authorization.

The appellants' cross-application for a declaration that the signs were permitted was dismissed as it confused the respondent's sign policy with the general prohibition under the Act.