Christopher P. Thompson

Electricity ratepayers brought an action seeking damages and declaratory relief concerning the sale of shares in Hydro One, alleging that the Premier and Ministers acted in bad faith to reward political donors and obtain further donations to the Ontario Liberal Party.

The motion judge struck out the claim under Rule 21, finding it was not justiciable as it concerned core policy and the pleadings were inadequate to support an inference of bad faith.

The appellants appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in assessing the facts in isolation, misconstruing material facts, and failing to accept pleaded facts as true.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants' allegations were insufficient to plead bad faith and that accepting such a pleading would undermine the immunity afforded to core policy decisions.

The plaintiffs, Hydro One ratepayers, brought an action for misfeasance in public office against the Premier and Ministers of Finance and Energy regarding the privatization of Hydro One.

They alleged the sale was motivated by improper purposes to reward Liberal Party benefactors.

The defendants moved to strike the claim.

The court granted the motion, finding the decision to sell Hydro One shares was a core policy decision authorized by the Electricity Act, 1998, and thus immune from judicial review in a civil tort action absent bad faith, which was not adequately pleaded.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action for malicious prosecution and other torts against multiple public servants and entities, the successful defendants sought costs.

The court considered the Rule 57.01 factors, noting the complexity of the case, the plaintiffs' unfounded allegations of malice and conspiracy, and the defendants' reasonable offers to settle.

The court fixed costs at $260,000 for the municipal defendants and $231,100 for the provincial defendants, representing an amount between partial and substantial indemnity.

The Crown sought indemnification for reasonable defence costs from the respondent pursuant to a prior declaration.

The respondent argued that because the Crown used salaried in-house counsel, its costs were purely notional and it suffered no actual loss.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the Crown incurs real costs for salaried lawyers, analogous to the statutory recognition in section 131(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Applying the nine factors from Cohen v. Kealey and Blaney, the court fixed the reasonable defence costs at $30,000 plus disbursements, and awarded $4,000 for the costs of the application.

The plaintiffs owned a property that was intentionally set on fire by a tenant, resulting in severe injuries to occupants.

The police and fire marshal investigated and concluded the property was an illegal rooming house with multiple Fire Code violations that contributed to the spread of the fire.

The plaintiffs were charged with arson by negligence under s. 436 of the Criminal Code, but were discharged at the preliminary inquiry.

They subsequently sued the investigating police officer, fire marshal investigators, and their municipal employers for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, negligent investigation, and Charter breaches.

The Superior Court dismissed the action in its entirety, finding no evidence of malice or bad faith, and concluding that the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charges based on the evidence gathered.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's consolidated fresh as amended statement of claim without leave to amend.

The claim arose from the procurement process for the Pan/ParaPan American Games Athletes' Village, where the plaintiff alleged it was wrongfully excluded from participating in the winning bid's financing.

The court struck several claims, including breach of the term sheet, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and a novel 'public law claim', without leave to amend.

Claims for breach of an oral agreement and misfeasance in public office were struck with leave to amend.

Claims for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation against the private defendants and the Crown agency were allowed to stand.

The defendants moved to strike the plaintiff's consolidated fresh as amended statement of claim without leave to amend.

The action arose from the procurement process for the Pan/ParaPan American Games Athletes' Village, where the plaintiff alleged it was wrongfully excluded from participating in the winning bid's financing.

The court struck several claims, including breach of the term sheet, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment against the Crown, without leave to amend.

The claim for breach of an oral agreement was struck with leave to amend to provide better particulars.

The claims for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation against the private defendants and Infrastructure Ontario were allowed to proceed.

The applicant, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, sought a declaration that the respondent, Turn-Key Construction Inc., had a contractual duty to defend Ontario in an action commenced by a third party, G. Prezio Electric Limited.

The underlying action arose from Turn-Key's subcontractor severing a major electrical power line during contract performance, leading Ontario to engage Prezio for emergency repairs.

The court found that the indemnity clause in the commercial contract between Ontario and Turn-Key created a duty to defend, as the third-party claim was "based upon, occasioned by or attributable to" the subcontractor's actions.

The application was granted, and Turn-Key was ordered to pay Ontario's defence costs.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's decision to strike her claim for negligent investigation on the basis that it was commenced beyond the two-year limitation period.

The appellant argued that the negligent investigation claim was interconnected with her breach of privacy claim, which the motion judge had allowed to proceed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the two claims protect different legal interests and are distinct.

The motion judge's costs award was also upheld.

The appellant submitted the lowest bid for a highway widening project but failed to declare the value of imported steel, rendering the bid non-compliant.

The Ministry of Transportation investigated, deemed the bid non-compliant, and awarded the contract to the second-lowest bidder.

The appellant sued for lost profits.

The Court of Appeal held that while a Contract A arose upon submission of the bid, the Ministry acted reasonably in refusing to waive the non-compliance.

Furthermore, an exculpatory clause in the tender documents barred the appellant's claim for damages arising from the non-acceptance of its bid.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff alleged that the provincial government induced a breach of his employment contract and intentionally interfered with his economic relations after revoking his security clearance to access the government licensing database used at a private motor vehicle licensing office.

The revocation followed a security screening that revealed past associations with outlaw motorcycle gangs.

The court held that the government’s decision was part of a general security screening policy designed to protect sensitive government databases and was not directed at causing a breach of the plaintiff’s employment contract.

The evidence did not establish the requisite intention to induce breach of contract, nor did it show the use of unlawful means necessary to support the tort of intentional interference with economic relations.

The plaintiff’s action was dismissed.

The appellant union filed grievances claiming damages for employees' exposure to second-hand smoke in correctional facilities.

The Grievance Settlement Board determined it lacked jurisdiction to award damages for injuries compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act or the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, regardless of whether the claim was framed in tort or contract.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the substance of the claim precludes the Board from awarding damages for compensable injuries.

The plaintiffs, employees of eHealth Ontario, brought a motion to certify a class action against eHealth for breach of contract and against Ontario for inducing breach of contract, relating to the non-payment of performance awards and merit increases.

The plaintiffs also moved to amend their statement of claim to add a claim for the 2011/2012 performance awards.

The court granted the motion to amend and certified the action as a class proceeding against eHealth, finding that the breach of contract claims were not plainly and obviously doomed to fail.

However, the court refused to certify the claim against Ontario for inducing breach of contract, finding it legally untenable.

The Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing brought a motion to quash an application for judicial review commenced by a landowner regarding a Minister's zoning order and a declaration of provincial interest.

The Minister argued the application should be dismissed for delay or prematurity, or alternatively, that portions of the supporting affidavits should be struck.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no unexplained delay, concluding it was not a clear case of prematurity to be decided by a single judge, and leaving the evidentiary issues for the panel hearing the merits.

The applicants appealed the assessment of numerous commercial investment properties, arguing they should be assessed in the farm property class under O. Reg. 282/98.

The Tribunal stated a case to the Divisional Court asking whether the phrase 'land is owned by' in s. 8(2)3 of the regulation includes both beneficial and legal ownership.

The Divisional Court applied the modern approach to statutory interpretation and concluded that the phrase is restricted to legal ownership, relying on the presumption of consistent expression and the presumption against tautology within the legislative scheme.

The court determined costs following an earlier decision declaring two individuals vexatious litigants and dismissing a related civil action.

The applicant sought substantial costs but failed to provide supporting dockets or disbursement records.

The court assessed costs based on the nature and length of the proceedings, including a two-day application and multiple motions brought during the hearing.

Costs were awarded to the successful applicant for the vexatious litigant application and to the defendants for dismissal of the civil action.

The court ordered specific amounts payable by the respondents, reflecting differing levels of responsibility and success.

The appellants brought a civil action in Small Claims Court against a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice, alleging injurious falsehood, misfeasance in public office, obstruction of justice, and fabricating evidence.

The claims arose from the judge's refusal to allow one appellant to act as agent for the other in family court, and the judge's subsequent editing of the hearing transcript.

The Small Claims Court dismissed the action without reasons.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that while the failure to provide reasons was an error of law, the matter could be decided de novo.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the judge's actions were carried out in the course of his judicial functions and were therefore protected by absolute judicial immunity.

Following the dismissal of Ontario's motion for leave to appeal, the successful plaintiff sought costs.

Ontario disputed the number of hours claimed and argued it should not be required to reimburse the plaintiff for GST on costs, citing previous case law.

The court disagreed, holding that where a successful party is indemnified for costs, the province cannot escape indemnification for GST.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs of $13,500 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and GST.

The Attorney General of Ontario and the Ontario Provincial Police appealed a motions judge's order refusing to dissolve an injunction against Aboriginal protestors occupying a residential development, and requiring the Attorney General to take carriage of criminal contempt proceedings while reporting back to the court.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part.

It held that the motions judge erred in refusing to dissolve the injunction after the Ontario government purchased the property and consented to the occupation.

The Court maintained the referral of the contempt matters to the Attorney General, but imposed strict conditions, finding that the motions judge's previous contempt process was fundamentally flawed for denying procedural fairness and improperly interfering with police and prosecutorial discretion.

The applicant sought judicial review of an arbitration award and a decision of the Ontario Police Arbitration Commission.

The arbitrator had dismissed a grievance regarding the inclusion of cadet service in the calculation of 'continuous active service' for a seniority premium, finding he lacked jurisdiction to define the term as the parties had not yet done so.

The Commission subsequently refused to appoint a conciliation officer, finding no notice to bargain had been given for the current collective agreement.

The Divisional Court applied the pragmatic and functional approach, determining the standard of review for the arbitration award was patent unreasonableness and for the Commission's decision was reasonableness.

The Court found neither decision met the threshold for intervention and dismissed both applications for judicial review.