William D. Black

The plaintiffs brought a mid-trial motion to disqualify the defendants' proposed expert witness, Dr. Vernon Quinsey, arguing he lacked the requisite independence and objectivity.

Dr. Quinsey was previously employed as a staff psychologist and Director of Research at the very psychiatric facility whose programs were being challenged as unethical human experimentation.

The court found that Dr. Quinsey's integral role in evaluating the contentious programs during the relevant period created a serious doubt as to his objectivity.

The court concluded that the prejudicial effect of his evidence outweighed its probative value, and disqualified him from testifying as an expert, though permitting him to testify as a fact witness.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to admit three sur-reply expert reports.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing the reports were unnecessary, prejudicial, and served late.

The court admitted two of the reports, finding them to be narrowly tailored responses to specific criticisms raised by the plaintiffs' experts.

However, the court excluded the third report, finding it to be an advocacy piece that improperly introduced new evidence and amounted to case-splitting.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to exclude the expert testimony of Professor Bernard Dickens, an ethicist, regarding the ethical standards of psychiatric care and research applicable in the 1960s and 1970s at the Oak Ridge Division of the Penetanguishine Mental Health Centre.

The defendants argued that Prof. Dickens, not being a physician, was unqualified to speak on psychiatric standards of care and that his reports primarily constituted legal analysis.

The court dismissed the motion, finding Prof. Dickens highly qualified as an expert in medical ethics, distinguishing ethical standards from medical standards of care and legal analysis.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to determine the admissibility of two reply expert reports (Prof. Shane O’Mara and Dr. Stephen Xenakis) served by the plaintiffs just before trial.

The defendants argued the reports were late and constituted impermissible case splitting.

The plaintiffs contended the lateness was due to unforeseen circumstances and that the evidence would assist the court.

The court found that the issues addressed by the reply reports were foreseeable and had already been covered by the plaintiffs' initial experts, thus constituting new evidence rather than proper reply.

The court dismissed the motion, ruling the reports inadmissible to avoid prejudice to the defendants and further trial delays, emphasizing the importance of adhering to trial schedules in a long-standing action.

The plaintiffs brought a mid-trial motion to amend their statement of claim to include reliance on section 16(1)(h.2) of the Limitations Act, 2002, and the common law doctrine of discoverability.

The claims arose from their treatment as involuntary patients at a mental health facility between 1966 and 1983, alleging assault through abusive experimentation and physical abuse.

The defendants opposed the amendment, arguing prejudice due to lack of particularity and insufficient discovery on discoverability.

The court granted the motion, finding no prejudice to the defendants as the allegations of assault and dependency were already pleaded, and the defendants had prior notice of the plaintiffs' intent to rely on section 16(1)(h.2) and had extensively explored issues related to discoverability (laches) during previous discovery examinations.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to exclude video footage of an interview between a deceased plaintiff and a documentary filmmaker.

The plaintiffs sought to introduce the unsworn footage to demonstrate the deceased plaintiff's sincerity and counter credibility attacks in the defendants' expert reports.

The court held that the video footage did not meet the criteria of necessity and reliability under the principled approach to hearsay, noting that the best available evidence was the deceased plaintiff's sworn examination for discovery transcript and affidavit.

The motion to exclude the evidence was granted.

The defendants, BNT Canada, L.P., BNT Canada GP, Inc., and Bechtel Power Corporation (collectively "Bechtel"), brought a motion to transfer the action from Walkerton (Central West Region) to the Toronto Region under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs, Bruce Power L.P. and Bruce Power Inc. (collectively "Bruce Power"), opposed the motion.

The court applied a holistic approach to the factors enumerated in Rule 13.1.02(2)(b), finding that the convenience of the parties, witnesses, and the court, along with advantages for securing a just, expeditious, and least expensive determination, and the availability of judges and court facilities, favored Toronto.

The court concluded that Bechtel had met the onus of demonstrating that Toronto was "significantly better" and that the transfer was in the interest of justice.

The motion to transfer the action to Toronto was granted.

This endorsement addresses costs arising from an unsuccessful and untimely motion brought by Sarah Werner to vary an order appointing a litigation guardian for her mother, Ida Rubin.

The court found Ms. Werner's proposed motion to be an obstructionist tactic, lacking merit, and brought in breach of a scheduling order.

Due to Ms. Werner's reprehensible litigation conduct, the court awarded full indemnity costs against her to the applicant and litigation guardian.

Additionally, costs were awarded to other parties (Morris Rubin and The Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company) from the estate, with these amounts to be allocated solely to Ms. Werner's share.

Joseph Pernica, litigation guardian for Ida Rubin, sought a case conference regarding his status amidst upcoming motions.

The endorsement addresses a purported motion by Sarah Werner to vary an order appointing Pernica as litigation guardian for Ida Rubin, arguing Pernica exceeded his mandate by obtaining Ida Rubin's banking records and challenging Ida Rubin's capacity.

The court declined to schedule Ms. Werner's motion, finding she lacked standing under Rules 59.06 and 7.06(1)(b).

The court affirmed Pernica's role as litigation guardian and provided specific directions for any future motion by Ida Rubin herself to remove the litigation guardian, emphasizing the need for transparency, personal affidavit, and attendance in open court for cross-examination due to the risk of abuse in ex parte proceedings.

The court also declined to stay the case, emphasizing the need for information sharing for mediation and a mechanism for fund distribution.

The plaintiff, Karen Stirrett, sought damages for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against three defendant doctors following the death of her spouse, David Stirrett, after an angiogram performed as part of the STREAM medical research study.

A jury found Dr. Strauss negligent but that his negligence was not causative of the death.

The court, sitting without a jury for the equitable claim, found that Dr. Strauss, as the principal investigator, owed and breached a fiduciary duty to David Stirrett by failing to disclose critical changes to the study protocol, funding, and participant numbers, which would have influenced David Stirrett's informed consent.

The court held that causation is not a requirement for recovery in breach of fiduciary duty.

Judgment was awarded in favour of the plaintiff against Dr. Strauss, while the actions against Dr. Cheema and Dr. Sheth were dismissed.

This is a trial management endorsement following a Court of Appeal decision that vacated a partial summary judgment and remitted the matter for a full trial.

The court addresses the plaintiffs' request for bifurcation (liability first, then damages) and the defendants' preference for a combined trial.

Given the age of the plaintiffs and the historical nature of the claims (1966-1983), the court emphasizes the need for expedition while ensuring procedural fairness.

The court orders a hybrid trial, combining affidavit evidence with necessary viva voce testimony, scheduled for 6 weeks, covering liability issues, with damages to be determined later.

The trial is scheduled for May-June 2019, despite scheduling conflicts for some defence counsel, prioritizing the need for a firm trial date.

The plaintiffs sought costs for undertakings and refusals motions brought against several defendants in a medical malpractice action.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $6,800 in costs against five defendant physicians who failed to answer undertakings until after the motion was served.

However, the court awarded costs of $3,257.64 to another defendant physician who was successful on the single refusal argued and had answered undertakings promptly.

No costs were awarded against two other defendants who resolved their issues prior to the hearing.

Former patients of the Oak Ridge Division of the Mental Health Centre in Penetanguishene brought a multi-party action against two physicians and the Crown for breach of fiduciary duty, battery, negligence, and violations of international law norms relating to torture and cruel treatment.

The patients alleged they were subjected to intensive therapy programmes involving psychological and physical torture between 1966 and 1983.

The motions judge granted partial summary judgment for breach of fiduciary duty and dismissed the defendants' motions to dismiss the action as statute-barred or barred by laches.

The appellants appealed, arguing procedural fairness violations and that the action was time-barred.

The Court of Appeal found the motions judge erred in granting partial summary judgment without proper notice and opportunity for the defendants to respond, and set aside those paragraphs.

The court remitted the matter for trial, finding genuine issues requiring trial on limitation and laches issues.

The Plaintiffs sought costs following their successful partial summary judgment motion, where the Defendants' motion to dismiss claims as statute-barred was dismissed, and the Plaintiffs' cross-motion for partial summary judgment on breach of fiduciary duty was granted.

The Plaintiffs requested $821,580.08 in costs and disbursements on a partial indemnity basis.

The Defendants argued for a significantly lower award of $50,655, alleging over-lawyering and inclusion of costs unrelated to the specific summary judgment motion.

The court awarded the Plaintiffs $282,504.34, disallowing costs for an unsuccessful productions motion and reserving discovery costs for the final adjudication, while finding the Plaintiffs' remaining claims for the summary judgment motion reasonable despite the Defendants' "over-lawyering" argument.

The defendants brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' multi-plaintiff action as statute-barred.

The plaintiffs, former involuntary patients at the Oak Ridge psychiatric facility, alleged they were subjected to abusive human experimentation and torture by the defendant doctors between 1966 and 1983.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the plaintiffs had a free-standing claim for breach of fiduciary duty that was not subsumed by the expired limitation periods for medical malpractice or tort claims.

The court granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claim, leaving issues of harm and damages for trial.

The plaintiff moved for a further examination for discovery of the corporate representative of the New Vector defendants.

The initial examination was aborted because the representative produced had no personal knowledge, failed to prepare, and defence counsel improperly obstructed questioning.

The court found that the defendant's conduct in thwarting discovery constituted special circumstances justifying a second examination.

The motion was granted, and the defendant was ordered to produce a properly prepared representative and pay substantial indemnity costs of $35,000.

Following a motion where the plaintiff was successful, the court considered costs submissions.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs based on a settlement offer, which the court rejected.

Applying the factors in the Rules of Civil Procedure and Boucher, the court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $22,500, in accordance with the parties' prior agreement on the quantum for partial indemnity costs.

The moving defendant sought to bifurcate the action so that the plaintiff's successor liability claim against it would be determined before the negligence and related claims against the remaining defendants.

Applying the governing bifurcation principles, the court held that bifurcation is an exceptional remedy available only in the clearest cases where the preponderance of factors favours severance and the proceeding will more likely than not be resolved justly, expeditiously, and inexpensively.

The court found the successor liability issue was not simple, the case was not extraordinary merely because it involved a novel American doctrine, and any clear advantage or costs savings were largely limited to the moving defendant.

The proposed procedure would also create delay, multiplicity of proceedings, and prejudice to the plaintiff.

The motion was dismissed, with costs to the plaintiff on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants brought a motion seeking dismissal or a stay of an Ontario action arising from a landslide at a Costa Rican gold mine, arguing that Costa Rica or Colorado was the more appropriate forum under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

The court applied the principles articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda and Breeden v. Black.

While the moving defendants established certain connections between the dispute and the proposed foreign forums, they provided little evidence regarding the characteristics of those forums or how litigation there would be fairer or more efficient.

The court held that merely identifying geographical connections and residence locations was insufficient to meet the burden of demonstrating that an alternative forum was clearly more appropriate.

As the evidentiary record did not establish that either Colorado or Costa Rica was better positioned to resolve the dispute, the motion was dismissed.

The appellant, an Ontario mining company, sued American engineering consultants for negligent misrepresentation regarding studies for a Costa Rican gold mine.

The defendants successfully moved to stay the action for lack of jurisdiction.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the tort of negligent misrepresentation was committed in Ontario, as the studies were received and relied upon at the appellant's Toronto head office.

This established a presumptive real and substantial connection that the defendants failed to rebut.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to determine forum non conveniens.