William D. Black

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against the defendant cardiologist following the sudden death of a 36-year-old man who collapsed after completing a half-marathon.

The deceased had severe aortic stenosis.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendant failed to properly advise the deceased against strenuous exercise.

The court ruled that hearsay statements by the deceased regarding the doctor's advice were inadmissible for lack of threshold reliability.

The court accepted the defendant's evidence that he had advised the deceased against distance running and warned him of the risk of sudden death.

The court found the defendant met the standard of care and dismissed the action.

An Ontario mining company sued numerous foreign engineering firms and engineers for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract following a landslide that closed a gold mine in Costa Rica.

The moving defendants challenged the jurisdiction of the Ontario court.

Applying the framework from Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, the court considered whether presumptive connecting factors established a real and substantial connection with Ontario.

The court held that neither alleged reliance on advice in Ontario, damages suffered in Ontario, nor business connections through related companies established sufficient jurisdictional ties.

Any connection to Ontario was tenuous, as the engineering services, alleged wrongdoing, and resulting physical damage occurred primarily in Costa Rica and the United States.

The court concluded that Ontario lacked jurisdiction simpliciter and therefore declined to assume jurisdiction over the moving defendants.

The plaintiff suffered a debilitating stroke and sued his family physician for medical malpractice, alleging negligence in the management of his Coumadin (blood thinner) therapy.

The court found that the physician breached the standard of care by failing to appropriately adjust the plaintiff's dosage and monitor his INR levels after subtherapeutic readings and a reported transient ischemic attack.

The court concluded that this breach caused the stroke and dismissed the defendant's claim of contributory negligence, finding the plaintiff acted reasonably.

The appellant brought a class action alleging that the respondent transmission repair franchisor breached consumer protection legislation by charging an 'Inspection Service' fee, which the appellant characterized as an illegal fee for an estimate when repairs are authorized and carried out.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding the fee was for the labour required to remove and reinstall the transmission, not for an estimate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing with the motion judge's statutory interpretation and finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The plaintiff appealed a summary judgment dismissing a certified class action against a vehicle repair franchisor.

The class alleged the franchisor breached the Motor Vehicle Repair Act and Consumer Protection Act by charging estimate fees for an 'Inspection Service' when repairs were authorized.

On appeal, the plaintiff sought to admit fresh evidence of a training manual that contradicted the franchisor's evidence and had not been disclosed during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding the due diligence test less significant when the opposing party failed to disclose it.

The court set aside the summary judgment, concluding the motions judge lacked a full record and a genuine issue for trial existed regarding conspiracy.

The appellant psychiatrist appealed a jury finding of medical malpractice after she changed a patient's status from involuntary to voluntary under the Mental Health Act.

Seven weeks after his release, the patient murdered his sister.

The respondents, the victim's family, successfully sued the psychiatrist for negligence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the honest and intelligent exercise of medical judgment, the reputable body of medical opinion doctrine, and causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions and concluding it was open to the jury to find that the murder would not have occurred but for the patient's release.

The applicant physician sought a stay of a hospital board's decision to revoke his privileges pending an appeal to the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board.

The court held that the Statutory Powers Procedure Act did not apply to automatically stay the decision, as the hospital's by-laws requiring a hearing did not constitute a hearing 'required by law' under the Act.

However, the court granted a common law stay under section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act, finding that the applicant satisfied the RJR-MacDonald test for an interlocutory stay.

The appellants, a professional engineer and his firm, appealed a finding of professional misconduct by the Discipline Committee of the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario.

The finding was based on a highly critical and intemperate letter the appellant wrote to a municipality regarding another engineering firm's proposal.

The Divisional Court upheld the finding of professional misconduct, deferring to the Committee's expertise that the conduct was unprofessional.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the penalty, finding the original sanctions excessive given the appellant's long, unblemished career and the fact that his technical advice was ultimately correct and saved the municipality money.

The penalty was reduced to an oral reprimand and publication.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict dismissing her medical malpractice claims against the respondent doctor, who inadvertently punctured her radial artery while attempting to aspirate a ganglion cyst.

The appellant argued the jury's verdict and nil damages assessment were unreasonable, and that the trial judge misdirected the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury was entitled to reject the appellant's evidence and conclude the doctor met the standard of care for informed consent.

The court also found no reviewable errors in the trial judge's jury charge and held that the standard practice for removing a ganglion cyst is not fraught with obvious risks.

The respondents purchased shares in a company from Mader and subsequently sued Mader and the company's accountants, Peat Marwick Thorne, for misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty regarding the company's financial status.

The trial judge awarded damages against all defendants.

The accountants appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in finding a fiduciary relationship and that the purchasers did not rely on the accountants' financial statements, having preferred to rely on Mader's assurances.