David G. Stinson

The applicant sought an interlocutory mandatory injunction to lift a Site Alteration Order issued by the respondent, which prohibited the importation of 500,000 m³ of fill for a proposed berm on its property.

The applicant argued the berm constituted landscaping and fell under an exception to the respondent's Fill Control By-law.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the applicant failed to meet the higher standard for a mandatory injunction, did not demonstrate irreparable harm (as it was the author of its own misfortune by proceeding without legal certainty), and the balance of convenience favoured the respondent due to potential environmental damage and remediation costs.

The applicant's undertaking as to damages was also deemed inadequate.

These supplementary reasons for judgment address Maryat Investments Inc.'s cross-claim against Mushtaq Raja for indemnity concerning Arif Hayat's claim.

The court found that the representations, warranties, and indemnity provided by Raja were personal obligations to the purchaser of Maryat's shares, PB 10 Investments Ltd., and not to Maryat itself.

As PB 10 was not a party to the litigation, these obligations could not be enforced in the current proceeding.

Consequently, the cross-claim for indemnity was dismissed.

The defendant, the Attorney General of Ontario, brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action on the ground that it was barred by a limitation period.

The plaintiffs, police officers, alleged negligence and misfeasance in public office by Crown counsel.

The court, applying the principles from Beardsley v. Ontario Provincial Police, found that the limitation period issue involved legal and factual complexities, including the discoverability of a potentially novel claim, and therefore should not be determined at a preliminary stage before pleadings were closed.

The preliminary question was decided in favour of the plaintiffs, and the motion to dismiss on this ground was denied.

This appeal concerns an arbitrator's decision regarding sanctions for an insurer's improper deflection of a statutory accident benefits (SABs) claim and failure to provide timely notice of dispute.

The Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund (MVACF) appealed the arbitrator's decision to impose only costs sanctions on TD Insurance, arguing that TD should be permanently liable for the SABs due to its conduct.

The court upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding it reasonable and within jurisdiction, as existing appellate authority supports that a breach of the "Disputes Between Insurers" regulation does not automatically result in permanent liability, especially when another insurer initiated the dispute process within the required timeframe.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a successful partial summary judgment motion brought by the Tassones against Hampton Securities Limited.

The Tassones had successfully dismissed Hampton's claims for over $600,000 in trading losses and relief under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

The court found the Tassones were entirely successful on the principal claims and awarded them partial indemnity costs, rejecting Hampton's arguments for divided success or disentitlement due to unproven allegations.

The quantum of costs, fixed at $48,500.54, was deemed fair and reasonable, considering the importance of the issues and the comparable legal expenses incurred by both parties.

The plaintiffs, DK Manufacturing Group Ltd. and S.G. Investments Group Ltd., sought insurance proceeds and damages for bad faith from Co-operators General Insurance Company following a fire and water damage incident.

Co-operators brought a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that the claims for insurance monies were resolved by a binding appraisal process and that a one-year contractual limitation period barred other claims.

The court found that Form AB, containing contractual statutory conditions including a one-year limitation period and appraisal process, applied to both policies.

The appraisal awards were binding, dismissing claims for further insurance monies.

However, the one-year contractual limitation period did not apply to the extra-contractual bad faith claims, which are governed by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs sued the Town of Orangeville for breach of contract related to a biosolids disposal tender and an agreement of purchase and sale for a storage facility.

The court found the Town breached "Contract A" by accepting a non-compliant tender bid from a third party (Entec) but dismissed the plaintiffs' claim for lost profits (Contract B) because they failed to prove they would have been awarded the contract.

The court also found the Town validly exercised a termination clause in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, dismissing the plaintiffs' claim for damages related to the property sale.

The Town's counterclaim for the return of the deposit was granted.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking the appointment of the Public Guardian and Trustee as litigation guardian for three defendants (Ruby, Louis, and Sylvia Kakoutis), the return of a $10,000 deposit, and the removal of certain internet postings.

The court ordered defendant Louis Kakoutis to undergo a mental examination under section 105(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, finding that he had put his mental state in issue through his counterclaim.

The court declined to appoint a litigation guardian for Ruby and Sylvia Kakoutis due to a lack of current medical evidence and refused to order the removal of internet postings, citing a lack of jurisdiction in the current proceeding.

The return of the deposit was deferred pending resolution of the litigation guardian issue.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the action, primarily focusing on a defamation claim, due to the plaintiffs' failure to provide the statutory notice required by s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act.

The court dismissed the libel claim of one plaintiff, Nina Willis, finding that compliance with the notice requirement is a condition precedent and its absence constitutes an absolute bar.

However, the motion to dismiss was denied for her remaining claims and all claims of the other plaintiffs, as it was not plain and obvious that these claims, including potential claims akin to the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, could not succeed.

The court also declined to dismiss claims for plaintiffs who had not been properly served with the motion.

The plaintiff purchaser moved for summary judgment seeking return of $1.2 million in deposits paid under an aborted real estate transaction, while the defendant vendor cross‑moved for summary judgment declaring its entitlement to retain the deposits.

The dispute centred on whether the vendor improperly refused to accept a proposed subordination and standstill agreement relating to secondary financing and thereby prevented closing.

The court held that the agreement of purchase and sale permitted secondary financing only if the secondary lender subordinated its rights to the vendor’s vendor‑take‑back mortgage and related security provisions, including an escrow deed provision and an escalator clause.

The purchaser’s proposed financing arrangements would have impaired those security rights and therefore did not comply with the contract.

The court concluded the purchaser failed to close and the vendor was entitled to retain the deposits.

The self‑represented moving party sought to reopen a 2012 judgment dismissing a dependant’s support claim under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act, relying on Rule 59.06(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and alleging fraud and newly discovered facts.

The court held that all alleged misrepresentations regarding the value of the estate were known to the moving party prior to the original decision and therefore did not constitute newly discovered evidence.

The court emphasized the principle of finality in litigation and found no basis to set aside the prior judgment.

While the court noted potential issues regarding an earlier consent order dismissing related claims, that issue had not been properly brought before the court.

The motion to reopen the trial and set aside the 2012 judgment was refused.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action following termination without cause.

The employer relied on an employment contract purporting to limit termination entitlements to those provided under the Employment Standards Act, 2000 and to exclude any common law damages.

The court held the termination clause was unenforceable because it limited compensation to salary and failed to ensure continuation of benefits during the statutory notice period, contrary to s. 61(1) of the ESA and therefore void under s. 5(1).

As a result, the plaintiff was entitled to pursue common law reasonable notice.

The court determined that prior service with the predecessor company following insolvency and a CCAA restructuring should not be credited for common law notice purposes and awarded eight months’ reasonable notice.

The municipality applied under s. 38 of the Building Code Act, 1992 for orders requiring property owners to permit inspection of a residential addition constructed without a building permit and to provide engineering reports verifying compliance with the Building Code.

The owners argued the City lacked authority to inspect without a warrant and that the requested relief violated their Charter rights.

The court held that s. 38 empowered the court to order compliance with the Act and that inspections were a necessary part of the statutory scheme governing building permits.

The owners could not rely on the dwelling status of the property to resist inspection where the construction had been carried out illegally.

The application was granted and the City was authorized to inspect the property and uncover portions of the construction if necessary.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant held title to a residential property as a bare trustee to enable mortgage financing while the plaintiff maintained beneficial ownership and paid all property expenses.

The defendant denied the existence of a trust and asserted she owned the property and the plaintiff was merely her tenant.

After disputes arose and the defendant initiated Landlord and Tenant Board proceedings, the property was sold under power of sale and repurchased by the plaintiff, resulting in alleged lost equity.

The court conducted a mini‑trial to resolve credibility issues and accepted the plaintiff’s evidence that the defendant held title in trust and repudiated the trust arrangement.

The court also found that the defendant had received and failed to repay two loans advanced in 2008 and 2009.

A third party brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a third party claim arising from a multi-vehicle collision on the Gardiner Expressway.

The moving party relied primarily on an affidavit sworn by counsel that included excerpts from police reports and discovery transcripts, including the moving party’s own discovery evidence.

The court held that such evidence was largely inadmissible under the Rules of Civil Procedure and noted the absence of direct affidavit evidence from the moving party with personal knowledge of the events.

Given conflicting evidence about whether the third party caused the defendant to swerve and lose control, the court concluded that there was a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The motion for summary judgment was therefore dismissed and costs were awarded against the moving party.

Following a successful appeal from a Master's order dismissing a motion to remove opposing counsel for conflict of interest, the court determined the appropriate costs disposition.

The defendant/appellant sought costs for both the motion before the Master and the appeal.

The court held it had authority to address costs at both stages.

While the quantum of the Master’s $3,000 costs award was maintained, the court ordered those costs payable forthwith rather than in the cause.

Additional partial indemnity costs of $4,250 were awarded for the appeal.

Parents sought a declaration that their homeowner’s insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify them in an action alleging they negligently failed to prevent or address bullying committed by their minor child.

The insurer denied coverage relying on policy exclusions for intentional acts and for failure to prevent abuse or harassment.

The court held that the negligence claims against the parents were distinct from the intentional tort allegations against the child and were not merely derivative.

Applying principles governing duty to defend and interpreting exclusion clauses narrowly, the court found the policy language did not clearly exclude negligent failure to prevent harassment.

The insurer was therefore obligated to defend and indemnify the parents.

The defendants brought a motion seeking to disqualify the plaintiff’s counsel on the basis that counsel had allegedly created a lawyer‑client relationship with a self‑represented defendant during settlement communications and obtained confidential information.

The court reviewed a series of emails and a telephone discussion initiated by the defendant proposing settlement and requesting assurances that the discussion would be “without prejudice” and off the record.

The court held that no solicitor‑client relationship or analogous relationship arose because the defendant knew counsel represented the opposing party and voluntarily initiated the communications.

The court further found that no confidential information was imparted and rejected allegations that counsel attempted to coach or solicit false evidence.

The motion was dismissed and the defendants were ordered to pay substantial indemnity costs.

A self‑represented party brought a motion opposing confirmation of interim and final reports prepared by a court‑appointed receiver in a partnership dissolution proceeding and sought leave to commence legal proceedings against the receiver and its president.

The court found the moving party had possessed copies of the receiver’s reports for at least five years before bringing the motion.

Any potential claim against the receiver was therefore barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court also held that the equitable doctrine of laches applied given the extensive delay and prejudice to the respondents.

The motion was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondents.

An organization operating treatment and support centres for children sought a declaration that two properties were exempt from municipal property taxation under s. 3(1)6.1 of the Assessment Act.

The respondents argued that the exemption applied only to facilities formally designated by the Ministry of Community and Social Services as “Children’s Treatment Centers.” The court held that the legislation contained no definition requiring such designation and that the ordinary meaning of a children’s treatment centre governed.

Based on the evidence that the facilities primarily provided treatment to children and received provincial funding, the properties qualified for the exemption.

A declaration of tax exemption was granted.