Ray Thapar

The plaintiff, Valentina Avdeeva, sought substantial indemnity costs against the Estate of Mr. Levon Haftan and personal costs against the Estate Trustee, Caroline Khousehabeh, following a judgment declaring Avdeeva the sole owner of a property.

The court awarded Avdeeva costs on a substantial indemnity basis against the Estate, reduced by 30% for partial success on other claims, totaling $135,242.58.

The court also found the Trustee personally liable for a portion of these costs incurred after she obtained the Order to Continue, due to her reprehensible conduct and pursuit of litigation for personal benefit without estate assets.

The plaintiff brought an action against the estate of a deceased family friend, claiming sole beneficial ownership of two properties and seeking repayment of loans evidenced by promissory notes.

The estate claimed a 50% interest in one of the properties, Bowan Court, arguing it was intended as a matrimonial home for the deceased and the plaintiff's daughter.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claims regarding the first property and the loans due to pleading deficiencies and lack of corroboration.

However, the court granted the plaintiff's claim for sole ownership of Bowan Court, finding no evidence of a common intention or unjust enrichment to support the estate's trust claims, and ordered the deceased's 1% interest removed from title.

This decision addresses several evidentiary issues that arose during a trial concerning claims of property conversion and trust.

The plaintiff, Valentina Avdeeva, alleges that Levon Khankaldiyan (whose estate is represented by the defendant, Caroline Khoushabeh) converted one property and held another in trust.

The court ruled on the admissibility of newly discovered documents, the personal testimony of the estate trustee (Caroline Khoushabeh), and the evidence of a third-party witness regarding a romantic relationship.

The court admitted new documents under Rule 53.08, finding no undue prejudice.

It largely excluded Caroline Khoushabeh's hearsay evidence due to lack of necessity and reliability, emphasizing the principle against trial by ambush, but allowed her non-hearsay observations.

The court also admitted the evidence of Edward Hambrachian, finding it consistent with disclosure rules despite initial objections, and deferred a decision on the application of the rule in Browne v. Dunn to Levon's discovery evidence, requesting further submissions.

The plaintiff brought a motion to adjourn an 8-day trial scheduled to commence shortly, arguing that the defendant's late disclosure of 147 new documents, including bank statements and documents of disputed authenticity, and a new witness statement, necessitated additional time for review, examination of the affiant, and further inquiries.

The defendant opposed the adjournment, citing the estate trustee's lack of information regarding the new documents and alleging the plaintiff's history of delaying the action.

The court granted a three-week adjournment, finding that the late disclosure was problematic and that the plaintiff deserved the opportunity to properly prepare for trial, prioritizing a fair trial on the merits despite the case's long history.

The plaintiff, Surinder Singh Manchanda, sought leave under Rule 1.08(5) to give evidence and participate in the trial by videoconference from Thailand, due to repeated refusals of his Temporary Resident Visa applications.

The defendants opposed the request.

The court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiff had not demonstrated all reasonable efforts to secure personal attendance, citing his failure to truthfully answer visa application questions and not pursuing judicial review.

Leave was granted to bring the motion again before the trial judge.

This decision addresses two motions: one by defendant Martini to compel the examination of Gheorghe Leferman (sole officer/director of the plaintiff, Romcan Limited) as a witness under Rule 39.03 for a pending motion for a further and better affidavit of documents, and another by defendant Shulgan to compel Mr. Leferman's examination for discovery.

The court granted Martini's Rule 39.03 motion, limiting the scope of examination to specific areas where Mr. Leferman had improperly introduced hearsay evidence, and deemed requests for personal documents premature.

Shulgan's motion for examination for discovery was also granted, finding that he had met the preconditions and the benefits of early discovery outweighed the burden of a second examination for Mr. Leferman.

Martini's motion for a further and better affidavit of documents was adjourned.

Costs were divided for Martini's motion due to mixed success, while Shulgan was awarded $5,000 for his entirely successful motion.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a registrar's order dismissing the action for delay.

The court found that the plaintiff provided a reasonable explanation for the delay, noting that the defendants' failure to advance their third-party claim contributed to the delay in scheduling mediation.

The court also found that the defendants suffered no actual prejudice from the delay, as the intervening bankruptcy of some defendants was unrelated to the litigation timeline.

The motion was granted and the dismissal order was set aside, with no order as to costs.

The estate of a deceased lawyer appealed a trial judge's damages assessment in an undefended trial arising from breaches of fiduciary duty by former employees.

The defendants had wrongfully removed and transferred 120 client files to a competing law firm.

The trial judge awarded $344,513.87 in general damages plus $145,662.19 in prejudgment interest but declined to award punitive damages.

The appellate court found three errors: (1) improper double-counting of overhead expenses in calculating general damages; (2) failure to award punitive damages despite egregious misconduct; and (3) undercompensation of special damages for disbursements.

The appeal was allowed in part, increasing the total award to $627,678.09 plus prejudgment interest.

The plaintiff, FLS Transportation Services Inc., sought an interim injunction against former employees and their new employer, Charger Logistics Inc., to restrain them from working for a competitor, soliciting clients and employees, and misusing confidential information.

The court applied the three-part test for an interlocutory injunction (serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, balance of convenience) and also considered the "clean hands" doctrine.

The court found that FLS failed to establish a strong prima facie case for breach of restrictive covenants, breach of confidence, or fiduciary duty, largely due to FLS's own prior statements in other proceedings that the information was not confidential.

Furthermore, FLS failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience favoured the defendants.

The motion was dismissed, also noting that FLS's conduct in misrepresenting the court's order to a client constituted a failure to come to court with "clean hands."

The plaintiff, Mohanjit Singh Jassal, sued the defendants, Pawan Kaith, Bibi Kaith, and Kundan Kaith, for specific performance or damages arising from an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) for a residential property.

The plaintiff alleged the APS was binding and never rescinded, while the defendants claimed it was orally rescinded shortly after signing due to a change in family circumstances.

The court found the plaintiff's testimony unreliable and concluded that the parties had mutually agreed to rescind the APS.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

The court also determined, in obiter, that even if the APS had not been rescinded, specific performance would not have been granted as the property was not unique, and only nominal damages would have been awarded due to the availability of similar properties.

Members of a religious corporation brought motions relating to governance disputes within the corporation.

The court considered applications to intervene, the validity of a consent order appointing corporate directors following a mediation process before another judge, alleged breaches of that order, and related procedural matters.

The respondents argued that the consent order appointing directors should be set aside on grounds including lack of a condition precedent and alleged illegality under the Corporations Act.

The court rejected those arguments, holding that the consent order was valid and final, having been agreed to by all parties through counsel and approved through the agreed process.

Injunctive relief was granted restraining certain respondents from interfering with the corporation’s governance and requiring the turnover of corporate property and documents.

Following dismissal of a motion seeking to remove the plaintiffs’ solicitors of record, the court addressed costs.

Applying the discretion under s.131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court considered proportionality and the surrounding circumstances.

Although the plaintiffs were the successful party, the motion had been dismissed without prejudice and the defendant’s timing argument was not improper or vexatious.

Relying on the fairness principles articulated in appellate authority, the court fixed costs at a reasonable amount rather than the full costs incurred.

Following a motion decision, the court addressed correspondence from counsel regarding the description of a costs request and the resulting costs award.

The moving defendants argued that the court had misstated their requested costs by referencing an amount calculated on an actual-rate basis rather than the lower partial indemnity amount.

The court reviewed the cost outlines and confirmed that the figure referenced in the earlier endorsement was used only as a convenient measure for reducing the successful party’s requested costs due to deficiencies in the statement of claim.

Exercising discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court declined to vary the previously fixed costs award.

Following a partially argued motion involving consolidation with a Small Claims Court action, a stay of the Small Claims proceeding, or alternatively striking portions of a counterclaim, the parties settled the motion except for the issue of costs.

The court considered written submissions and the discretionary authority over costs under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Given that the motion resolved by settlement and considering the settlement terms, the court held that it was in the interests of justice for each party to bear its own costs.

No costs were awarded.

The defendant franchisor brought a motion to remove the plaintiffs’ solicitors of record on the basis that the firm had previously represented the plaintiffs in negotiating the franchise agreement and would likely be a necessary witness at trial.

The plaintiffs argued the motion was premature because documentary discovery and examinations for discovery had not yet occurred and it had not been established that counsel would be a material witness.

The court held that removing counsel of choice at a pre‑trial stage should occur only in the clearest of cases.

Given the early stage of the litigation and the possibility that discovery might eliminate the need to call counsel as a witness, the court concluded that the motion was premature.

The defendants moved to vacate a Certificate of Pending Litigation obtained ex parte against a Mississauga property.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure by omitting information suggesting he knew the overseas land transaction involved a leasehold interest with a much lower purchase price.

Nevertheless, the court concluded the plaintiff had a sufficient interest arising from funds advanced to the defendant and concerns about the timing and consideration of the property transfer to family members.

The CPL was vacated due to the disclosure failure, but the court exercised its discretion under the Courts of Justice Act to require substantial security to protect the plaintiff’s potential claim.

The realtor defendants brought a motion to dismiss or stay the action as an abuse of process, arguing that all parties had operated under the mistaken belief that the claim against them had been struck following a consent order requiring delivery of an affidavit of documents.

In fact, no formal order dismissing the action had ever been obtained.

The moving parties argued that principles of finality and fairness required that the action be treated as if it had been dismissed and that the delay in pursuing the claim against them justified termination of the proceeding.

The court held that the finality principle applies only where a final order exists and that prejudice cannot be presumed where the action remains valid and subsisting.

Balancing fairness and the absence of demonstrated prejudice, the court permitted the action to continue against the realtor defendants.

Following an earlier ruling declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant, multiple applicants sought costs of the proceeding.

The court found that the respondent’s conduct throughout the litigation, including unsupported allegations of misconduct, disregard of procedural orders, and repeated technical objections, justified an award of substantial indemnity costs.

The court reviewed each applicant’s bill of costs and assessed overall reasonableness, reducing or excluding amounts relating to deferred motions for security for costs and instances of over‑lawyering.

Several cost awards were fixed globally rather than assessed strictly by docketed hours.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to multiple applicant groups in varying amounts.

The applicants, comprising 27 parties adverse to the respondent in 14 different actions, brought an application to declare the respondent a vexatious litigant under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent had a history of commencing multiple actions against his former lawyers and others, alleging widespread conspiracies and fraud after losing previous litigation.

The court found that the respondent persistently instituted vexatious proceedings without reasonable grounds, sought to relitigate previously decided issues, and failed to pay outstanding costs orders.

The court granted the application, prohibiting the respondent and his corporations from instituting or continuing any proceedings without prior leave of the court.