Ray Thapar

Following a motion decision, the court addressed correspondence from counsel regarding the description of a costs request and the resulting costs award.

The moving defendants argued that the court had misstated their requested costs by referencing an amount calculated on an actual-rate basis rather than the lower partial indemnity amount.

The court reviewed the cost outlines and confirmed that the figure referenced in the earlier endorsement was used only as a convenient measure for reducing the successful party’s requested costs due to deficiencies in the statement of claim.

Exercising discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court declined to vary the previously fixed costs award.

Following a partially argued motion involving consolidation with a Small Claims Court action, a stay of the Small Claims proceeding, or alternatively striking portions of a counterclaim, the parties settled the motion except for the issue of costs.

The court considered written submissions and the discretionary authority over costs under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Given that the motion resolved by settlement and considering the settlement terms, the court held that it was in the interests of justice for each party to bear its own costs.

No costs were awarded.

The defendant franchisor brought a motion to remove the plaintiffs’ solicitors of record on the basis that the firm had previously represented the plaintiffs in negotiating the franchise agreement and would likely be a necessary witness at trial.

The plaintiffs argued the motion was premature because documentary discovery and examinations for discovery had not yet occurred and it had not been established that counsel would be a material witness.

The court held that removing counsel of choice at a pre‑trial stage should occur only in the clearest of cases.

Given the early stage of the litigation and the possibility that discovery might eliminate the need to call counsel as a witness, the court concluded that the motion was premature.

The defendants moved to vacate a Certificate of Pending Litigation obtained ex parte against a Mississauga property.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure by omitting information suggesting he knew the overseas land transaction involved a leasehold interest with a much lower purchase price.

Nevertheless, the court concluded the plaintiff had a sufficient interest arising from funds advanced to the defendant and concerns about the timing and consideration of the property transfer to family members.

The CPL was vacated due to the disclosure failure, but the court exercised its discretion under the Courts of Justice Act to require substantial security to protect the plaintiff’s potential claim.

The appellants appealed an order declaring them vexatious litigants, arguing procedural irregularities in the application process.

The appellants contended that opposing counsel lacked authority to act for all applicants, the application judge lacked authority to hear the matter, the affidavit evidence was inadmissible, and the reasons were inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit to any of the procedural complaints and upholding the vexatious litigant order.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the respondents due to the appellants' persistent groundless allegations.

The realtor defendants brought a motion to dismiss or stay the action as an abuse of process, arguing that all parties had operated under the mistaken belief that the claim against them had been struck following a consent order requiring delivery of an affidavit of documents.

In fact, no formal order dismissing the action had ever been obtained.

The moving parties argued that principles of finality and fairness required that the action be treated as if it had been dismissed and that the delay in pursuing the claim against them justified termination of the proceeding.

The court held that the finality principle applies only where a final order exists and that prejudice cannot be presumed where the action remains valid and subsisting.

Balancing fairness and the absence of demonstrated prejudice, the court permitted the action to continue against the realtor defendants.

Following an earlier ruling declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant, multiple applicants sought costs of the proceeding.

The court found that the respondent’s conduct throughout the litigation, including unsupported allegations of misconduct, disregard of procedural orders, and repeated technical objections, justified an award of substantial indemnity costs.

The court reviewed each applicant’s bill of costs and assessed overall reasonableness, reducing or excluding amounts relating to deferred motions for security for costs and instances of over‑lawyering.

Several cost awards were fixed globally rather than assessed strictly by docketed hours.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to multiple applicant groups in varying amounts.

The applicants, comprising 27 parties adverse to the respondent in 14 different actions, brought an application to declare the respondent a vexatious litigant under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent had a history of commencing multiple actions against his former lawyers and others, alleging widespread conspiracies and fraud after losing previous litigation.

The court found that the respondent persistently instituted vexatious proceedings without reasonable grounds, sought to relitigate previously decided issues, and failed to pay outstanding costs orders.

The court granted the application, prohibiting the respondent and his corporations from instituting or continuing any proceedings without prior leave of the court.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing his motion to strike the statement of defence of the defendant corporation.

The plaintiff argued that because the corporation was dissolved, it was a non-entity and could not file a defence.

The Divisional Court agreed with the motion judge that it is implicit in the Business Corporations Act that a dissolved corporation permitted to be sued must also be permitted to defend itself.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed, with the court also noting the motion was moot as the corporation had since been revived.

The appellant appealed a judgment recognizing and enforcing a United States District Court judgment against him as guarantor.

The sole ground of appeal was that the motion judge erred in refusing to grant a stay of enforcement in Ontario pending the final decision of a New Jersey Bankruptcy Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the appellant had acknowledged owing millions of dollars, the US judgment was final, and the appellant had lost at every juncture in the collateral bankruptcy proceedings, including being refused a stay pending appeal in that court.