Brian Nathan Radnoff

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment ordering the return of a $250,000 deposit on a failed commercial lease for a sports dome facility.

The respondents had terminated the lease because the facility was not completed by the required date and lacked heat, water, and fire safety access.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation of the termination clause, finding no ambiguity that would require a trial.

The Court also affirmed that partial summary judgment was appropriate under Rule 20 to resolve the discrete issue of the deposit return, even if it effectively determined liability for the main action and counterclaim.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an interlocutory injunction that prevented them from directly soliciting the responding party's customers after their business relationship deteriorated over allegations of contaminated products.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's application of the RJR Macdonald test for an injunction, including the findings of a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm to the responding party's business relationships, and the balance of convenience favouring the responding party.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside default judgments for $3.2 million obtained by the respondent.

The default judgments arose from a claim for indebtedness related to purchases in brokerage accounts and allegations of an unlawful stock manipulation scheme.

The appellants also brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge properly applied the three-part test for setting aside a default judgment and that the appellants failed to adequately explain their delay or raise a triable defence.

The motion to introduce fresh evidence was also dismissed as it did not meet the Palmer test.

The appellant, Jazz Air LP, appealed a costs award of $160,000 on a substantial indemnity basis following the dismissal of its motion for an interlocutory injunction against the respondents.

The appellant argued the amount was excessive for a one-day motion and that substantial indemnity was unwarranted.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge did not err in principle given the unsubstantiated allegations of conspiracy, the tactical timing of the motion, and the reasonable expectation that the respondents would spare no expense to defend against an injunction that would have catastrophic consequences for their business.

The appellant sued the corporate and personal defendants for the price of products supplied under an oral distribution agreement.

The personal defendants successfully moved for summary judgment dismissing the claim against them personally.

On appeal, the majority of the Court of Appeal held that the motion judge failed to consider the admissions and positions taken by the personal defendants in their statement of defence and counterclaim, which raised a genuine issue for trial regarding their personal liability.

The appeal was allowed and the summary judgment was set aside.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal a costs order of $160,000 on a substantial indemnity scale following the dismissal of its injunction motion.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision to award substantial indemnity costs without clear findings of reprehensible conduct, and questioning the overall reasonableness of the quantum awarded for 500 hours of preparation over four days.