Brian Nathan Radnoff

The court imposed sentence following a second finding of civil contempt for breach of a prior sentencing order that required the contemnor to remain within Ontario.

Despite a stay expiring and an obligation to return to Canada, the contemnor chose to remain in Europe to complete a vacation, making only minimal efforts to alter travel arrangements.

The court found significant aggravating factors, including the repeat contempt and a demonstrated disregard for court authority, while identifying minimal mitigation.

Emphasizing denunciation and specific deterrence, the court imposed a seven‑month conditional sentence and extended probation with strict travel restrictions and community service.

The plaintiff brought a second contempt proceeding against the defendant for breaching the terms of a prior sentencing order arising from an earlier finding of contempt for violating a permanent injunction in a libel action.

The sentencing order required the defendant to remain in Ontario during the currency of a conditional sentence once the stay pending appeal expired.

The defendant remained in Europe beyond the date he was required to return, arguing that he attempted to change flights and believed reasonable efforts to comply were sufficient.

The court held that civil contempt requires knowledge of the order and intentional commission of the prohibited act, regardless of intent to defy the court.

Finding that the defendant knowingly and wilfully failed to return to Ontario despite having reasonable opportunities to do so, the court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in contempt.

Following a civil contempt conviction and the imposition of a conditional sentence of imprisonment with probation, the court addressed allegations that the contemnor had breached the conditional sentence order.

The court considered the appropriate procedure for dealing with alleged breaches of conditional sentences imposed for civil contempt.

It held that a breach constitutes a fresh contempt that may be pursued through a motion supported by evidence under Rule 60.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

While the Criminal Code conditional sentence breach framework may provide guidance for available remedies, the court held that the breach must still be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in civil contempt proceedings.

The court outlined procedural options, including a fresh contempt motion or investigation by the conditional sentence supervisor.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's finding of contempt and the determination of a fit sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decisions, noting the reasons were clear and correct.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granting specific performance of an easement agreement in favour of the respondent.

The parties had signed an 'Easement Summary' to provide road access to the respondent's water-access-only property, but the appellant later refused to finalize the formal easement, demanding additional consideration including a severed lot.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the Easement Summary was a binding preliminary agreement containing all essential terms, that there was no genuine issue for trial, and that specific performance was the appropriate remedy.

The appeal and the motion for leave to appeal costs were dismissed.

Supplementary endorsement addressing unresolved questions arising from a refusals and undertakings motion following examinations for discovery in a civil action.

The court clarified and completed earlier rulings by issuing directions regarding specific questions and document production obligations.

The respondent was ordered to provide various financial records, identification details, correspondence with third parties, and explanations of efforts to obtain certain documents within specified timelines.

Some requests were declined.

The endorsement also confirmed that any ordered production of correspondence excludes solicitor‑client privileged material.

Following a jury verdict awarding damages for defamation, the judgment creditor examined the debtor in aid of execution and brought a motion to compel answers to refusals and undertakings concerning the debtor’s financial affairs.

Many questions sought information relating to the bank accounts and financial affairs of the debtor’s companion, a non‑party.

The court held that absent evidence of fraudulent conveyance or authority over the non‑party’s accounts, it would be inappropriate to compel production of her financial information.

However, the debtor was required to disclose information directly within his knowledge or control, including particulars of transfers of funds, credit card information in his name, client identities relevant to potential income, and details of his travel.

The motion was granted in part and dismissed in part, with compliance required within sixty days.

The plaintiff successfully sued the defendant for defamation and obtained an injunction prohibiting the defendant from communicating about him.

The defendant breached the injunction by communicating with a Member of Parliament, claiming it was an act of conscience, and was found in civil contempt.

The court sentenced the defendant to a 90-day conditional sentence with house arrest, followed by 18 months' probation and 200 hours of community service, finding that jail was not necessary.

The defendant was also ordered to pay substantial indemnity costs of $24,377.41.

The appellants appealed an order that included a final declaration regarding the applicability of the Repair and Storage Liens Act, which was made during an interlocutory motion.

The Court of Appeal found that the declaration was not intended to be a final determination and deprived the appellants of a substantive defence at a preliminary stage.

Despite procedural errors by the appellants, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the declaration in the interest of justice, but awarded costs of the appeal to the respondent.

The defendant moved for security for costs against the plaintiff based on outstanding cost awards and an allegation that the action was frivolous and vexatious.

The plaintiff alleged a beneficial ownership interest in family lands and resisted the motion by asserting impecuniosity and that the claim was not plainly devoid of merit.

The court held that while unpaid cost awards satisfied the threshold under Rule 56.01(1)(c), the plaintiff established genuine impecuniosity and the claim met the low threshold of not being plainly devoid of merit.

Accordingly, ordering security would unjustly terminate a potentially meritorious claim.

The court also addressed costs following the discontinuance of a corporate co‑plaintiff and awarded costs of the action and motion against that entity.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking orders that her former solicitors personally repay legal fees and indemnify her for costs incurred following the dismissal of her action for delay.

The lawyers admitted responsibility for significant delays that contributed to the dismissal.

The court considered the principles governing personal costs orders against lawyers, emphasizing that such orders must be made sparingly and only in clear cases.

Given the clear admissions of delay and the direct connection between that delay and the costs consequences faced by the plaintiff, the court exercised its discretion to require the lawyers to pay the defendants’ costs of the dismissed action and to reimburse the plaintiff for certain costs awards.

The court declined to order repayment of legal fees, leaving issues of negligence and causation to be determined in a separate solicitor’s negligence action.

The appellant tenant appealed a summary judgment decision that found it had not validly exercised its lease renewal option.

The motion judge concluded that the parties' conduct did not amount to a waiver of the notice requirement and that post-deadline negotiations were for a new lease, not a renewal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding the record supported the motion judge's conclusions and that the landlord did not act in bad faith by considering other tenant options.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking a finding of contempt against the defendants and a non-party corporation for allegedly failing to comply with prior court orders requiring the delivery of aircraft engine logbooks.

The moving party argued the materials had been removed or withheld in breach of orders compelling their production.

The court held that contempt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and found the evidence against the non-party was entirely circumstantial with no plausible motive established.

While the evidence suggested it was possible the individual defendant removed the logbooks, the court concluded the record did not establish the allegation beyond a reasonable doubt due to alternative explanations and lack of direct evidence.

The contempt motion was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that despite not having the benefit of the Combined Air decision, the motion judge developed a full appreciation of the case.

The motion judge was entitled to engage in a limited weighing of the evidence and correctly concluded there was no evidence of over service of alcohol by the respondent.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff moved for leave to amend the statement of claim under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court reaffirmed that leave to amend should generally be granted unless non-compensable prejudice would result, but amendments may be refused where they constitute an abuse of process or fail to plead necessary material facts.

Several proposed amendments were denied because they asserted negligence, breach of trust, fiduciary duty, and duty of care without pleading the material facts required under Rule 25.06(2).

One proposed amendment was also rejected as inconsistent with the plaintiff’s own discovery evidence.

Limited amendments were permitted, portions of an affidavit disclosing mediation communications were struck, and the defendants were awarded costs.

The moving defendant sought to set aside a previously granted Mareva injunction obtained without notice, alleging inadequate evidence, hearsay, and failure by the plaintiffs to make full and frank disclosure.

The court examined alleged deficiencies including the presentation of SMS message data, inaccuracies in affidavit evidence, and hearsay regarding customer orders.

While the court acknowledged certain imperfections and minor inaccuracies in the evidence, it concluded that the original motion judge had sufficient admissible evidence to justify the injunction.

The court held that minor imperfections or omissions in ex parte proceedings do not automatically invalidate relief where the overall evidentiary foundation remains adequate.

The Mareva order was therefore maintained, subject to a minor agreed amendment.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment regarding monies owing on a second mortgage, arguing the motion judge erred in her treatment of the burden of proof, the interests of justice under Rule 20.04(2.1), and the finding of no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds, finding the evidence insufficient to establish an agreement terminating liability upon giving up possession of the house.

The court also dismissed an application to introduce fresh evidence under the Palmer test.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part, reducing the judgment by $6,705.58 due to a lack of evidence supporting awards for service of notices of sale and additional legal fees.

Following an appeal, cross-appeal, and fresh evidence motion where the respondents were successful, the parties made submissions on costs.

The respondents claimed over $98,000 in total on a partial indemnity scale, while the appellants argued no costs should be awarded or, alternatively, a significantly reduced amount.

Applying the Boucher principles, the Court of Appeal fixed costs at $30,000 for the Receiver and $7,500 for the trust company, noting the appellants' alternative of not suing and the trust company's minor role in the appeal.

The appellant appealed an order finding its bid in a receivership sale process to be invalid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the agreed process required parties to submit their final and best offer by a specified date and that the bids were to remain confidential.

As such, an auction was not contemplated, and the appellant's bid was properly ruled invalid.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order approving a court-appointed receiver's recommendation to sell a contaminated property to the polluter and settle related damage claims.

The appellants argued the property and claims were undervalued and sought to introduce fresh evidence alleging the motion judge was pressured into releasing his decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the receiver acted providentially and the settlement was commercially reasonable.

The Court allowed the receiver's cross-appeal, setting aside the motion judge's order granting the appellants leave to sue the receiver, as the motion judge applied the wrong legal test.