M.L. Biggar

A judgment creditor brought a motion to appoint a receiver in aid of execution after the debtor transferred assets to his spouse and related corporation and made an assignment in bankruptcy.

The debtor sought to discharge a certificate of pending litigation registered against the matrimonial home to facilitate refinancing intended to satisfy the judgment.

The court held that the debtor’s conduct, including fraudulent conveyances and repeated attempts to hinder collection, created special circumstances rendering ordinary execution methods ineffective.

The appointment of a receiver was found just and convenient under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The request to discharge the certificate of pending litigation was denied as premature pending agreement or determination of the full amount owed.

Following success on a summary judgment motion in a fraudulent conveyance action, the self-represented plaintiff sought costs for the litigation.

The court reviewed principles governing costs awards to self-represented litigants, noting that such parties are not compensated as though they retained counsel but may recover a reasonable allowance for proven loss of opportunity cost.

Evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff’s professional income declined due to time spent conducting the litigation.

Applying fairness and proportionality principles, the court awarded a reduced allowance for the plaintiff’s time plus supported disbursements.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to void two transfers made by her former business partner to his wife and his wife's company.

The defendant had misappropriated funds from their ATM business and subsequently transferred his interest in the family residence and the business.

The court found that the transfers exhibited several badges of fraud and were made with the intent to defeat creditors, even though the plaintiff was not a creditor at the time of the first transfer.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the transfers were declared void.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment after goods worth $263,520.00 were stolen while in the defendant carrier’s possession during transport from Toronto to Calgary.

The central dispute was whether the value of the consignment had been declared on the face of the contract of carriage so as to avoid the regulatory limitation of liability.

Applying the summary judgment framework, the court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and concluded that the contract of carriage was not limited to the bill of lading, but also included oral representations and the invoice referenced on the signed bill of lading.

Because the invoice showing the full value formed part of the contract of carriage and was referenced on its face, the plaintiff was entitled to judgment for the full value, less any amount already paid, with interest.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's finding of contempt and the determination of a fit sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decisions, noting the reasons were clear and correct.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) that upheld the Investment Dealers Association of Canada's (IDA) disciplinary actions against them.

The IDA had fined the appellants and terminated their membership for failing to provide documents during an investigation into alleged principal trading in an error account.

The appellants argued the IDA lacked jurisdiction, its by-laws violated the Charter, and the investigation was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the appeal, finding the IDA is not a government entity subject to the Charter, its investigative powers are valid under the regulatory scheme, and its disciplinary process and penalties were reasonable.

The appellant mortgage broker appealed the trial judge's dismissal of its action against the respondents for unpaid commissions.

The appellant argued the respondents should be liable for breach of contract, oppression, or as principals by piercing the corporate veil.

The respondents cross-appealed the trial judge's refusal to award them costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to pierce the corporate veil or find oppression in what was an ordinary breach of contract by the corporate defendant.

The cross-appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge's decision to deprive the successful respondents of costs due to their borderline dishonest conduct was justified.