Frederick J. Skeggs

The appellants appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision finding that their long-term cabin leases were exempt from the Residential Tenancies Act under the seasonal or temporary accommodation exemption.

The Divisional Court found the Board's decision unreasonable, as the cabins were permanent structures subject to 20-year leases and were used as secondary homes, not temporary vacation accommodations.

The court declared that the Act applies to the leases and that the appellants reside in a land lease community.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granting specific performance of an easement agreement in favour of the respondent.

The parties had signed an 'Easement Summary' to provide road access to the respondent's water-access-only property, but the appellant later refused to finalize the formal easement, demanding additional consideration including a severed lot.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the Easement Summary was a binding preliminary agreement containing all essential terms, that there was no genuine issue for trial, and that specific performance was the appropriate remedy.

The appeal and the motion for leave to appeal costs were dismissed.

The plaintiff brought an action seeking an order vesting title to a portion of his parents' property, which he had used to operate a scrap yard business with his late father.

He claimed his parents had promised him the land and sought a constructive trust based on the principles in Soulos v. Korkontzilas.

The court dismissed the claim, finding insufficient evidence of a clear promise and concluding that the family's mutual assistance did not give rise to unjust enrichment, wrongful conduct, or an equitable obligation that would justify imposing a constructive trust.

Following summary judgment in a dispute over an easement and related counterclaim, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiff had been entirely successful in obtaining a declaration of a binding easement agreement, a vesting order, leave to amend its claim, and dismissal of the defendant’s counterclaim seeking transfer of land or damages.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs on the basis that the defendant’s conduct was reprehensible.

While the court found the defendant’s conduct deserving of criticism, it concluded the threshold for substantial indemnity costs was not met.

Costs were therefore awarded on a partial indemnity basis, with additional substantial indemnity costs for costs thrown away due to an adjournment requested by the defendant.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking declarations and specific performance relating to an easement agreement over the defendant’s lands.

After reasons were released, the parties were unable to settle the order because the reasons did not explicitly address the plaintiff’s request to amend the statement of claim.

The court held it retained jurisdiction to clarify or amend its reasons before judgment was entered, including under Rule 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court concluded that the earlier reasons implicitly granted the requested amendments and that no prejudice or limitation issue arose from the amendments.

An addendum was issued confirming that the amendments to the pleadings were granted.

The applicant sought summary judgment declaring that a written “Easement Summary” constituted a binding agreement requiring the respondent to grant an access easement over neighbouring lands.

The dispute arose from negotiations concerning road access to landlocked lakeside properties and a related understanding that the applicant would attempt to obtain severance of a waterfront lot for the respondent.

The court held that both the easement summary and severance summary were binding preliminary agreements, but that the severance agreement only required the applicant to use best efforts to obtain approval and did not guarantee a lot or monetary compensation if severance failed.

The court concluded that the easement agreement was independent of the severance process and that the respondent breached the agreement by refusing to complete the easement.

Summary judgment was granted declaring the easement binding, vesting the easement in favour of the applicant, and dismissing the respondent’s counterclaim.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment concerning a property boundary and adverse possession dispute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately addressed the boundary issue, properly accepted the respondents' expert evidence, and made no reversible error regarding adverse possession.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellants purchased 1700 acres of land and sought a declaration under the Road Access Act or a prescriptive easement to use two roads on the respondent's adjacent 40-acre property.

The trial judge dismissed the claims, finding alternate access existed and the appellants failed to prove continuous use for a prescriptive easement.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in assessing alternate legal access and failing to apply the doctrine of lost modern grant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that alternate access over private property can constitute legal access and that the appellants failed to establish the necessary continuous, uninterrupted, open, and peaceful use to raise a presumption of lost modern grant.

The appellant lien claimant appealed the dismissal of its application for a declaration that its non-possessory lien attached to a respondent's interest in trailers.

The court held that the respondent acquired rights in the trailers only upon repurchase, after the lien arose but before it was registered, engaging s. 10(1) of the Repair and Storage Liens Act and giving the respondent priority.

The court also rejected reliance on s. 63(11) of the Personal Property Security Act, noting that the PPSA does not apply to a statutory lien and that prior appellate authority had already limited the effect of that provision in this dispute.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.