Brian Nathan Radnoff

The moving defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim, which alleged breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and negligent misrepresentation against the corporate directors personally.

The court struck the claims, finding that the alleged oral guarantees were unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, the unjust enrichment claim lacked material facts, and there was no basis pleaded to pierce the corporate veil.

Leave to amend was denied for the contract and unjust enrichment claims, but granted for the negligent misrepresentation claim.

The Public Guardian and Trustee, acting for an incapable beneficiary, applied to require the estate trustee to pass accounts.

The estate trustee relied on a release signed by the beneficiary before she was declared incapable.

The application judge ordered the passing of accounts, finding 'red flags' regarding the beneficiary's capacity.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the application judge erred in applying s. 2(4) of the Substitute Decisions Act by failing to consider what the estate trustee actually knew about the beneficiary's capacity at the time the release was signed.

The appeal was allowed and the order to pass accounts was set aside.

The plaintiffs brought an action for defamation regarding negative online reviews posted by the defendant on Yelp, Google, and Twitter.

The defendant moved under Rule 21 to strike the claim as it was commenced more than two years after the plaintiffs discovered the posts.

The plaintiffs argued that the continuous availability of the posts on the internet constituted multiple publications, retriggering the limitation period each time they were accessed.

The court rejected this argument, holding that the limitation period begins to run when the internet defamation is first discovered, and struck the statement of claim as statute-barred.

The appellants appealed from an order of the application judge that determined the respondents had not substantially interfered with an easement in favour of the appellants, assuming the easement to be valid.

The Court of Appeal found the evidentiary record before the application judge was insufficient to support any conclusions on the issues.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the application judge's order, and remitted the matter to the Superior Court of Justice for a fresh hearing or trial.

The court identified numerous unresolved questions regarding the validity of the easement, including issues relating to the title history, the precise location and dimensions of the easement, compliance with part lot subdivision control provisions, and whether the respondents' actions constituted substantial interference with the easement rights.

The plaintiff, an employment staffing agency, sought an interlocutory injunction against a former Director of Branch Operations and his new employer for alleged breaches of non-solicitation and confidentiality covenants.

The court found the Proprietary Information, Developments Non-Competition and Non-Solicitation Agreement to be valid and binding, rejecting the argument of lack of fresh consideration as the agreement was a condition of employment and presented on the first day.

A strong prima facie case was established for the former employee's solicitation of a major client (Cisco) and misuse of proprietary information (knowledge of a former colleague's value to Cisco).

However, no strong prima facie case was found for solicitation of another client (Bank of Montréal) or employee inducement.

The court determined that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm from loss of goodwill and market share, which would be difficult to quantify in damages.

The balance of convenience favored granting the injunction.

In this class action appeal, the court considered whether the deemed undertaking rule under Rule 31.1.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure applies to the names and number of class members who opted out of two companion class actions concerning municipal licensing fees for charitable and religious fundraising events.

The appellants had engaged in a public campaign during the opt-out period to encourage class members to opt out, which the class actions judge found created undue influence.

A protection order was imposed preventing disclosure of opt-out information during a reconsideration period.

After the reconsideration period, the appellants sought to lift the protection order.

The Divisional Court held that the deemed undertaking rule applied to the opt-out information.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the opt-out information is statutorily created information not subject to the deemed undertaking rule, and that class members should be treated as akin to parties whose identities are entitled to be known by the actual parties and the public.

The plaintiffs succeeded on their appeal to add a term confirming the applicability of the deemed undertaking under Rule 30.1.

They sought partial indemnity costs for the appeal and leave motion.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $13,202 in costs for the appeal.

Regarding the initial motion below, the court found that success was divided and set aside the previous costs order of $16,686.33, ordering no costs for the initial hearing.

Following the dismissal of two proposed class action certification motions and a Rule 21 motion regarding the unauthorized sale of hospital patient contact information to RESP sales representatives, the successful defendants sought costs totaling over $690,000.

The Law Foundation of Ontario, which had indemnified the plaintiffs, argued that no costs should be awarded due to the novelty of the legal issues and the significant public interest in the protection of health privacy.

The court agreed, finding that the case raised novel questions about commercial liability for purloined patient information and engaged important public policy issues.

Applying section 31 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, the court exercised its discretion to make no order as to costs.

Various defendants brought motions to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim, which alleged civil conspiracy, defamation, intentional interference with economic relations, and unjust enrichment.

The court struck the claims for defamation, intentional interference with economic relations, and unjust enrichment against all applicants.

The civil conspiracy claim against one individual defendant (Moez Kassam) was struck, but the conspiracy claims against the remaining Anson Corporate Defendants, Adam Spears, Sunny Puri, ClaritySpring Inc., Nathan Anderson, Richard Molyneux, and Darryl Levitt were allowed to proceed.

The court also clarified that 'whistleblower' complaints to the Ontario Securities Commission are subject to absolute privilege and do not constitute the commencement of legal proceedings for the tort of abuse of process.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff Liliana Siggillino's action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The action concerned a dispute over the 2008 transfer of a family farm, where Liliana alleged misrepresentation regarding its value.

The central issue was when Liliana discovered her claim, specifically when she first read a 2008 property valuation report.

The court found Liliana's evidence regarding the discovery date to be contradictory and not credible, preferring her earlier statements and a 2013 letter indicating she read the report in 2008.

The court also found that a reasonable person in her circumstances ought to have known of the claim by July 30, 2008, through reasonable diligence.

Consequently, Liliana's action was dismissed as statute-barred.

Two proposed privacy class actions arising from hospital employees’ unauthorized extraction of patient contact information for RESP sales leads were refused certification.

The court held that, on the actual evidentiary record, the disclosure of contact information alone, without disclosure of medical records or other objectively private information, could not support the tort of intrusion on seclusion because there was intrusion but no legally sufficient seclusion and no objectively highly offensive invasion.

Although certain claims, including a PHIPA s. 65 claim and some negligence theories against the hospitals and rogue employees, were arguable at the pleadings stage, there were no viable common issues and a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure.

Small Claims Court proceedings or PHIPA-related processes were found more proportionate for any remaining individualized claims.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful summary judgment motion where the defendants' action was dismissed as statute-barred.

The defendants, as the successful parties, sought costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing for a reduction based on the defendants' limited success on all grounds of the summary judgment motion and alleged conduct that lengthened the proceeding.

The court found no reason to depart from the usual rule that costs follow the event, rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments regarding distributive costs and alleged conduct.

The court fixed costs of the action at $156,599.20, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, to be paid by the plaintiffs to the defendants.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a motion brought by the moving parties (Singh et al.) seeking consolidation of multiple actions, payment of outstanding costs orders against Talon International Inc. (Talon), and security for costs against Talon.

The court had previously dismissed the consolidation request, ordered Talon to pay existing costs or have its defence struck, and granted security for costs in one action.

In this costs decision, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to Val Levitan and the Trump parties, who successfully opposed the consolidation motion.

Costs were denied to Alex Shnaider, who was represented by the same counsel as Talon, and Talon itself did not seek costs.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs to Levitan, finding the settlement offer did not trigger such an award.

The plaintiffs, Michael and Solbyung Coveley, brought a professional negligence action against their former law firm, Thorsteinssons LLP, and several lawyers, alleging negligent advice regarding tax appeals.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that the plaintiffs knew or ought to have known of their claim by October 27, 2010, when they received advice that fundamentally contradicted earlier assurances about the strength of their tax appeals.

As the action was commenced on November 2, 2012, more than two years after discovery, the claim was statute-barred.

The defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted, and the action was dismissed.

The moving parties sought to consolidate 19 actions related to hotel condominium units in the Trump Tower, compel payment of outstanding costs orders against Talon International Inc. (Talon), and obtain security for costs against Talon.

The court dismissed the motion for consolidation, finding it unlikely to streamline proceedings and primarily a tactical move to enforce costs.

However, the court ordered Talon to pay existing costs awards in two specific actions within ten days, failing which its defence and counterclaim in those actions would be struck.

Security for costs was granted against Talon only in the Shah/Patel action, where Talon was the plaintiff and had insufficient assets, but denied in other actions where Talon's counterclaims were deemed defenses.

The plaintiff, Musab Saeed, sought specific performance and declarations after a property transaction failed and the vendors sold to other purchasers.

The vendor defendants moved for partial summary judgment to dismiss the specific performance claim, arguing the property was not unique and damages were an adequate remedy.

The purchaser defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the entire claim against them, relying on the Land Titles Act and the mirror principle.

The court found the property was not unique, damages were an adequate remedy, and the plaintiff's claim of intending to reside there was not credible.

The court also found that only actual notice of a defect in title, not constructive knowledge or wilful blindness, would be an exception to the mirror principle under the Land Titles Act, and the purchasers did not have actual notice.

Both motions were granted, dismissing the specific performance claim and the action against the purchaser defendants.

The appellant sought to appeal an order from the Superior Court of Justice dated November 29, 2017.

The Court of Appeal determined that the order under appeal was interlocutory in nature and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the proposed appeal.

The appeal was quashed without prejudice to the appellant's right to seek leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

Costs of $3,500 inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant charities in two related class actions appealed a case management judge's decision declining to continue a protective order over the identities of potential class members who opted out.

The appellants argued the judge failed to consider whether the deemed or implied undertaking rules applied to this information.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the deemed undertaking rule under Rule 30.1.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure applies to the names and numbers of opt-outs disclosed by the plaintiffs' counsel to the defendants' counsel, as this information is relevant and discoverable.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that dismissed his defamation and related claims against his former employer and awarded him only $17,192.57 for wrongful dismissal, while ordering him to pay $35,000 in costs.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in her defamation analysis, credibility findings, and acceptance of unpleaded defences.

The Divisional Court dismissed the substantive grounds of appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the employer's negative reference was substantially true.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the costs award, finding the trial judge erred by applying Rule 49.10(1) instead of Rule 49.10(2) for a defendant's offer to settle, and remitted the costs issue to the trial judge.

The Team Lead-Civil in the Toronto Region issued an administrative endorsement assigning Justice P. Cavanagh as the case management judge for the actions and directed that a case conference be held as soon as possible.