James C. Robb

The appellant, a private investigator hired by the defence, attempted to discover the identity of a confidential police informant.

He was charged with obstruction of justice and extortion.

The trial judge acquitted him on all counts.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial on all counts.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the defence is not bound by informer privilege and may independently investigate an informant's identity, such investigation must be lawful.

The Court ordered a new trial on the obstruction of justice and the first extortion count (against the police officer) due to errors of law by the trial judge, but restored the acquittal on the second extortion count (against the associates) as it was based on factual findings.

The appellant appealed convictions for child luring arising from sexually explicit computer communications with an undercover officer posing as a 13-year-old.

The central issue was the interaction between the presumption in s. 172.1(3) of the Criminal Code and the reasonable steps requirement in s. 172.1(4).

The Court held that where an interlocutor is represented as underage, the accused is presumed to believe that representation unless rebutted by evidence that includes reasonable steps taken to ascertain age.

Because the appellant took no reasonable steps despite repeated assertions that the interlocutor was 13, the Court upheld the substituted convictions and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was charged with kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, and first degree murder as a party to the offences committed by a co-accused.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding he lacked the requisite knowledge of the co-accused's intention to commit the crimes.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittals and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider the doctrine of wilful blindness.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, confirming that wilful blindness can substitute for actual knowledge and that the trial judge's failure to consider it constituted a legal error necessitating a new trial.

The accused was convicted of kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, and first-degree murder.

At trial, the judge rejected the accused's testimony, citing his 'very great motive to be untruthful' to secure an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding this undermined the presumption of innocence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that while such language is concerning in isolation, the trial judge's reasons, read as a whole in the context of a trial where the accused challenged every witness's credibility based on their motives to lie, did not rely on an impermissible assumption.

The appellant engaged in sexually explicit online chats with a 12-year-old girl, believing her to be 13 or 14.

He was acquitted at trial of luring a child under s. 172.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code because the trial judge found he did not intend to meet the complainant or carry out the secondary offence.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the offence is an inchoate crime that does not require an intention to meet the victim or commit the secondary offence, but only the specific purpose of facilitating its commission.

The Crown appealed a majority decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal that overturned the respondent's convictions for first degree murder, aggravated sexual assault, and kidnapping.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal as of right, and the Crown brought a cross-motion for leave to appeal the refusal of the majority to apply the curative proviso.

The respondent withdrew the motion to quash.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that it is unnecessary for the Crown to seek leave to appeal the application of the curative proviso, as the provisions for taking account of the severity of errors are always intertwined with any error of law considered by the Court.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed as unnecessary.

These companion youth sentencing appeals considered the meaning of “violent offence” in s. 39(1)(a) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, one of the statutory gateways to custody.

The Court rejected both a force-based definition and the broader Alberta approach that included offences where bodily harm was merely reasonably foreseeable.

It held that a “violent offence” is one in the commission of which a young person causes, attempts to cause, or threatens to cause bodily harm.

Because the record did not establish that the appellants’ offences met that definition, the custodial sentences were quashed and the matters remitted to youth court for fresh sentencing.

The accused sent 'teaser' e-mails marketing the sale of 'Top Secret' files, including software to generate valid credit card numbers, bomb recipes, and break-in instructions.

He was charged with counselling four indictable offences that were not committed.

The trial judge acquitted him, finding he lacked the requisite mens rea, and the Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal on the count of counselling fraud, finding the trial judge erred in law by confounding motive and intent, and ordered a new trial on that count.

The appeal concerned whether several proposed provisions for a first collective agreement were excluded from interest arbitration under the Alberta public service labour statute.

The Court held that, despite certiorari being available, review of the labour board's interpretation of its home statute was constrained by strong privative clauses and limited to decisions that were patently unreasonable.

Applying that deferential standard, the majority concluded that provisions addressing changes in compensation during the agreement, reclassification and classification appeal procedures, and wage protection on downward reclassification were arbitrable and not excluded by s. 48(2).

The appeal was allowed and the labour board's decision was restored.