Amanda Sansregret

The appellant was charged with sexual offences and convicted after the trial judge reserved judgment for approximately nine months following the conclusion of evidence and argument.

The appellant sought a stay of proceedings on the basis that the delay between charges and verdict was unreasonable under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court held that while s. 11(b) applies to verdict deliberation time, the Jordan presumptive ceilings do not extend to that period.

The applicable test is whether verdict deliberation time took markedly longer than it reasonably should have in all of the circumstances, assessed in light of the presumption of judicial integrity.

Applying this test, the appellant failed to establish a breach of s. 11(b), given that the trial and most of the deliberation occurred before Jordan was released.

The Crown appealed a Manitoba Court of Appeal decision ordering a new trial after the accused was convicted at trial of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching.

The Court of Appeal majority found the trial judge had misapprehended the evidence, but the dissenting judge held that deference was owed to the trial judge's credibility assessments.

The Supreme Court agreed with the dissent, finding the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence, draw unavailable inferences, or err in his credibility findings.

The convictions were restored.

In this criminal appeal, the accused challenged a sexual assault conviction on the basis that the trial judge failed to properly assess reliability and credibility.

The Court upheld the appellate majority’s conclusion that the trial judge’s reasons demonstrated consideration of both reliability and credibility concerns.

The Court adopted the reasoning of the intermediate appellate judge cited at para. 48.

The conviction remained undisturbed and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant Crown appealed acquittals entered after a criminal prosecution for aggravated sexual assault based on non-disclosure of HIV-positive status.

The Court reaffirmed that fraud vitiating consent under ss. 265(3)(c) and 273 requires a dishonest act and deprivation, and held that deprivation turns on whether there was a realistic possibility of HIV transmission.

The Court held that, on the record, a realistic possibility is negated where the accused had a low viral load and condom protection was used.

Applying that test, the Court restored three convictions where no condom was used and maintained one acquittal where condom use accompanied a low viral load.

The appeal was allowed in part.