Renée Lagimodière

The Crown appealed a Manitoba Court of Appeal decision reducing a six-year sentence for sexual interference with a four-year-old child to four and one-half years.

The sentencing judge had employed a higher starting point despite the absence of a formal trust relationship, relying on the aggravating nature of the offence.

The Court of Appeal found an error in principle.

The Supreme Court allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal mischaracterized the sentencing judge's reasoning and that no error in principle was made.

The Court provided comprehensive guidance on sentencing for sexual offences against children, directing that sentences must increase to reflect Parliament's legislative initiatives and society's deepened understanding of the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual violence against children.

The appellant was charged with sexual offences and convicted after the trial judge reserved judgment for approximately nine months following the conclusion of evidence and argument.

The appellant sought a stay of proceedings on the basis that the delay between charges and verdict was unreasonable under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court held that while s. 11(b) applies to verdict deliberation time, the Jordan presumptive ceilings do not extend to that period.

The applicable test is whether verdict deliberation time took markedly longer than it reasonably should have in all of the circumstances, assessed in light of the presumption of judicial integrity.

Applying this test, the appellant failed to establish a breach of s. 11(b), given that the trial and most of the deliberation occurred before Jordan was released.

In this criminal appeal, the accused challenged a sexual assault conviction on the basis that the trial judge failed to properly assess reliability and credibility.

The Court upheld the appellate majority’s conclusion that the trial judge’s reasons demonstrated consideration of both reliability and credibility concerns.

The Court adopted the reasoning of the intermediate appellate judge cited at para. 48.

The conviction remained undisturbed and the appeal was dismissed.