Daniel C. Santoro

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner denying a fee waiver for a freedom of information request made to the Ministry of the Environment.

The Adjudicator had reduced the fee but found it was not fair and equitable to waive it entirely, noting the applicant did not work with the Ministry to narrow the request.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard and dismissed the application, finding the Adjudicator's decision fell within a range of acceptable outcomes.

The appellant was convicted of assault and sexual assault against his former wife.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred by admitting irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence of extrinsic misconduct, specifically allegations of child abuse, and by failing to provide a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the use of that evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the evidence was improperly admitted and that the trial judge's instructions failed to shield the jury from impermissible propensity reasoning.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was directed.

The appellant was convicted of unlawfully producing marijuana and possession for the purpose of trafficking after being found at a marijuana grow-op.

He told police he believed his boss had a licence to produce marijuana at that location.

The trial judge convicted him as an aider and abettor, finding the defence had an onus to establish the honest belief defence and could only do so if the appellant had seen a licence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in placing an onus on the appellant and that the Crown was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant knew his boss did not have a licence.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and importing cocaine, but the jury could not reach a verdict on a trafficking charge.

During deliberations, the jury asked if a guilty verdict on importing required a guilty verdict on trafficking.

The trial judge answered 'no' without further explanation, contradicting his earlier instructions that the key issue for all charges was whether a specific transfer of cocaine occurred.

The Court of Appeal held that this incomplete and unhelpful response compromised trial fairness and left the jury adrift to assess conflicting bases of culpability.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused, an anti-abortion activist, was charged with disobeying a court order pursuant to section 127(1) of the Criminal Code.

The charge arose from her conduct on September 2, 2015, when she protested outside the Morgentaler Clinic in Toronto carrying a sign and speaking to patients entering the clinic, attempting to persuade them not to have abortions.

The court found that her conduct breached paragraphs (c) and (h) of a 1999 injunction by disturbing and interrupting the functioning of the clinic and causing a nuisance within 500 feet of the premises.

The court distinguished the present case from a prior 2014 appeal decision where similar conduct had resulted in acquittal, finding that the evidence of disruption to clinic operations and impact on patients and staff was substantially different and more compelling.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a drug-related offence.

The Crown's case relied on the appellant placing a bag in a car, which was later found to contain drugs after being in a motel room for over two hours.

The Court of Appeal found the verdict unreasonable, as there was no evidence regarding who had access to the bag while it was in the motel room.

The trial judge erred by looking for evidence that the contents had changed, rather than requiring the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they had not changed.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant was convicted of disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code after violating an injunction protecting an abortion clinic.

She appealed, arguing that the injunction was unenforceable against her because she was not a named party to the original proceedings, and that she should have been charged with criminal contempt instead of a s. 127 offence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the injunction expressly applied to non-parties and that her argument constituted an impermissible collateral attack.

The court further held that s. 127 of the Criminal Code is a valid mechanism for enforcing court orders against non-parties, alongside the common law power of criminal contempt.

The appellant, an octogenarian with medical issues, appealed his concurrent 12-month custodial sentences for historical sexual assault, interference, and exploitation of a child.

He argued the sentence should be served conditionally.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was below the usual range for prolonged sexual abuse by a person in a position of trust, and that denunciation and deterrence required a custodial sentence despite the appellant's medical difficulties.

The appellants, members of the Bandidos motorcycle gang, appealed their convictions for multiple counts of first degree murder and manslaughter arising from the execution-style killings of eight fellow gang members.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in ruling that the common law defence of duress was unavailable to persons charged as parties to murder.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law, as the common law defence of duress remains available to parties to murder.

However, the Court dismissed the appeals, finding no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice because there was no air of reality to the duress defence for any of the appellants on the evidence.

The accused was charged with drug trafficking offences.

Police, wishing to protect an ongoing wiretap investigation, directed a traffic officer to conduct a pretext traffic stop of the accused, lie about the reason for the stop, and attempt to obtain consent to search his vehicle.

The accused was not informed of the true reason for his detention or his right to counsel.

When the accused tossed a bag to his wife, multiple officers rushed him, resulting in a physical altercation and broken ribs.

The court found egregious breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Grant and Regan frameworks, the court concluded that the deliberate police planning to bypass Charter protections constituted an abuse of process.

A stay of proceedings was ordered for all counts.

The appellants were convicted of trafficking and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest one of the appellants, and therefore the evidence obtained during the search incident to arrest should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the arresting officer had the requisite reasonable and probable grounds based on confidential information and police surveillance of a suspected drug transaction.

The appellants were convicted of drug-related kidnapping and robbery.

At trial, two key Crown witnesses recanted their prior statements inculpating the appellants.

The trial judge admitted the prior inconsistent statements for the truth of their contents under the K.G.B. framework but refused to allow defence counsel to cross-examine one of the witnesses on her statement after it was admitted.

The trial judge also admitted the entire transcript of a co-accused's guilty plea proceedings.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred by denying the defence the right to cross-examine the witness on her prior statement and by admitting the guilty plea proceedings where cross-examination was limited by solicitor-client privilege and the statement contained inadmissible hearsay.

The appellant was convicted under s. 127 of the Criminal Code for breaching an interlocutory injunction prohibiting anti-abortion protests near clinics.

She appealed, arguing the prosecution was an abuse of process due to Crown delay in the civil proceeding, and that s. 127 was unconstitutional on division of powers and Charter s. 7 grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no abuse of process, characterizing the argument as an impermissible collateral attack, and upholding the constitutionality of s. 127.

The appellant was convicted of marijuana production and firearms offences based on circumstantial evidence found at a house he co-owned.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapplied the rule in Hodge's Case by requiring alternative explanations to be based on 'proven facts' rather than available inferences.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge improperly shifted the burden of proof.

The Court also found the firearms convictions unreasonable, as the evidence did not exclude the possibility that another person involved in the grow operation hid the handgun without the appellant's knowledge.

The appeal was allowed, with a new trial ordered for the grow operation charges and acquittals entered for the firearms charges.

The appellant appealed a conviction for disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code arising from conduct outside an abortion clinic.

The alleged breach involved a civil injunction prohibiting certain activities within 500 feet of the clinic, including intimidation of patients and others.

The appeal court held that criminal liability for breach of an order requires proof that the accused violated a specific term of the order.

The evidence established only peaceful leafleting and silent protest, which did not constitute intimidation or other prohibited conduct within the meaning of the injunction.

The conviction was therefore unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence.

Accused persons charged following a large police investigation sought disclosure of source materials underlying wiretap authorizations to support anticipated Garofoli and Dawson applications.

The defence argued that all investigative materials, including pre‑Part VI materials referenced or relied upon by the affiant, were presumptively relevant and disclosable under Stinchcombe principles.

The Attorney General of Ontario argued that disclosure should be limited to materials relevant to the accused’s ability to make full answer and defence at trial unless the defence first demonstrated a reasonable possibility that additional materials would assist in challenging the authorization.

The court acknowledged conceptual difficulties with the Crown’s narrower approach but held that existing authorities required an accused to meet a minimal relevance threshold before obtaining additional disclosure beyond what was before the authorizing judge.

Applying principles of judicial comity and following prior decisions adopting that approach, the court dismissed the disclosure applications.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and his indeterminate sentence as a dangerous offender.

He argued the trial judge erred by refusing to edit his criminal record to remove prior sexual assault convictions and by excluding collateral fact evidence about the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the Corbett ruling and no substantial wrong from the evidentiary exclusion given the overwhelming forensic evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the dangerous offender proceeding was conducted fairly.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision, arguing that the court below erred in its assessment of credibility and the risk of witness tainting.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that the appeal did not raise a question of law requiring clarification and that the arguments were not sufficiently strong to warrant a second appeal.

Pre‑trial evidentiary rulings in a first‑degree murder prosecution concerning the admissibility of the accused’s statements and post‑offence conduct.

The accused attempted to plead guilty to manslaughter, but the Crown rejected the plea and pursued first‑degree murder based on an alleged killing during or in connection with sexual assault.

The court held that a rejected guilty plea and unaccepted defence admissions do not remove issues from the jury unless the Crown agrees to a formal admission under s. 655 of the Criminal Code.

Evidence of post‑offence conduct remained relevant to actus reus and identification issues but could not be used to determine the level of intent between manslaughter and murder.

The accused’s statement to police was admitted, subject to limited redactions and jury instructions, while a statement to a friend about “going to jail for life” was excluded for minimal probative value and high prejudicial effect.

A clinic sought leave to intervene in a summary conviction appeal brought by an accused convicted of disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code.

The proposed intervention related only to the interpretation of a permanent injunction previously issued against demonstrators outside the clinic’s premises.

The court accepted that the clinic had a significant interest in the interpretation of the injunction but found that its proposed submissions were substantially the same as those the Crown would advance.

Given the limited scope for third‑party intervention in criminal proceedings affecting liberty interests and the lack of distinct submissions, the court concluded that intervention was unnecessary.

The motion for leave to intervene was dismissed.