Sonya Shikhman

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault with a weapon and uttering threats, arguing errors in identification evidence, credibility assessment, motive, burden of proof, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence, credibility, or application of legal principles, and concluding that trial counsel's performance, while not perfect, did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The applicants, charged with serious firearms and gaming offences, experienced a 12-day delay before their special bail hearing was held.

They brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, arguing that the delay violated their s. 11(e) rights and constituted an abuse of process.

The Crown conceded the Charter breach and acknowledged systemic issues in scheduling lengthy bail hearings in Brampton.

The court found that the systemic and ongoing nature of the bail delays severely compromised the integrity of the justice system.

Despite the seriousness of the charges, the court concluded that a stay of proceedings was the only appropriate remedy to address the persistent institutional failure.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for assault, forcible confinement, failure to comply with probation, and sexual assault against his wife.

At trial, the complainant recanted her initial police statement, which was admitted for the truth of its contents.

The appeal judge upheld the convictions for assault, forcible confinement, and breach of probation, finding no misapprehension of evidence or improper shifting of the burden of proof.

However, the appeal judge quashed the sexual assault conviction, finding the trial judge reversed the burden of proof on consent and relied on impermissible myths and stereotypes regarding the complainant's sexual preferences.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against three accused (Pauls, Jamal Yusuf, and Jamis Yusuf) for assault causing bodily harm and unlawful confinement, citing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial judge had attributed most of the 35-month delay to the Crown's inaccurate time estimate and mishandling of a defence disclosure request.

The Court of Appeal re-evaluated the delay, finding that while the Crown was initially responsible for the misestimate, all parties and the court shared responsibility once the trial progressed.

The defence's disclosure request was deemed unnecessary and inappropriate, contributing to delay.

After further deductions for defence-caused delay (counsel unavailability, Pauls' illness) and joint responsibility for misestimates, the net delay for all respondents fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The Court also rejected the respondents' challenges to their guilt findings.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired operation of a motor vehicle and failing to remain at the scene of an accident, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable and the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) analysis and providing insufficient reasons.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were reasonable, her credibility findings were entitled to deference, and she properly applied the W.(D.) principles and provided adequate reasons.

Two accused were charged with multiple offences related to an illegal online gaming and betting operation, as well as serious firearm offences.

The Crown opposed their release on both secondary and tertiary grounds under section 515 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while the charges were serious and involved firearms, the proposed release plans with responsible sureties and strict house arrest conditions adequately addressed public safety concerns.

The court granted bail to both accused, emphasizing that detention is the exception and release the rule, and that the strength of the proposed supervision plan is a relevant factor in the tertiary ground analysis.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two counts of breaching his bail.

The police arrested the appellant after observing him with an individual they believed was not his surety, contrary to his bail conditions.

The trial judge accepted the officers' evidence that the individual was not the surety, despite a description matching one of the sureties.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to address the apparent conflict in the identification evidence and its impact on the reliability of the officers' testimony.

The applicants, charged with drug-related offences, brought a Garofoli application challenging the validity of a search warrant executed at their home.

The Information to Obtain (ITO) relied heavily on tips from two confidential informants.

The applicants argued the ITO lacked reasonable grounds and contained misleading statements.

The court excised certain erroneous statements but found that, based on the totality of the circumstances and the Debot criteria, the remaining information provided sufficient grounds for the issuing justice to authorize the warrant.

The court also held that even if a section 8 Charter breach had occurred, the evidence would be admissible under section 24(2).

The application was dismissed.

The offender, Andrew Medford, brought a motion for recusal of the trial judge and a declaration of mistrial, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias during his conviction for assault, sexual assault, and related offences, and during a subsequent dangerous offender application.

The allegations included the judge's facial expression while viewing video evidence, the short deliberation time before conviction, the judge's statement about convicting on 'pretty much everything,' and the revocation of bail.

Further allegations during the dangerous offender application concerned the judge's handling of a publication ban, an alleged excusal of the complainant's inappropriate gesture, and signs of frustration with defence counsel during cross-examination of an expert witness.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, either individually or cumulatively, and affirmed the presumption of judicial impartiality.

The applicants challenged the constitutional validity of step six of the Garofoli procedure, arguing it violates section 7 of the Charter by preventing them from making full answer and defence.

The applicants contended that judicial summaries of redacted information in an Information to Obtain (ITO) do not provide sufficient disclosure to know the case they must meet.

The court rejected the constitutional challenge, finding that step six does not breach section 7 rights because it is a pre-trial evidentiary hearing on admissibility, not a trial on guilt or innocence, and the procedure appropriately balances the accused's right to make full answer and defence against the near-absolute privilege of confidential informants.

The accused was convicted of historical sexual assault against his stepson (A.B.) and assault against his biological son (C.D.).

The stepson was approximately 14 years old when he was anally penetrated by the accused while asleep in his own bedroom.

The biological son was approximately six years old when the accused forcefully removed his shirt in a closed washroom during a party.

The court imposed a sentence of three and a half years in penitentiary for the sexual assault and 30 days concurrent for the assault, rejecting the defence position for a conditional sentence and accepting the Crown's position that denunciation and deterrence must take precedence.

The defendants brought a preliminary motion seeking to excise from an Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant references to the unlawful search of a third party's vehicle in which cocaine was found.

The search had been previously determined to be unlawful by another justice.

The Crown opposed the excision, arguing the defendants lacked standing to challenge a third party's search.

The court held that while the defendants could not challenge the lawfulness of the third party search itself, they could seek excision of evidence obtained through a judicially determined Charter breach to prevent the state from benefiting from illegal police conduct.

The court granted the motion and excised all references to the stop, arrest, and seizure from the third party's vehicle.

The Appellant challenged her conviction for impaired driving and Over 80, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and in rejecting her testimony.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, affirming that the arresting officer had sufficient objective grounds based on the totality of circumstances, and that the trial judge's credibility assessment and reasons for conviction were adequate and entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed convictions for dangerous driving and over .80 operation of a motor vehicle, following a trial where the sole issue was the identity of the driver.

The trial judge disbelieved the appellant's evidence and accepted the arresting officer's identification, which was based on a brief "one second glance" followed by apprehension 40 seconds later.

The appellant contended that the trial judge erred in assessing the reliability of the officer's identification and the appellant's credibility.

The appellate court affirmed the trial judge's findings, emphasizing the high degree of deference owed to credibility assessments and finding no error in the application of identification evidence principles.

The court held that the trial judge's reasons for rejecting the appellant's implausible version of events and accepting the officer's identification were well-supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant brought a second application under Section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to stay charges of impaired driving and "over 80" due to unreasonable delay.

The first application was dismissed in August 2016 when the anticipated trial completion was under 18 months.

By the time of the second application in February 2017, the total delay had exceeded 22 months.

The court found that the Crown failed to disclose critical evidence (an audio dispatch recording) despite repeated requests over many months, and that this disclosure failure was the primary cause of delay beyond the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown adduced no evidence of exceptional circumstances to justify the excess delay.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The accused brought a Section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay.

Charged on April 14, 2015, with impaired driving and "over 80," the trial was set for September 26-27, 2016, representing approximately 17 months of delay.

The application was heard on July 13, 2016, shortly after the Supreme Court of Canada released its landmark decision in R. v. Jordan, which established an 18-month ceiling for delay in Ontario Court of Justice cases.

The court found that while the delay fell slightly below the presumptively reasonable threshold, the accused failed to demonstrate meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and the delay did not markedly exceed what was reasonably required.

The application was dismissed and the trial dates were upheld.

The accused were charged with assault causing bodily harm, forcible confinement, and intimidation following an incident in which the complainant was lured to the defendant's home and severely beaten.

The Crown alleged that the male defendant, motivated by jealousy over the complainant's intimate relationship with the female defendant, orchestrated the assault with an unknown second assailant.

The trial judge found the complainant credible and accepted his evidence that he was set upon by two individuals and beaten, suffering fractured ribs and significant facial injuries.

The male defendant was found guilty of all charges.

The female defendant's charges were dismissed due to insufficient evidence of her knowledge and intent to participate in the assault, though the judge found her at least wilfully blind to the possibility of violence.

The accused was tried on multiple counts of sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual exploitation arising from allegations by his step-daughter and a foster child over several years.

After a jury mistrial triggered by concerns about interpretation of the accused’s testimony, the matter proceeded before a judge alone.

Applying the W. (D.) framework, the court found major credibility and reliability problems in both complainants’ evidence, accepted key defence evidence about the household composition and the accused’s work schedule, and concluded the Crown had not proved any count beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all 17 counts.

The applicant sought a one-day extension of time to file a summary conviction appeal from an over 80 conviction and a stay of the driving prohibition and fine pending appeal.

The court reviewed the proposed grounds attacking the trial judge’s conclusion that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand and rejected the submission that the trial judge failed to assess whether the relied-upon indicia were actually present.

Applying the governing principles on arguable appeal and stay pending appeal, the court held the proposed appeal had no merit and no chance of success.

Both the extension motion and the stay application were dismissed.

The applicant sought renewed bail on a charge of first-degree murder after an earlier bail application had been dismissed.

The court held the application was not an appeal and required a material change in circumstances, which had not been shown despite some progress in cross-examination at the preliminary inquiry.

Applying the tertiary ground under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code, the court found the prosecution case remained strong, the offence was extremely grave, the circumstances were horrific, and the applicant faced a mandatory life sentence without parole eligibility for 25 years.

Detention remained necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.