Sonya Shikhman

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and excess alcohol following a rear-end collision with a taxi at approximately 2:30 a.m. on October 20, 2012.

The Crown relied on observations of impairment by the arresting officer and toxicology evidence showing blood alcohol readings of 172 and 179 mg/100mL more than two hours after the incident.

The defendant argued that bolus drinking (rapid consumption of alcohol shortly before driving) explained the high readings and that her blood alcohol level at the time of driving may have been below the legal limit.

The court acquitted the defendant of impaired operation but convicted on the excess alcohol charge, finding the defendant's evidence regarding bolus consumption unreliable and applying a common sense inference that people do not normally consume large quantities of alcohol immediately before driving.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving.

Following his arrest, he was subjected to a routine strip search before being lodged in cells, which the Crown conceded violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The trial judge refused to grant a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1), finding that the search did not impact trial fairness and that police had reasonable and probable grounds to conduct the search due to safety concerns.

The summary appeal court dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding no error of law in the trial judge's application of the objective standard for strip searches.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Convictions Appeal Court dismissing his appeal from a sexual assault conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave, finding that the case was essentially a matter of credibility and raised no issue of law with significance beyond the particulars of the case.

The court noted that even if leave were granted, the appeal would be dismissed on its merits.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He argued the Crown failed to prove that breath samples were taken “as soon as practicable” under s. 258(1)(c)(ii), and that police breached his Charter right to counsel under s. 10(b), including by failing to provide a Prosper warning.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court held the trial judge reasonably concluded that an 18‑minute transport to the police station satisfied the “as soon as practicable” requirement and that police acted reasonably and promptly.

The court further found the appellant was given a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel and did not act diligently in pursuing that right, and that his statement declining to speak with counsel constituted an unequivocal waiver.

The conviction was upheld.

The accused were charged with assault causing bodily harm, forcible confinement, and intimidation.

The Crown alleged that following a sexual encounter between the female accused and the complainant, the male accused lured the complainant to the home where he and an unidentified assailant attacked him, causing serious injuries including fractured ribs and a collapsed lung.

The defence sought to exclude evidence of flirting between the complainant and the female accused, and evidence that the female accused encouraged alcohol consumption, arguing such evidence relied on discriminatory stereotypes about women's sexual conduct.

The court admitted the evidence, finding it relevant to establishing motive and context while carefully distinguishing between proper and improper uses of such evidence.

The accused applied under ss. 8, 9, and 24(2) of the Charter to exclude drugs found in the trunk of a vehicle following his arrest for multiple counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The defence alleged the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds and argued that officers fabricated surveillance observations and notes after the arrest.

The court rejected the defence theory, finding that key allegations of fabrication were never put to the officers in cross‑examination contrary to the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

After reviewing the surveillance evidence, confidential informant information, and officer testimony, the court concluded that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and that the search of the vehicle was lawful as incidental to arrest.

The evidence of the accused and a co‑accused was rejected as improbable and inconsistent with the credible testimony of the officers.

The appellant appealed convictions and sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice for three counts of sexual assault.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to properly apply the burden of proof and presumption of innocence, misapprehended the evidence, and applied a different standard of scrutiny to Crown and defence witnesses.

The court held that the trial judge properly applied the principles in R. v. (W.D.) and was entitled to accept the complainant’s evidence and reject the accused’s evidence.

No material misapprehension of evidence or error in credibility assessment was established.

The court also found no error in the nine‑month concurrent sentences imposed within the joint submission range.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to consider his evidence and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge accepted the appellant's evidence about the ten-second episode but concluded that by deliberately showing off and squealing his tires, the appellant left himself too little time to correct his accidental acceleration.

The findings were open to the trial judge on the record.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The primary issue was whether the Crown had proven that the breath samples were taken “as soon as practicable” for the purpose of the presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c)(ii).

The appellant argued that unexplained delays in preparing the Intoxilyzer and transferring custody undermined the presumption.

The court held that the trial judge properly considered the entire timeline and reasonably concluded that the delay was explained by necessary procedures including changing the alcohol standard solution and warming the machine.

The conviction was upheld.

The Crown brought pre-trial motions to admit hearsay statements made by the deceased to her daughter, and a statement made by the accused to police following his arrest for murder.

The court admitted the deceased's statements under the state of mind and principled exceptions to the hearsay rule, finding they were relevant to her fear of the accused and desire to separate, and possessed sufficient indicia of reliability.

The court also admitted the accused's statement to police; although the officer breached the accused's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel by questioning him prematurely, the court found the subsequent spontaneous utterance was not tainted by the breach.

The appellants appealed their convictions for fraud and their sentences.

The Court of Appeal found the fraud convictions unreasonable because there was no admissible expert evidence explaining how the seized equipment operated to capture financial data.

The police officer who testified was not qualified to give such evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the fraud convictions were quashed, and acquittals were entered.

Consequently, the sentence for driving while disqualified was varied to time served.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to surrender him to the United States, arguing that his serious eye condition would not be adequately treated in a Florida jail and that surrender would shock the conscience of Canadians.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister had fully considered the new medical evidence and reasonably concluded that the U.S. authorities' assurances were sufficient.

The Minister's decision was owed considerable deference.

The 18-year-old appellant appealed his nine-year sentence for a brutal robbery of an elderly store clerk.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the sentence was just outside the range established in similar cases, particularly R. v. Borde.

The majority reduced the sentence to six years (effective eight years with pre-trial custody) to better reflect the principle of parity and the appellant's potential for rehabilitation.

MacPherson J.A. dissented, finding no error in the trial judge's sentence.