Michelle Schwartz

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The court analyzed the total delay, deducting defence delay, and assessed whether the remaining delay exceeded the presumptive ceiling.

Key issues included the impact of court staff shortages causing trial rescheduling and the Crown's claim for an exceptional circumstance deduction due to the COVID-19 pandemic backlog.

The court found the delay caused by staff shortages was attributable to the Crown and not an exceptional circumstance, and that the COVID-19 backlog did not appreciably affect the original trial date.

The court also found the defence was reasonably available for continuation dates.

The total net delay exceeded the Jordan presumptive threshold for a straightforward case, leading to a breach of the applicant's Charter rights.

The defendant, Hamed Nadi, was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample after a Mandatory Alcohol Screening (MAS) demand.

The defence argued the demand was invalid due to a 6-minute delay and incorrect information provided by the officer regarding the consequences of refusal versus failing the test.

The court found the 6-minute delay reasonable for administrative tasks and training, and that the officer's incomplete information about consequences did not taint the demand, as the defendant's refusal was unequivocal and occurred both before and after the information was given.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant, a bank employee, pleaded guilty to three counts of fraud involving the theft of over $11,000 from the bank and its clients.

The Crown sought a six-month conditional sentence, while the defence sought a discharge.

The defendant claimed he committed the frauds to raise money to save his sister from kidnapping and rape threats by a Syrian militia group.

The court found the defendant's testimony credible and accepted that his motivation was to protect his sister from serious harm.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with two years' probation, finding that the exceptional circumstances of the case—involving duress-like conditions and a humanitarian motivation—warranted a departure from the typical sentencing range for breach of trust frauds.