David Bruce Harris

The appellant appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by using rehabilitation as a reason for imposing a custodial sentence.

The majority held that a custodial sentence was still appropriate but reduced it to time served (53 days) plus an additional six months in custody, with probation unchanged.

The dissenting judge would have reduced the sentence to time served due to the two and three-quarter years the appellant spent on bail pending the appeal.

The young person appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in finding their acts aided in the commission of the offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's actions rendered it easier for the offence to be committed, and thus there was no error in the trial judge's conclusion.

The Crown appealed a sentencing judge's decision regarding a DNA order for a young person under s. 487.052(2) of the Criminal Code.

Although the respondent conceded the sentencing judge made errors in principle, the Court of Appeal found the judge's consideration of the statutory factors persuasive and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown requested to re-open a sentence appeal after discovering that an unknown 90-day consecutive sentence had nullified the probation order previously imposed by the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal re-opened the appeal and, on consent, varied the sentence for criminal harassment to twenty months plus three years probation to ensure the total period of incarceration remained under two years, preserving the probation order.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis that evidence led to explain the absence of a witness was highly prejudicial.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the evidence left the jury with the erroneous impression that the witness had helpful evidence for the Crown and that the appellant was responsible for his absence.

Given the weaknesses in the Crown's case, the curative proviso could not be applied.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, challenging the trial judge's finding that his statement was voluntary and arguing that police conduct regarding his status as a confidential informant constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings of fact were supported by the evidence and that the alleged police misconduct post-dated the statement and did not affect trial fairness.

The court also declined to make a non-publication order, noting the appellant's status had been public record for years.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking by offer after offering to sell crack cocaine to an undercover police officer, despite having no drugs in his possession and later withdrawing the offer.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the offence of trafficking by offer, which does not require an intention to actually sell the narcotic, violates section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the offence requires an intention to make an offer that will be taken as genuine, which satisfies the fault requirement.

Furthermore, the court found that making such offers causes a reasoned apprehension of harm, thus complying with the harm principle as a principle of fundamental justice.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for assault, criminal harassment, breach of recognizance, and breach of probation arising from the termination of a common-law relationship.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in applying the rule in Brown v. Dunn to reject the appellant's self-defence evidence on the assault charge, as the record showed the complainant had been cross-examined on the issue.

The assault conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The remaining convictions were upheld.

The global sentence was reduced from four years to two years less a day, plus three years' probation, to account for pre-trial custody and to avoid double punishment for conduct already sentenced.

The appellants appealed their convictions for robbery and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

One appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing eyewitness identification evidence, while the other argued the trial judge made inconsistent findings regarding his control of the weapons and role in the robbery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the trial judge's findings were not inconsistent and that the convictions were supported by the totality of the circumstantial and identification evidence.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of arson.

He was arrested and held in police custody for 16 hours before being interviewed and giving a statement.

The Crown failed to account for this 16-hour period or explain why the appellant was not brought before a justice of the peace.

The trial judge admitted the statement, finding that the appellant's consultation with counsel cured any concerns about the delay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge misdirected himself on the burden of proof for voluntariness.

Proof of access to counsel is not a proxy for proof of voluntariness, and the Crown was required to account for the lengthy period of custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the Crown's improper cross-examination rendered the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the Crown's cross-examination was sarcastic, personally abusive, and improperly exploited bad character evidence.

The Crown also improperly required the appellant to comment on the veracity of other witnesses and mocked his religious beliefs.

Given the highly prejudicial nature of the cross-examination, the curative proviso could not be applied, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm.

At trial, the Crown introduced similar fact evidence from the accused's former wife regarding alleged past assaults to show a propensity for non-consensual, painful sex.

The accused argued the evidence was highly prejudicial and that the former wife and the complainant had colluded.

The trial judge admitted the evidence and left the issue of collusion to the jury, resulting in a conviction.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the similar fact evidence was wrongly admitted because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, and the trial judge erred in law by failing to resolve the issue of collusion as a condition precedent to admissibility.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in leaving s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code to the jury, misdirected the jury on planning and deliberation, improperly admitted expert evidence from a detective, and erred in instructing the jury on the common sense inference of intent for a party.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's role in binding and shooting the victim in the leg during an unlawful confinement could be regarded as a substantial and integral cause of death under the Harbottle test.

The court also found no errors in the trial judge's instructions on planning and deliberation, the admission of the expert evidence, or the instruction on the common sense inference of intent.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that a witness statement was improperly admitted at trial.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the statement lacked sufficient indicia of reliability because the police failed to warn the witness of the consequences of making the statement or its potential use in court.

As the trial judge relied on this statement as part of the identification evidence, the appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the refusal of trial judges to make DNA data bank orders for five adult offenders.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal route follows the general scheme of the Criminal Code and that the standard of review is one of deference absent an error in principle.

The Court found that the DNA data bank provisions apply retrospectively to offenders still before the court after the legislation came into force.

The Court allowed the appeals, finding that the trial judges misapprehended the broad purposes of the DNA data bank, placed unreasonable emphasis on the offenders' privacy, and failed to properly weigh the offenders' criminal records and the nature of their offences.

DNA data bank orders were issued for all five offenders.

The appellant was convicted of being an occupant in a motor vehicle knowing there was a restricted weapon present.

During deliberations, the jury asked for clarification on the time frame of being aware of the weapon, and the trial judge merely re-read the charge without explaining that the appellant must have had a reasonable opportunity to remove himself or the weapon.

The trial judge also failed to instruct the jury on the use of the main Crown witness's criminal record to assess credibility.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred on both grounds.

The appellants were convicted of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and unlawful use of a firearm.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, including the trial judge's charge to the jury on identification evidence and section 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds but allowed the appeal based on the Crown's closing address.

The Crown had improperly invited the jury to speculate on why one co-accused did not testify and to use that silence as positive evidence of the other's guilt.

The trial judge also erred in instructing the jury that a statement made by one co-accused to an undercover officer could be used against the other.

The appeals were allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree murder for drowning his two children.

The trial judge rejected a joint submission for a 12-year parole ineligibility period and imposed 23 years.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err in rejecting the joint submission, as a 12-year period would bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the aggravating features of the crime.

However, the trial judge erred in imposing 23 years, as the appellant was not one of the worst offenders, had no prior record, suffered from severe depression, and showed remorse.

The parole ineligibility period was reduced to 17 years.

The four appellants were convicted for their roles in the $3.1 million robbery of a Loomis armed truck.

The robbery was an 'inside job' masterminded by a Loomis guard and a police officer.

The Crown's case relied heavily on accomplice testimony, wiretap evidence, and cellular phone records.

On appeal, the appellants raised several issues, including the validity of wiretap authorizations, the failure to give a Carter instruction, and the impermissible use of hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals of three of the appellants against conviction, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias in the wiretap authorizations and no error in the omission of the Carter instruction due to defence counsel's tactical decisions.

However, the court allowed the appeal of one appellant, finding that the trial judge erred in permitting the Crown to use a co-accused's hearsay statement to bolster an accomplice's credibility against him, and ordered a new trial for that appellant.

The court also reduced one appellant's sentence to account for pre-trial custody but upheld the compensation orders for the unrecovered stolen funds.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the shaking death of his infant son.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of the appellant's wife, who had initially lied to police and had the opportunity to commit the offence herself.

The appellant appealed the conviction based on several errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made multiple errors, including improperly instructing the jury on circumstantial evidence, misdirecting them on how to treat the wife's evidence, and failing to properly instruct on prior acts of misconduct.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.