David Bruce Harris

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment, attempting to obstruct justice, and breach of recognizance.

On the scheduled trial date, the trial judge ruled that the appellant's counsel was no longer on the record due to a prior endorsement, forcing the appellant to proceed unrepresented.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in interpreting the prior endorsement and that counsel remained on the record.

The Court held that the appellant's right to be represented by counsel was violated, requiring a new trial without the need to demonstrate actual prejudice.

The appellant appealed from an order committing him for trial on first degree murder.

The preliminary inquiry judge committed him on the basis of liability for murder through s. 21(2) and first degree murder through s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued these sections could not be combined to found liability for first degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if combining the sections was an error of law, there was an evidentiary basis to commit for first degree murder through the combined effect of aiding and abetting and s. 231(5).

The court found evidence that the appellant aided and abetted in two murders committed by his co-accused during a robbery and forcible confinement, and that his actions passed the causation threshold in R. v. Harbottle.

The appellant, who was found guilty of manslaughter by a jury, appealed his sentence of two years less a day incarceration and three years probation.

He was sentenced as an adult but ordered to serve his sentence in a youth facility.

The appellant argued the sentence was unfit, the trial judge failed to consider his immaturity under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, erred in treating psychiatric evidence, and failed to give enhanced credit for three years of pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding the adult sentence was fit and balanced.

The appellant was convicted of sexual touching and invitation to sexual touching of a child.

His summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by relying solely on the 'unnaturally close' relationship between the appellant and the child to reject the appellant's evidence and find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court held the verdicts were unreasonable, allowed the appeal, and substituted verdicts of not guilty.

The appellant appealed his murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the common sense inference of intent and in delivering an inadequate Vetrovec warning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the instruction on intent was properly left as permissive and appropriate for party liability.

The Court also held the Vetrovec warning was adequate, noting both counsel approved the illustrations of potential confirmatory evidence and did not object to the instruction at trial.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision regarding a dangerous driving conviction.

The appellant argued that the summary conviction appeal court judge misapplied the curative proviso after the trial judge allegedly misstated the legal test for dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err or depart from the correct legal test.

The appellant was stopped for a traffic violation and refused to produce his driver's licence, ownership, and insurance.

The police officer arrested him for failing to identify under the Highway Traffic Act, and a scuffle ensued.

The appellant was convicted of assault with intent to resist arrest.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the arrest was unlawful because the officer did not make a separate request for alternative identification as required by section 33(3) of the Highway Traffic Act.

Because the arrest was unlawful, the appellant was entitled to resist, and the convictions were quashed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a violent bank robbery in which a bank employee was fatally shot by a co-perpetrator.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge's charge to the jury violated his right to a trial by jury under s. 11(f) of the Charter by expressing opinions on contested factual issues, and that the comments exceeded common law limits.

The Court of Appeal held that the common law rule permitting judicial comment on evidence does not violate the Charter, provided the judge does not usurp the jury's fact-finding role.

The court found that while some of the trial judge's comments were unfortunate, they did not overwhelm the jury or deprive the appellant of a fair trial.

The appeal from conviction and the 17-year parole ineligibility period were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences, including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, following a traffic stop.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge failed to give adequate reasons, improperly rejected allegations of racial profiling, and erred in evidentiary rulings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons adequate and no evidence of racial profiling.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the two-year sentence to two years less 20 days to preserve the appellant's right to appeal his deportation under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The applicant, a Justice of the Peace, sought judicial review of an Order in Council removing him from office following a public inquiry.

The inquiry commissioner found that the applicant had engaged in a pattern of misconduct, including denying due process and abusing judicial power in three separate incidents.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the commissioner's findings, concluding that it was reasonable to hold a justice of the peace to the same high standard of conduct as a judge.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in cocaine, arguing the trial judge erred regarding the burden of proof and in assessing the evidence of surveillance officers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly understood the burden of proof, did not draw an adverse inference from the appellant's failure to testify, and made no error in assessing the credibility and reliability of the police witnesses.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault causing bodily harm and related offences, arguing that the trial judge erred in relying on palm print evidence found on the victims' car and improperly shifted the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was entitled to conclude the circumstantial palm print evidence was consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion.

The Court also held that the trial judge properly analyzed and rejected the defence's speculative explanations without shifting the burden of proof.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime after police stopped his vehicle and searched him.

The police suspected the appellant was involved in drug trafficking after observing his interactions with a suspected prostitute.

During the stop, an officer touched the appellant's groin area, leading to the discovery of cocaine and cash.

The Court of Appeal found that while the initial stop was justified, the search violated the appellant's s. 8 Charter rights as it was not conducted for officer safety.

The Court concluded that the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence under s. 24(2), as the breach was serious and its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and his conviction appeal was previously dismissed.

He also filed an inmate notice of appeal against his sentence.

The Court of Appeal quashed the sentence appeal, noting that the sentence for first degree murder is fixed by law and therefore no appeal lies under section 675(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appellants appealed their convictions for fraud related to the Ontario Drug Benefit Program.

They argued that the jury lacked a basis to find the plan was deprived of funds and that inadmissible hearsay evidence was admitted regarding the total detriment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the convictions and concluding that any hearsay evidence caused no prejudice since the appellants conceded the detriment exceeded $5,000.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing that a statement he made to police should have been excluded at trial.

Although the statement was made after the appellant had consulted with counsel, it followed a 14-hour interrogation process during which his s. 10(b) Charter rights were repeatedly breached.

The Court of Appeal found that the statement was temporally and contextually connected to the prior breaches, and was therefore obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter.

Concluding that the admission of this conscriptive evidence would render the trial unfair and bring the administration of justice into disrepute, the Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after sexually assaulting and strangling the victim.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in defining 'likely' in the jury charge on intent, allowing his former common law spouse to testify, and admitting good character evidence about the victim.

The Court of Appeal found the jury charge definition unnecessary but not prejudicial, and upheld the spousal testimony because the relationship had ended.

While the trial judge erred in admitting some good character evidence, the Court applied the curative proviso due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt, dismissing the appeal.

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on the respondents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence for the first respondent based on his degree of complicity and personal circumstances.

For the second respondent, the Court noted the sentence should have been custodial, but declined to interfere given the passage of time, completion of an extensive community service order, and personal circumstances.

The Court also declined to set out sentencing principles for the criminal organization charge due to the unique circumstances and joint submission of the parties.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for an offence involving pushing the complainant off a roof.

The trial judge had assessed credibility by comparing the evidence of the complainant and the accused on an either/or basis, and failed to consider whether the accepted evidence proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal found these to be errors, allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellants were convicted of fraud and uttering forged documents in relation to a complex tax loss scheme involving limited partnerships.

On appeal, they argued that evidence obtained during a joint investigation by Revenue Canada's Tax Avoidance and Special Investigations sections violated their Charter rights and should have been excluded.

The Court of Appeal held that while the predominant purpose test from Jarvis might push back the date the Charter breach occurred, the evidence was inevitably discoverable and properly admitted under s. 24(2).

The court also dismissed the sentence appeals, finding the sentences fit for a massive $118 million tax fraud.