Sheila Cuthbertson

The respondent requested that the human rights application alleging housing discrimination based on disability be deferred pending an ongoing Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) proceeding.

The LTB proceeding involved the respondent's application to evict the applicant for failing to remove a freezer, which the applicant claimed she needed due to her disability.

The Tribunal granted the deferral, finding that the factual underpinnings of both proceedings were the same and that proceeding with the human rights application could lead to inconsistent findings of fact.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board dismissing her claim for compensation for mental shock suffered after her home was destroyed by arson.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board erred in law by treating the appellant as a secondary victim and applying the wrong criteria to deny her claim.

The Court held that the appellant was a primary victim and remitted the matter for a new hearing before a differently constituted Board.

The applicant filed a human rights complaint alleging that a hospital and a doctor discriminated against her based on her Aboriginal ancestry by making stereotypical comments in a discharge summary.

The respondents raised preliminary objections, including that the complaint was filed out of time.

The Tribunal found that the applicant was aware of the material facts in December 2001 but did not file the complaint until February 2004.

The Tribunal rejected the applicant's argument that she was medically incapacitated from filing earlier, noting she had pursued other legal and complaint avenues during that time.

Finding no good faith reason for the delay and potential prejudice to the respondents, the Tribunal dismissed the application as out of time under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The tenant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board, arguing a denial of procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court found that the Board erred in law by receiving documentary evidence after the formal hearing without affording the tenant an opportunity to respond, and by failing to address this flaw on reconsideration.

The appeal was allowed, and a new hearing was directed before the Board, with instructions to consider new evidence regarding municipal restrictions.

The tenant appealed an eviction order from the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The tenant argued the Board erred in refusing an adjournment and lacked jurisdiction to impose a condition requiring completion of an alcohol withdrawal program.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the refusal to adjourn given the continuing dangerous condition and the tenant's consent order to vacate.

The Court also held the condition issue was moot and, regardless, permitted under s. 204 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The appellant, a recipient of disability benefits, applied for a retroactive special diet allowance for the period from June 1998 to November 2003.

The Director denied the application, and the Social Benefits Tribunal dismissed the subsequent appeal.

On appeal to the Divisional Court, the appellant argued the Tribunal erred in law by not applying the relevant regulation retroactively and breached natural justice by requiring corroborative evidence without notice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal made no error of law in determining the facts did not justify a retroactive award, and held there was no breach of procedural fairness as the onus was on the appellant to prove his claim.

The tenants appealed a Tribunal decision finding they committed an "illegal act" under s. 62(1) of the Tenant Protection Act, 1997, related to drug activities.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Tribunal's refusal to grant an adjournment pending the tenant's criminal charges.

The Court also held there was sufficient evidence of an illegal act and that the Tribunal properly considered how drug activities negatively affect the community's character and reasonable enjoyment.

The applicants filed objections to a review officer's order regarding the employer's pay equity plan, alleging undervaluation of their work and flawed comparison systems.

The Tribunal considered whether the applicants had established a prima facie case in their pleadings.

The majority held that the pleadings, though sparse, went beyond bald allegations and established a prima facie case, noting that non-union applicants have limited access to information about their employer's pay equity plan.

The Tribunal granted leave to provide further particulars and directed a second pre-hearing conference.

The Alternate Chair dissented, finding that the applications failed to plead material facts demonstrating how the evaluations were inappropriate.

The applicant union applied for a declaration under section 62 of the Labour Relations Act that it was the successor to the Melnor Manufacturing Ltd. (Brantford) Shop Union following a merger.

The respondent employer argued that the predecessor union's constitution did not permit a merger without unanimous consent, relying on the common law principles in Astgen v. Smith.

The Board rejected this argument, finding that the predecessor union had validly amended its constitution to permit the merger by a majority vote, and that the statutory framework of the Labour Relations Act supersedes the common law requirements for unanimous consent.

The Board granted the declaration of successor rights.