James Miglin

The offender pleaded guilty to discharging a restricted firearm with intent to wound and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

The offences occurred during a public altercation outside a shopping mall where the offender fired a handgun at another individual, though no one was struck.

The court weighed the significant aggravating factor of a public shooting near a school against mitigating factors including a guilty plea, remorse, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court imposed a total sentence of 6.5 years, reduced by 40.5 months for enhanced pre-sentence custody credit.

The offender pleaded guilty to abducting his 21-month-old son in 1987 in violation of a custody order and fleeing to the United States, where they lived under false identities for 31 years.

The mother had no knowledge of her son's whereabouts or well-being during this time.

The court accepted a joint submission for a sentence equivalent to three years in custody (time served) but rejected the proposed two-year probation term, imposing three years of probation instead to ensure the offender receives necessary counselling.

The accused pleaded guilty to eight counts of first-degree murder for the killings of eight men over a seven-year period.

The Crown sought consecutive periods of parole ineligibility totaling 50 years under section 745.51 of the Criminal Code, while the defence sought concurrent periods totaling 25 years.

The court weighed the horrific nature of the crimes, the impact on the victims' families and the LGBTQ community, and the accused's age of 67.

Given the accused's early guilty plea, which spared the community a traumatic trial, and the fact that he would be 91 years old before being eligible to apply for parole, the court ordered the 25-year parole ineligibility periods to run concurrently.

During a murder trial involving a Mr. Big undercover operation, the Crown sought to introduce statements the accused made to an undercover officer about his prior involvement in the cocaine trade.

The defence objected, arguing the evidence was highly prejudicial bad character evidence.

The court applied the framework for propensity evidence and found that the evidence was highly probative to the jury's assessment of the reliability of the accused's confession, as it provided context regarding his sophistication and vulnerability to inducements.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, concluding its probative value outweighed the risk of prejudice, which could be managed with a limiting instruction.

During pre-trial motions for a murder trial, the accused sought an order to have his leg shackles removed while in the courtroom.

The Crown opposed the request for security reasons, citing alleged gang affiliation, a prior incident in the cells, and staffing pressures.

The court found insufficient evidence that the accused posed a flight or safety risk to justify the continued use of shackles, emphasizing the presumption of innocence.

The court ordered the shackles removed.

The defendant pleaded guilty to trafficking heroin and possession of proceeds of crime following a dial-a-dope investigation.

He subsequently applied for a stay of proceedings, arguing that the police conduct constituted entrapment through random virtue testing.

The court found that the police were engaged in a bona fide investigation of a targeted individual based on an informer tip, and that the undercover officer merely provided an opportunity to commit the offence without inducing it.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused, charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, brought a renewed application to stay the proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter following a mistrial.

The court held that under s. 653.1 of the Criminal Code, the earlier s. 11(b) ruling by the first trial judge was binding on the parties, and it was not in the interests of justice to revisit those findings.

After analyzing the additional delay caused by the mistrial and scheduling the retrial, the court concluded that the total delay of nearly 35 months, while lengthy, did not violate the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable time when balanced against the serious nature of the offence and the lack of prejudice to fair trial interests.

The application was dismissed.

The accused applicants brought a Garofoli application seeking to exclude wiretap evidence obtained pursuant to a Part VI intercept authorization, alleging a violation of their s. 8 Charter rights.

The investigation stemmed from an armed robbery at a pawn shop where the owner was shot.

The applicants argued the information to obtain (ITO) relied on unreliable confidential informant information and that police failed to exhaust alternative investigative methods.

The court reviewed the redacted ITO and found that, even excluding the contested informant information, the remaining evidence—including DNA matches and association evidence—provided reasonable grounds for the authorization.

A supplementary application regarding police obtaining contact information from Ontario Works without a warrant was also dismissed.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The accused applied under s. 8 and s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude drugs, cash, ammunition, and a taser seized following the execution of search warrants and a warrantless search of his person.

The defence challenged the validity of the warrants, alleging deficiencies in the Information to Obtain and reliance on fabricated police evidence.

The court found that a key surveillance officer fabricated observations of a purported hand‑to‑hand drug transaction that had been relied upon to corroborate confidential informant information.

After excising misleading and unsupported information from the warrant materials, the court concluded the remaining evidence failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds under the Debot framework.

The warrants were therefore invalid, the searches unlawful, and the evidence excluded under s. 24(2) due to serious and deliberate police misconduct.

Sentencing for possession of a small quantity of crack cocaine after the accused was acquitted of several firearms and assault police charges.

The court considered the proportionality principle under ss. 718 and 718.1 of the Criminal Code and weighed aggravating factors including the harmful nature of crack cocaine and the admitted intention to sell the drug.

Mitigating factors included the accused’s youth, lack of criminal record, family support, strict compliance with bail conditions, and time spent in pre-trial custody on related matters.

Applying the criteria for a discharge under s. 730(1), the court concluded that avoiding a conviction would be in the accused’s interest and not contrary to the public interest.

A conditional discharge with one year of probation and abstention from controlled substances was imposed.

The accused sought exclusion of firearm and drug evidence alleging breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter following a police encounter and subsequent arrest.

Police had responded to a complaint of an assault and attempted to question a group of men outside a business when the accused fled.

Officers observed suspicious behaviour while the accused ran, including holding one arm in a manner suggesting concealment of a weapon, which led to pursuit and arrest after the accused confronted an officer with a firearm.

The court held that the initial interaction did not amount to a detention and therefore did not engage Charter protections.

The accused’s flight created reasonable suspicion justifying police pursuit and detention.

The arrest and subsequent strip search were lawful and the evidence was admitted.