National Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers Union of Canada, (CAW-Canada) v. Melnor Manufacturing Ltd., 1989 CanLII 3128

[1989] OLRB Rep. April 360

1965-88-R National Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers Union of Canada, (CAW-Canada), Applicant v. Melnor Manufacturing Ltd., Respondent -

BEFORE: Paula Knopf, Vice-Chair, and Board Members W. H. Wightman and P. V. Grasso.

APPEARANCES: Sheila Cuthbertson and Jane Armstrong for the applicant; W. J. Hayter, AndySzalai and Teresa Savage for the respondent.

DECISION OF THE BOARD; April 20, 1989

1. This is an application under section 62 of the Labour Relations Act for a declaration that the applicant (also referred to as the CAW) is the successor of the rights, privileges and duties of the Melnor Manufacturing Ltd. (Brantford) Shop Union (also referred to as the Shop Union) by reason of a merger, amalgamation or transfer of jurisdiction.

2. At the opening proceedings, counsel for the employer indicated that the respondent was not taking issue with the facts set forth in the application. Therefore,, the Union's facts set out in the application have been accepted as true by this Board. These facts are as follows. The constitu­tion of the Shop Union contains the following provision:

Article 10 - Amendments

These by-laws may be amended by the affirmative vote of not less than two-thirds (2/3) of the members present at any special membership meeting called for that purpose.

The Executive of the Shop Union called a "special meeting" of the employees in the bargaining unit of the Shop Union to consider and vote on a motion to amend the Shop Union's constitution to permit it to "merge" with another trade union. Further, the meeting was to consider and vote upon a motion to provide that the Shop Union "merge" with the CAW and thereby dissolve the Shop Union's separate existence. A notice of a special meeting of the Shop Union to be held on Sunday, October 16, 1988 at a specified location was mailed to each of the members of the Shop Union by prepaid post on or before Thursday, October 6,1988. The mailing contained:

(1) A notice of special meeting;

(2) a letter to the employees in the unit of the Shop Union signed by its President and Vice-President indicating that the Union Executive had decided that it would "be in the best interest of the employees to merge with CAW-Canada ... to secure a better future for the employees at Melnor Manufacturing Ltd.";

(3) a copy of the text of the motion to amend the constitution to permit it to merge, amalgamate with and/or transfer its jurisdiction to any other trade union by a majority vote of those present and voting on the motion; and

(4) a copy of the text of the motion to merge and amalgamate with and transfer its jurisdiction to the CAW and thereby dissolve its separate existence.

The Shop Union also later distributed a reminder of the special meeting. Thereafter, the special meeting was held on October 16, 1988 at the Brantford Park Inn in Brantford. Fifty persons who were members of the Shop Union were in attendance at the meeting. The motion to amend the constitution to permit merger and the motion and effect of the merger with the CAW were pre­sented and discussed. Voting on these motions was taken by secret ballot.

3. The vote to amend the constitution to permit the Shop Union to merge, amalgamate and transfer its jurisdiction and thereby dissolve itself was passed with thirty-nine approving the motion and eleven opposing the motion. The motion seeking approval of the merger, amalgama­tion and transfer of jurisdiction of the Shop Union with the CAW and the dissolution of the Shop Union was then passed, with forty-six approving the motion and four opposing it.

4. The following day, on October 17, 1988, the CAW contacted the respondent by telex,

to the attention of the Plant Manager, advising the respondent of the merger and suggesting that

the parties meet. The National Representative of the CAW sent a follow-up letter on October 25,

1988, again suggesting that the parties meet.

5. By notice dated October 27, 1988, all members of the Shop Union were welcomed into the CAW by its President Robert White and informed that they were now members of the CAW, Local 397.

6. On November 1, 1988 the CAW received a letter dated November 1, 1988 from the Director of Operations of the respondent indicating that the respondent required verification of the CAW's status as the bargaining agent and declining to meet with the CAW or to transact any business until verification of the CAW status as a bargaining agent had been accomplished. There­after, the applicant filed this application for a declaration concerning status of the successor trade union.

7. After having accepted these facts, counsel for the employer asked the Union if it was willing to supply the Board with information surrounding the present status of the Shop Union. Counsel for the CAW replied to this request with the information that the predecessor had simply dissolved once the vote was taken. But in any event the position was taken that its status was of no interest to the respondent or the Board and thus the CAW chose not to present any other evidence on the issue.

The Argument

8. Upon this context, counsel for the CAW argued that a satisfactory basis had been estab­lished for the Board to make a declaration under section 62 that the CAW was the successor of the Melnor Shop Union. Counsel outlined how the predecessor had called a special meeting to amend the constitution to allow for merger and then to vote upon the merger itself by giving full and ade­quate notice to all the affected employees. The two votes were passed by a large majority. Thus, the CAW argues that the methods and procedures adopted here conform with the Board's many cases that have granted declarations of successorship where the merger is contemplated by a union constitution, even if it was recently amended to allow such action. The Board was referred specifi­cally to the cases of Peerless Plastics Limited, [1978] OLRB Rep. Sept. 848; Zehrs Markets Divi­sion of Zehrmart Limited, [1977] OLRB Rep. Oct. 637 and I. B. L. Industries Limited, [1987] OLRB Rep. Sept. 1144.

9. Counsel for the employer urged the Board to take a close look at its own jurisprudence in this area and ask itself if it has correctly interpreted and applied the dicta on mergers contained in the Ontario Court of Appeals' decision in Astgen v. Smith, (1969) 1969 CanLII 488 (ON CA), 7 D.L.R. (3rd) 657. Counsel for the respondent argued that a proper reading of that case dictates that we must conclude, as a mat­ter of law, that no merger took place in the facts at hand.

10. The respondent's first argument was that the union has no power to amend its constitu­tion to provide for any mechanism for merger. We were reminded that the original constitution was silent on the question of merger. Article 10 which is quoted above only empowers the union to amend its "by-laws." We were told that the evidence only revealed the existence of a constitution, but did not reveal any separate by-laws. It was argued that while the constitution allows by-laws to be amended by a two-thirds vote, since there were no by-laws to amend and no power to amend the constitution itself, it was said that any attempt to amend the constitution would therefore be without force and effect.

11. The respondent's second and main argument was based on the decision in Astgen v. Smith, supra. It was said that that case must be read to establish that any amending formula under a constitution is insufficient to support an amendment which changes the fundamental objects of the association unless unanimous consent is attained. Similarly, if the constitution is silent on the question of merger, it was argued that the only way it can be dealt with is by the unanimous con­sent of its members. Further, it was said that even a change in the constitution to add the power to merge in the future should be considered a fundamental change requiring unanimous votes. Hence, it was argued that the union could not avoid the requirement of unanimous consent.

12. Finally, the respondent argued that the Board must be presented with evidence regard­ing the current status of the predecessor union before we should exercise our discretion under sec­tion 62. It was said that we need evidence to satisfy ourselves about the substantial completion of the merger before we should issue a declaration under section 62. We were referred to L. M. L. Foods Inc., [1985] OLRB Rep. Aug. 1252 at paragraph 39, Peerless Plastics Limited, supra, and Corporation of the City of Brockville, Board File 1402-78-R, paragraph 16.

13. In response to these submissions, the Union offered at that stage to present evidence on the question of the Shop Union's status. But the respondent took the position that the Union had been alerted to the issue at the outset of the proceedings and had chosen not to call evidence. Thus, the respondent argued that it ought to be considered too late for the Union to try to do so at this stage of the proceedings.

The Decision

14. Let us begin by dealing with the respondent's secondary arguments on the issue of the constitutional power to amend and the lack of factual evidence about the present status of the Shop Union.

15. First of all, the original Melnor Shop Union constitution contained an amendment clause in Article 10 providing for the amendment of "these by-laws". It is true that the Article only refers to the amendment of by-laws and that there are no indications in the evidence of anything entitled "By-laws." It is also true that by-laws are often separate concepts from a constitution and amount to the ancillary mechanisms necessary to implement the fundamental powers conferred in a constitution. However, a full reading of the Melnor Shop Union constitution discloses that the document itself contemplates that its own provisions or articles ought to be considered as its own by-laws. Article 9(a) of the constitution refers to "the constitution or these by-laws" [emphasis added] indicating that the document considers the very terms of the constitution to be its by-laws. The document, read as a whole, seems to discuss the totality of the document in terms of a consti­tution but considers its individual terms or articles as "its" or "these by-laws." Thus, we do not agree that the amending formula in Article 10 is confined to amendment of non-existent and sepa­rate by-laws. Instead, Article 10 confers on the members of the union the power to amend both the individual and global terms of the constitution filed before us.

16. We shall now address the question of whether the Board has sufficient evidence on the present status of the predecessor union to exercise our discretion under section 62. We agree that our declaratory powers under section 62 should only be exercised where we are satisfied that there was substantial completion of the merger. But here we have evidence that the members of the pre­decessor union voted to merge with the CAW and thereby dissolve itself. Thereafter, we have evi­dence of the CAW communicating its merger to the employer by way of a telex on October 17th and that a copy of this telex was sent to the President of the former Shop Union, Liviana Macar­etta. Follow-up correspondence was sent to the company on October 25th by the CAW and also copied to Ms. Macaretta. Notice of the merger was also given to all members of the Shop Union. No affected employee has disputed the purported merger or is challenging this request for the dec­laration of successorship. There is no evidence or allegation that the Shop Union has done any­thing other than dissolve. At the very least, the evidence is sufficient to show that the Shop Union has transferred its jurisdiction to the CAW and the CAW has accepted the responsibility to repre­sent the members in collective bargaining.

17. This brings us to the main thrust of the dispute in this case as to whether, as a matter of law, a merger has taken place. Counsel for the respondent conceded at the outset of his argument that he faced an uphill battle with the Board because the respondent's position contradicts years of authorities issued by this Board where procedures such as those adopted by the applicants here have been routinely declared appropriate and valid by the Board. Not surprisingly, counsel for the Union asked the Board rhetorically how we could or would entertain the notion of declaring a dec­ade of jurisprudence inappropriate.

18. Let us start by assuring the parties and the community we serve that we must and shall look carefully and openly upon each argument presented to us. If we can be persuaded that an established trend of cases is incorrect or no longer appropriate, then we are prepared to change the direction of those cases. But this will not be done lightly or unless it has been clearly demonstrated that such a course is appropriate. In the situation at hand, we were presented with able and cre­ative arguments by Mr. Hayter and they deserve careful reflection.

19. Let us now deal with the respondent's primary argument dealing with the application of Astgen v. Smith to this fact situation. In Astgen v. Smith, a merger agreement was made between the International Union of Mine, Mill and the United Steelworkers of America. The Court of Appeal was asked to consider the making of a declaratory judgement on the validity of the merger. The Court of Appeal told itself that in order to determine the validity of the purported merger, two questions must be answered at the outset. First, was the action taken by Mine, Mill and Smel­ter Workers in concluding an agreement to merge with Steelworkers intra vires Mine, Mill? Sec­ondly, if the action was intra vires, were the proper procedural steps taken to bring about such a merger? The Court reviewed the constitutions of both the unions carefully, the legal status of a trade union and the legal relationship between the members in each union. On the facts of Astgen v. Smith, the Court considered how Mine Mill had attempted to amend its constitution which had been silent on the ability to merge. There, the Executive Board had attempted to act with the approval of a majority vote on a referendum. The Court considered the importance of such an issue beyond the power of the Executive Board. The Court also noted that "the difference in the constitutions of the two unions is too fundamental to be glossed over." Thus, the Court concluded that the proposed merger was ineffective and void.

20. The principle which emerges strongly from Astgen v. Smith, and which the respondent argues that this Board has forgotten over the years, is that the fundamental objects of the union cannot be amended by a majority. Instead, unanimous consent is required. The respondent's argu­ment is based on the concept that the principles in Astgen v. Smith demand that a union cannot dis­solve itself without having initially given itself the power to do so in its constitution or without later obtaining the unanimous consent of its members.

21. But does that mean that every union which has a constitution which is silent on the spe­cific question of merger cannot initiate a merger or amalgamation process without the unanimous approval of its membership? The Board has not required that since the release of Astgen v. Smith. Indeed, we have demanded unanimity only in the absence of constitutional provisions in the prede­cessor trade union regarding merger, amalgamation or transfer. Further, we have made successor declarations under section 62 where unions have amended constitutions to provide for mergers on the strength of a majority vote. Therefore we must look closely at the Astgen v. Smith case. That case was concerned with the property rights which resulted after certain actions were taken by and between two unions. Two members of the local Mine, Mill & Smelter Union were challenging a process by which the local union had purported to merge with the United Steelworkers. The Court of Appeal dealt with whether the merger was intra vires the constitution of the local union and whether the merger was binding. In reviewing the acts which led to the attempt to merge, the Court of Appeal discovered that the local constitution did not contemplate or provide for any pro­cedure for merger. The executive of the union then set up a process to try to bring about the merger which the Court of Appeal viewed to be entirely outside of the executive authority and ultra vires the constitution of the organization. On that basis alone, the Court was able to conclude that the purported merger was of no effect. These facts are quite distinct from the facts in the case at hand and do not form the basis of the part of the case which the respondent relies upon here.

22. The aspects of the Astgen v. Smith decision that the respondent relies upon deal with the discussion concerning the status of a trade union and the relationship between its members inter se. The Court reviewed the well-established body of "club law" which governs the relation­ship and "contract of association" between members of voluntary organizations and trade unions. The Court acknowledged that trade unions have a "somewhat different" status than an athletic club (at page 661). But essentially the analysis treats the distinctions as being without a difference and of no relevance to the question before the Court. Insofar as that analysis is concerned, we respectfully must point out that the analysis in the decision is obiter dicta and that it would be inap­propriate to apply it to this Board's considerations under section 62 of the Act.

23. It must be stressed that this Board is being asked to make a declaration under section 62 of the Act. The Court in Astgen v. Smith was not making its considerations under the Labour Rela­tions Act at all. Under section 62, we must turn our minds to whether the appropriate situation has been presented for us to declare that one union has become the successor of another. In doing so, we are dealing with the transfer and acquisition of all the rights, privileges and duties conferred to a union under the Act and that may also exist in a collective bargaining relationship. This is fully canvassed in the Board's earlier decision of Waterloo Spinning Mills Ltd., [1984] OLRB Rep. Mar. 542, paragraphs 33-38:

24. At common law (i.e., before the passage of modern labour legislation some forty years ago), a trade union was merely a voluntary association of employees, like a club, acting collectively in pursuit of their common interests and without any statutory framework or underpinnings. Indeed, for a time, trade unions and their activities attracted common law sanctions because such collective action amounted to a civil conspiracy in restraint of trade. However, to deter­mine whether one trade union has acquired the statutory rights and obligations of another - that is, to determine the application of section 62 of the Act - one cannot ignore the statutory frame­work or forget that unions no longer operate (as they once did) in a legislative vacuum. Trade unions, like clubs, may well be able to exist without direct reference to the Labour Relations Act, but the fact is that if a trade union is to do what by statute it must do to preserve its status as a union under the Act, it must conform to statutory norms.

25. A modern trade union is very different from a typical club. It is concerned primarily with the acquisition and exercise of statutory bargaining rights. What club or mere voluntary association has the exclusive statutory right to determine its members' terms and conditions of employment - regardless of what those members might think from time to time? What voluntary association in pursuit of its constitutional objectives has the right to act on behalf of and fundamentally affect the rights of persons who are not its members and who may never have voluntarily sub­scribed to those objectives? What club has a statutory obligation to fairly represent non-members, where necessary, expanding membership funds to do so? What club can compel the payment of membership fees from members and non-members alike? How realistic is it to treat a trade union as a "voluntary" association when the reality is that membership may be made a compulsory condition of employment? In the present case, membership in the Associa­tion has been made a condition of employment for a number of employees. The fact is that while at common law a trade union may still be only a voluntary association, under the Labour Relations Act it is much more than that, and when considering the acquisition, exercise or trans­fer of rights rooted in the statute, one cannot ignore either the practical or legal differences. Likewise, in trying to ascertain a union's essential objects (in an Astgen v. Smith sense) we think the statute provides a guideline - at least in the absence of explicit conditions in the union's own constitution.

26. The Labour Relations Act defines "trade union" as an "organization of employees formed for purposes that include the regulation or relations between employees and employers and includes a provincial, national or international trade union, a certified council of trade unions and a designated or certified employee bargaining agency" (see section l(l)(p) of the Act). The Act does not distinguish between trade unions on the basis of national or international affilia­tion. For the purposes of the statute it does not matter. It is not even significant, let alone funda­mental. Nor is there any requirement, for example, for internal union democracy (see the deci­sion of the Court of Appeal in C.S.A.O. National (Inc.) v. Oakville Trafalgar Memorial Hospital Association et al. (1972) 1972 CanLII 563 (ON CA), 26 D.L.R. (3d) 63). Again, for the purpose of the statute, it does not matter. What does matter is that the organization be composed of employees and have, among its objects, the regulation of relations between employees and employers. That is what defines the essence" of a trade union under the Act and distinguishes it from athletic clubs, debating societies, ethnic organizations, political parties, or other voluntary associations. It is the collective bargaining purpose that is the critical requirement. Anything else is ancillary or superfluous. Conversely, an organization which does not have as its object collective bargaining, cannot be a trade union capable of acquiring rights or responsibilities under the Labour Rela­tions Act.

27. This is not to say, of course, that the constitution of a trade union is irrelevant to the Board. It is obviously an important document and in particular cases or contexts, its terms may be deci­sive. But it does not have the central role which it plays at common law in resolving disputes among the members over the use or distinction of assets, eligibility for office, the conduct of elections, the pursuit of the organization's objectives, and so on. That is evident from the terms of the statute itself. For example, for some statutory purposes, an individual can be a member of a trade union regardless of the eligibility requirements of its charter, constitution, or bylaws upon merely making application for membership and paying one dollar (see section i(1)(j). That is the effect of section 103(4) of the Act, and it is interesting to note that it specifically reverses a Supreme Court of Canada decision to the contrary (see Me.rropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 796 et al. (1970), 1970 CanLII 7 (SCC), 11 D.L.R. (3d) 336). Even section 62 does not expressly require that the purported merger, etc. must, or need only be in accordance with the constitution - although that is the interpretation which the Board has generally given it. The provision for taking representation votes suggests that the Board may require additional confirmatory evidence even if all of the constitutional proprieties have been observed. Conversely, it might be argued that a Board supervised vote could cure any constitu­tional irregularities.

28. We think the starting point in any consideration of the application of section 62 should be the trade union itself: how its objects have actually been framed in constitution, and how it has actually operated in purported furtherance of those objects. In the absence of compelling evi­dence~ we do not think the Board would be warranted in reading into the constitution either purposes or restrictions which are not there, nor if there is no distinction in the document itself between objects which are 'fundamental" and those which are merely ancillary, do we think it appropriate for this Board to second-guess the intentions of the founding members - particularly since, in all likelihood, no one ever really considered the matter, just as no one paid any atten­tion when the Association expanded its membership base beyond those limits which the consti­tution contemplates. The lack of a merger or affiliation provision is not an indication of some essential but unstated premise about the fundamental nature or destiny of the Association. More likely, it results from a lack of sophistication or simply oversight.

29. We might observe at this point that we do not think anything turns on the fact that the trans­action with the UFCW was framed as a merger rather than a transfer of bargaining jurisdiction. Although the merger permits the employers to now claim that the "very existence" of the Asso­ciation was at stake, that argument is a little artificial. Suppose, for example, that the Associa­tion had merely purported to transfer to the UFCW bargaining jurisdiction for the employees it represents, while preserving its separate existence, officers, assets, members, and so on. Would this change in the form of the transaction make any difference? We do not think so. The Associ­ation would be a hollow shell, a form without function, an organization with a continued com­mon law existence but unable any longer to bargain with the employer in pursuit of the objec­tive expressly stipulated in its constitution. If a merger is a fundamental change in the nature of the organization, a transfer of jurisdiction must be too.

30. Several important principles emerge from the Waterloo Spinning Mills Ltd. case. First, in exercising our jurisdiction under section 62, we are concerned with the acquisition, exercise and transfer of all collective bargaining rights. Secondly, the "essence" of a trade union under the Act is that it is an organization of employees which has, among its objects, the regulation of relations between employees and employers through collective bargaining. All other objects are "ancillary or superfluous". Thus, the object of regulating relations between employees and employers is the "essential object" of a trade union that Astgen v. Smith is concerned about. We recognize that the Astgen v. Smith decision deals in obiter dicta and criticizes the purported merger because it would have merged two organizations with what the Court considered to be fundamentally different objects because one union was considered national and the other was considered to be interna­tional. But the Court failed to recognize that the two organizations shared the same fundamental objects of being a trade union and existed to regulate the relations between the employer and the employees.

31. The Labour Relations Act in section 62 does not concern itself with the affiliation of trade union. But section 62 does concern itself with whether an organization does have as its objec­tive collective bargaining so that it can be capable of acquiring the rights and responsibilities under the Labour Relations Act.

32. In order to fulfil the Board's responsibilities under section 62, we must look to the con­stitution of the trade union. But as pointed out in Waterloo Spinning Mills Ltd., the union's consti­tution is not the sole determiner of the cases because the Labour Relations Act regulates union membership rights regardless of certain constitutional provisions. Employees represented by trade unions may have rights beyond what the constitutions allow (for example under section 68). But, when we look at the constitution of the Melnor Shop Union before us, we see that the objectives expressly spelled out in the constitution are the regulation of employer/employee relations:

Article 3 - Objectives

The objectives of the union are

(a) To unite within the union all workers within its jurisdiction.

(b) To improve the wages and hours of work; to increase job security; and to better the working and living conditions of its members.

(c) To establish and maintain collective bargaining with employers within its jurisdiction.

(d) To promote good relationships with management.

(e) To defend and extend democratic procedures and the civil nights and liberties to its members.

Initially this constitution was silent on the question of merger or affiliation with other organizations or trade unions. However, there is an unrestricted procedure for amending the constitution in arti­cle 10, quoted above. Those words are broad enough to contemplate merger with another union, which is a union within the meaning of the Labour Relations Act. Nothing on the face of the consti­tution suggests that its founders wished to preclude the possibility of a merger or prevent a consti­tutional amendment to let it pass. There has been no suggestion on the evidence that anyone ever claimed that the local union required unanimous consent to effect the merger until the employer raised the question in argument before the Board. Certainly the employer has the status and the right to require the union to establish its right to a declaration under section 62. But the following passage from the Waterloo Spinning Mills Ltd. is again appropriate on the facts before us:

39. ... the subjective expectations of the members may not be legally relevant; but when the Board is being asked to read some fundamental but unexpressed limitation into the constitution of an organization, it is at least interesting to note that the notion does not seem to have occurred to any of the members of the organization who gave evidence. And whatever the founding members and framers of the constitution may have thought about the desirability of the later merger, there is no reason to believe that they expected it to be impossible without unanimity.

Similarly, nothing in the evidence before us suggests that the founders or even the members of the Shop Union contemplated that they could only merge with another union if they could get unanimous consent of their members or conversely, that one vote could theoretically veto the desires of the remainder to affect what was believed to be an advantageous merger with another union.

27. Therefore, it is our view that the obiter dicta in Astgen v. Smith does not apply and is not entirely appropriate to considerations under section 62. But even if we are wrong about that, our experience in dealing with the regulation of labour relations convinces us that a constitutionally authorized merger of one trade union with another trade union is not a change in the essential objects of such an organization per se. Indeed, it is worth noting that even on the facts of the Astgen v. Smith situation, in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Laskin, he reveals that the Labour Relations Board at that time had made a declaration of successorship under section 62 for these two unions. Thus, the property rights that the Court of Appeal were dealing with are sepa­rate and distinct from the successorship issues that the Labour Relations Board deals with under section 62.

28. We can now apply these principles to the case at hand. Here we have a shop union with a constitution giving it the object of overseeing the relations between the employees and the employer. We have evidence that it entered into a collective bargaining relationship with the employer and has been recognized by the employer as the employees' representative for a number of years. Having regard to all the circumstances, we are satisfied that the Shop Union was at all material times a trade union within the meaning of the Labour Relations Act which had collective bargaining rights. That organization then drew upon its constitutional authority to amend its con­stitution and embarked on a process to merge with the CAW. We are satisfied that the procedures adopted were intra vires the Shop Union and that good and sufficient notices were given to all the employees. We are also satisfied that the resulting meeting and votes had the effect of transferring the Shop Union's collective bargaining jurisdiction to the CAW and that the CAW accepted that jurisdiction by immediately setting about to attempt to employ and enforce these rights. We also see nothing on the evidence or in the submissions that would give cause for us to decline to issue a declaration under section 62.

29. Therefore, in consideration of all the above, the Board finds and declares, pursuant to section 62 of the Labour Relations Act, that the applicant has, by means of the steps taken to merge with and transfer jurisdiction from the predecessor trade union, acquired the rights, privi­leges and duties of the Melnor Shop Union which was the bargaining agent for the employees of the respondent defined in a collective agreement between the intervener and the predecessor trade union.