Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18011/MVDA

Appeal from a decision of the Board of Trustees, Ontario Motor Vehicle Dealers Compensation Fund, to disallow a claim for compensation under section 85 of O. Reg 333/08 made under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002

Between:

Matthew Hurry

Appellant

and

Board of Trustees, Ontario Motor Vehicle Dealers Compensation Fund

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Michael Beauchesne

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Matthew Hurry, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Jean Iu, Counsel

Heard by videoconference: March 11, 2026

OVERVIEW

1The hearing for this matter was requested by Matthew Hurry (the “appellant”) from a decision of the Board of Trustees of the Ontario Motor Vehicle Industry Compensation Fund (the “respondent”) denying his claim for compensation under section 42(4) of the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act (the “Act”) and section 79 of Ontario Regulation 333/08 (the “Regulation”).

2For context, on November 6, 2025, the respondent considered the appellant’s August 2025 application for compensation in the amount of $29,235.28 from the Motor Vehicle Industry Compensation Fund (the “Fund”) with respect to the refinancing of a 2019 Jeep Compass motor vehicle (the “2019 Jeep”). The appellant submits he purchased the 2019 Jeep for $25,800 (exclusive of fees, extended warranty, and tax) in June 2023 from KJ Auto Sales | Approved Autoloans and Leasing (the “dealer”) with financing from the National Bank. The appellant also submits that in January 2025, the dealer approached him to refinance the 2019 Jeep through the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (“CIBC”), which he agreed to do to obtain a better interest rate. The appellant explains that the dealer subsequently failed to pay out the first loan with National Bank upon securing the re-financing funds from CIBC, leaving the appellant with two loans to pay on the 2019 Jeep.

3In its letter of November 11, 2025, the respondent denies that the appellant is entitled to compensation from the Fund on the basis that the nature of the transaction that gave rise to the appellant’s claim did not constitute a trade under section 79(1)(a) of the Regulation. At the outset of the hearing, the respondent also took the position that that the appellant was complicit in illegal conduct relating to the trade and is therefore not entitled to compensation from the Fund according to section 79(4) of the Regulation. The basis for this position is that the refinancing transaction involved a trade-in allowance of $27,865 for a 2017 Jeep Cherokee (the “2017 Jeep”) that was not actually traded in.

4The appellant appeals the respondent’s decision to deny his claim for compensation to the Tribunal.

ISSUES

5The issue to be decided is whether the appellant has demonstrated his claim arises from a trade in a motor vehicle between himself and the dealer. If he does not, then the appellant is not entitled to compensation from the Fund according to section 79(1)(a) of the Regulation.

6If the appellant does demonstrate entitlement to compensation from the Fund according to section 79(1)(a) of the Regulation, he must then establish that he is not complicit in illegal conduct relating to the trade. If he does not, then the appellant is disentitled to compensation from the Fund according to section 79(4)(d) of the Regulation.

7Should I find the appellant’s claim does not arise from a trade in a motor vehicle between himself and the dealer, I need not determine whether he is disentitled to compensation according to section 79(4) of the Regulation.

RESULT

8The appellant is not entitled to compensation from the Fund because he did not establish his claim arises from a trade in a motor vehicle between himself and the dealer according to section 79(1)(a) of the Regulation. The appeal is dismissed.

ANALYSIS

The appellant has not demonstrated his claim arises from a trade in a motor vehicle between himself and the dealer.

9I find that the appellant has not met his onus to show that his claim arises from a trade in a motor vehicle between himself and the dealer according to section 79(1)(a) of the Regulation.

10Section 79(1)(a) of the Regulation, which pertains to entitlement to compensation, says “[a] customer of a registered motor vehicle dealer is entitled to compensation from the Fund in respect of a claim for a pecuniary loss if the claim arose from a trade in a motor vehicle between the customer and the dealer.”

11Section 1 of the Act defines a “trade” as: “…buying, selling, leasing, advertising or exchanging an interest in a motor vehicle or negotiating or inducing or attempting to induce the buying, selling, leasing or exchanging of an interest in a motor vehicle, and [‘trade’] when used as a noun has a corresponding meaning…”.

12The appellant submits that the refinancing document itself (i.e., the second bill of sale dated January 28, 2025) constitutes a trade under the Regulation because it shows the dealership was providing a vehicle (i.e., the 2019 Jeep) and that he purchased that vehicle. Put differently, the appellant explains that he entered into an agreement that shows he promised to pay for the 2019 Jeep, and he therefore reasons that a trade occurred because a transaction between two parties was completed.

13The respondent argues that the Fund is intended to compensate for transactions arising from the sale or lease of a vehicle, which excludes the January 2025 refinancing transaction because it was strictly for a loan from the bank and did not involve any vehicle trade between the appellant and the dealer. While the respondent concedes that there appears to be wrongdoing on the part of the dealer, it maintains that the Fund does not extend to remedying every wrongdoing that causes loss to a customer.

14The respondent also contends that the 2017 Jeep trade-in indicated on the January 2025 bill of sale is fictitious and therefore cannot be construed as a legitimate trade between the appellant and the dealer under the Regulations. In response, the appellant submits that the dealer’s misrepresentation of the trade on the January 2025 bill of sale is a separate issue and should not be considered when analyzing whether his claim arises from a motor vehicle trade between himself and the dealer.

The January 2025 transaction does not constitute a trade as defined in the Act.

15While I accept the appellant’s claim arises from the 2019 Jeep bill of sale that is dated January 28, 2025, I disagree this transaction establishes a trade in a motor vehicle occurred between the customer and the dealer. When I consider the essence of what a trade is under the Act, I find the transaction made between the appellant and dealer is something other than a trade.

16For example, the appellant did not buy or lease the 2019 Jeep from the dealer in January 2025. He already owned it. This is made out when I compare the January 2025 bill of sale to the bill of sale dated June 27, 2023. I conclude it is the same vehicle because both bills of sale indicate the same unique vehicle identification number (“VIN”). Further, the appellant’s testimony during cross-examination confirmed he was not buying the 2019 Jeep in January 2025 because he had already bought it in June 2023.

17Similarly, I find the evidence does not establish that the appellant and dealer exchanged an interest in the 2019 Jeep in January 2025, nor that the 2019 Jeep was sold back to the dealer by the appellant in January 2025. During cross-examination, the appellant denied the Ontario Ministry of Transportation’s record (the “MTO record”) produced by the respondent, which shows the ownership of the 2019 Jeep was transferred to the dealer on January 29, 2025, and then reverted to the appellant on the same day as if a trade had occurred. The appellant testified that he did not transfer ownership of the 2019 Jeep to the dealer at that time, nor was ownership transferred back to him. He maintained that the 2019 Jeep remained his since originally purchased in June 2023 and that he believed he was simply transacting to “transfer a loan and not a vehicle” in January 2025. I accept this testimony because I was not pointed to any aspect of the January 2025 bill of sale or other documentary evidence that persuades me the appellant knowingly consented to transfer ownership of the 2019 Jeep to the dealer—even temporarily—as part of the transaction. As such, I conclude that the January 2025 entries in the MTO record most likely resulted from inaccurate reporting to MTO by someone other than the appellant, and therefore merit little weight as evidence of an authentic trade.

18Then there is the issue of the falsified 2017 Jeep trade-in on the January 2025 bill of sale. I did not consider this to be persuasive evidence of a trade as defined by the Act because the appellant acknowledged during cross-examination that he did not, in fact, trade in a 2017 Jeep. The appellant further agreed that this was a fictitious trade that was “probably” documented for the purpose of “wiping out” the taxes that would otherwise be payable on the refinanced value of the 2019 Jeep.

CONCLUSION

19When I consider this evidence in totality on a balance of probabilities, I find the appellant has not met his onus to prove his claim arises from a trade in a motor vehicle between himself and the dealer. The thrust of the appellant’s argument is that his January 2025 bill of sale constitutes a trade under the Regulation because he entered into an agreement where he promised to pay for a vehicle and is, in fact, making those payments. However, his position is diminished by his own testimony and documentary evidence that shows he understood the transaction to be a transfer of his loan to a different lender to obtain a better interest rate, and not to buy, sell, lease or exchange an interest in the 2019 Jeep. As such, I conclude that the January 2025 transaction did not involve a trade of the 2019 Jeep—or the 2017 Jeep for that matter—as contemplated by the Act and its Regulation.

20Given that I find the appellant’s claim did not arise from a trade in a motor vehicle between himself and the dealer, I find the appellant has not demonstrated entitlement to compensation per section 79(1)(a) of the Regulation. It follows then, that it is unnecessary to address whether the appellant was complicit in illegal conduct relating to the trade of a motor vehicle purchase per section 79(4)(d) of the Regulation.

ORDER

21The appellant is not entitled to compensation from the Fund because he did not establish his claim arises from a trade in a motor vehicle between himself and the dealer according to section 79(1)(a) of the Regulation. The appeal is dismissed.

Released: May 25, 2026

__________________________

Michael Beauchesne

Adjudicator