Holly Walbourne

The appeal concerns the openness of a police services board hearing regarding an extension of time for service of a disciplinary notice.

Following an investigation by the Ontario Independent Police Review Director into allegations of police misconduct in the investigation of the death of an Indigenous man, a retired judge appointed as a substitute decision-maker ordered that the extension hearing be held in camera.

The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and First Nation complainants sought judicial review, arguing that the hearing should be open pursuant to section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Divisional Court upheld the in camera order, finding that the Dagenais/Mentuck test did not apply to administrative proceedings and that the statutory test under the Police Services Act was sufficient.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while the Dagenais/Mentuck test does not apply to administrative proceedings, the Charter right to freedom of expression and freedom of the press recognized in Langenfeld applies to police services board meetings, and the presumption of openness under the Police Services Act must be considered in light of this Charter protection.

The applicant media organization sought judicial review of a decision to hold an in camera hearing for an extension of time application under s. 83(17) of the Police Services Act regarding police misconduct allegations.

The applicant argued the decision-maker erred by failing to apply the Dagenais/Mentuck test for open court proceedings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the standard of review was reasonableness and that the Dagenais/Mentuck test does not apply to administrative or procedural functions under the Police Services Act, which contains its own statutory framework for determining when hearings may be closed to the public.

The appellants, charged with drug offences, sought disclosure of police policy directives regarding confidential informants during their preliminary inquiry.

After the Crown refused disclosure, the preliminary inquiry judge issued subpoenas duces tecum to the police chiefs.

A Superior Court judge quashed the subpoenas, finding the preliminary inquiry judge lacked jurisdiction to order what amounted to third-party disclosure.

The appellants appealed.

Although the appeal was moot because the appellants had since pleaded guilty, the Court of Appeal exercised its discretion to hear it.

The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a preliminary inquiry judge cannot use a subpoena duces tecum to circumvent the jurisdictional limits on ordering production of third-party records, which must be sought before a trial judge under the O'Connor regime.

The respondent requested the dismissal of the human rights application on the basis that the applicant's conduct constituted an abuse of process.

The applicant repeatedly breached the Tribunal's rules and orders by posting documents obtained through the proceeding, including witness lists and booking room videos, on the internet.

The applicant also posted highly vulgar and insulting videos directed at the respondent and its counsel.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's actions demonstrated a blatant disregard for the Tribunal's rules and orders, amounting to a serious abuse of process.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant in a human rights proceeding brought several interim requests, including a request to remove the adjudicator for a reasonable apprehension of bias, a request to adjourn the hearing to pursue a civil claim, and a request to exclude two of the respondent's proposed witnesses.

The adjudicator dismissed the bias and adjournment requests, finding no factual or legal basis for them.

The adjudicator granted the request to exclude the two witnesses, as their expected testimony related to the events leading to the applicant's arrest, which had already been determined in a criminal proceeding and could not be re-litigated.

The adjudicator also directed the applicant to indicate whether he wished to make oral submissions regarding the respondent's request to dismiss the application for abuse of process.

The respondent requested an order imposing sanctions on the applicant for violating Rule 3.3 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure by posting a video disclosed during pre-hearing discovery on the internet.

The applicant admitted to posting the video but argued that Rule 3.3 was unconstitutional and that the public had a right to know about the respondent's alleged misconduct.

The Tribunal found that the applicant violated Rule 3.3, which codifies the implied undertaking rule, and that the constitutional challenge was not properly brought.

The Tribunal ordered the applicant to remove the material from the internet and warned that further breaches could result in the dismissal of the application.

The respondent requested an order directing the applicant to cease and desist public disclosure of documents provided for the sole purpose of litigation.

The applicant had disclosed documents and sent emails to community members regarding the litigation.

The Tribunal found the applicant in breach of Rule 3.3, which prohibits the use of disclosed documents for any purpose other than the proceeding.

The applicant was ordered to comply with Rule 3.3 and the respondent was ordered to immediately comply with its disclosure obligations.

The applicant filed three Requests for an Order During Proceedings seeking document disclosure, exclusion of evidence, and a declaration of guilt against the respondent police services board.

The Tribunal ordered the respondent to request the applicant's Prisoner's Medical Forms from the Crown, as they were arguably relevant and the applicant claimed they were in the Crown's possession.

The Tribunal dismissed the applicant's requests for a policy document, video evidence that no longer existed, and the exclusion of late-disclosed documents, finding no prejudice to the applicant.

The applicant police services board filed an application alleging the respondent contravened Minutes of Settlement and confidentiality agreements by publicly disclosing information discussed during mediation.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that while the respondent disclosed information from the mediation, the confidentiality agreements were not incorporated into the terms of the settlement itself.

Furthermore, the respondent's public complaints did not constitute a legal claim or demand that would violate the full and final release in the settlement.

Police services applied to quash subpoenas duces tecum issued by a preliminary inquiry judge compelling production of police policy directives governing confidential informants.

The subpoenas were issued after the Crown had refused defence disclosure requests for the documents on grounds of irrelevance and informer privilege.

The Superior Court held that a preliminary inquiry judge lacks jurisdiction to determine disclosure applications, whether framed as first-party disclosure under Stinchcombe/McNeil or third-party production under O'Connor.

By issuing subpoenas that effectively compelled production of materials the Crown had declined to disclose and which were arguably held by third parties, the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded his jurisdiction.

The subpoenas were therefore quashed.

The applicant, a Caucasian employee who followed First Nations spiritual practices, alleged discrimination and harassment by two board members of the Nishnawbe-Gamik Friendship Centre.

The Tribunal found that one respondent, Chris Carter, harassed the applicant by questioning his right to possess traditional medicines because he was not a First Nations person, making comments at an AGM questioning the job security of non-First Nations staff, and making derogatory comments about the applicant's family status after his dismissal.

The application against the other respondent, Ralph Johnson, was dismissed as there was no evidence connecting his actions to a Code ground.

The Tribunal awarded the applicant $3,000 for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect against Chris Carter.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal scheduled a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant failed to attend the summary hearing despite receiving notice.

Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the application as abandoned.

The applicant, who was in custody, requested that his human rights application be deferred until his release from jail.

The respondent objected, arguing an indefinite deferral would be unfair.

The Tribunal found that proceeding with a merits hearing while the self-represented applicant was in custody would be unfair, as he would have difficulty accessing necessary medical and other documentation.

Balancing the interests, the Tribunal ordered the application deferred for six months or until the applicant's release, whichever occurs first.

The applicant alleged that the respondent police services board discriminated against him on the basis of disability and creed, and reprised against him.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the allegations had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal dismissed most of the allegations, including claims of reprisal and Charter violations, for lack of jurisdiction or lack of evidence connecting the conduct to Code grounds.

However, the Tribunal allowed the allegations regarding the denial of medication while in custody and the use of a racial slur by an officer to proceed to mediation.

The applicant requested to amend her human rights application to remove references to damages for dismissal in order to pursue other causes of action in court.

The Tribunal initially granted the request without prejudice to the respondents.

The respondents subsequently requested an extension of time to respond, claiming they missed the request due to a spam filter.

The Tribunal treated this as a request for reconsideration but ultimately upheld its original decision, finding no current abuse of process or prejudice to the respondents, and noting that the respondents could raise jurisdictional arguments if the applicant pursued a claim in court.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment.

The application was previously withdrawn against the organizational respondent, Nishnawbe-Gamik Friendship Centre.

The individual respondent, Ralph Johnson, requested to be removed as a party.

The Tribunal directed submissions on whether the Centre remained a proper respondent.

The Tribunal treated the applicant's submissions as a request for reconsideration of the withdrawal order and denied it, finding no compelling or extraordinary circumstances to reverse the withdrawal.

Consequently, the Centre was not reinstated as a respondent.

Because no organizational respondent remained, the Tribunal denied the individual respondent's request to be removed from the application.

The applicant filed a Request for Order During Proceedings seeking to amend her human rights application to remove all references to damages for dismissal and to add the Town of Fort Frances as a respondent.

The respondents did not respond to the request.

The Tribunal granted the request to remove references to damages, finding no prejudice to the respondents given the early stage of the proceedings.

The request to add the Town of Fort Frances as a respondent was deferred to the hearing.

The applicant requested an adjournment of a scheduled summary hearing on the basis that he was in custody and suffering from medical issues, including mental trauma, a recent stroke, and head injuries from an assault.

The respondent opposed the request, arguing that custody alone does not prevent participation.

The Tribunal granted the adjournment despite a lack of medical documentation, noting the unique circumstances, but warned the applicant that future requests would require medical evidence.

The hearing was rescheduled for Fall 2013.

The applicant filed an application under the Human Rights Code alleging discrimination and reprisal in employment.

The respondent Town of Fort Frances requested to be removed as a party, arguing it was merely the sole shareholder of the respondent Fort Frances Power Corporation and had no employment relationship with the applicant.

The Tribunal denied the request at this preliminary stage, noting the applicant's assertion that her pay cheques and benefits came from the Town, and held that the Town could renew its request with evidentiary support if mediation failed.

The defendants brought a motion in Small Claims Court to strike an amended plaintiff’s claim alleging negligent construction of an in-ground swimming pool.

The defendants argued the action was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 because the plaintiffs allegedly discovered their loss in 2009 and commenced the claim outside the two‑year limitation period.

The court held that it was not clear on the pleadings when the claim was discovered, particularly given allegations that the defendants continued attempting to remedy the deficiencies through 2010.

Because it was possible that a proceeding was not yet an appropriate means to remedy the dispute during ongoing repair efforts, the limitation defence was not virtually certain to succeed.

The court declined to strike the claim and left the limitation issue to be determined at trial.