Harry G. Black

The Crown sought leave to call reply evidence from a former federal drug prosecutor regarding general expectations of the federal Crown concerning the preparation of police Crown briefs, disclosure obligations, and the handling of confidential informants.

The proposed evidence was intended to rebut defence testimony suggesting disclosure had been made in accordance with Department of Justice policy.

The court held the evidence remained only marginally relevant because no evidentiary link connected those general expectations to the accused police officers or their training.

Given its limited probative value and the risk that calling a sitting Superior Court judge as a witness would unduly influence the jury, the court found the potential prejudice outweighed the minimal probative value.

The application to introduce the reply evidence was therefore refused.

In a criminal trial involving allegations of assault, theft, perjury, and conspiracy to obstruct justice by police officers, the Crown sought to introduce Toronto Police Service directives and evidence of standard police practices.

The defence objected on grounds including irrelevance, prejudice, and hearsay.

The court held that the directives and expert evidence regarding general police norms were admissible because they provided context for assessing the accused officers’ conduct and state of mind, particularly regarding omissions in memo books, handling of seized property, disclosure practices, and use of informants.

However, testimony about how particular directives were implemented at a specific police division without personal knowledge was excluded as hearsay.

Selected directives and limited expert evidence were admitted subject to these constraints.

Media organizations sought permission to use electronic devices to transmit information from inside the courtroom and to make audio recordings during a criminal jury trial.

The court considered s. 136 of the Courts of Justice Act and an applicable practice direction permitting unobtrusive audio recording by journalists solely to supplement handwritten notes.

The court authorized such audio recordings and permitted journalists to transmit information from inside the courtroom, provided proceedings were not disrupted.

The court also established a procedure governing media access to large volumes of documentary exhibits, requiring undertakings preventing publication until a judicial determination confirmed sufficient evidence to place the document before the jury.

A publication restriction was ordered for specified personal identifying information contained in documentary materials.

The appellant police officer appealed a decision of the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services, which upheld a Hearing Officer's finding of discreditable conduct and the penalty of dismissal.

The misconduct involved the officer issuing but failing to serve six traffic tickets, resulting in an innocent man being wrongfully convicted and incarcerated for five days.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no breach of procedural fairness, upholding the findings of misconduct, and concluding that the penalty of dismissal was reasonable given the egregious nature of the officer's actions and lack of rehabilitative potential.

The applicant police officer brought a motion to dismiss the appellant's appeal for failing to comply with the 30-day time limit under section 70(1) of the Police Services Act.

The appellant filed his notice of appeal over 60 days after receiving the hearing officer's decision staying the disciplinary proceedings.

The Commission held that the 30-day statutory time limit is mandatory and cannot be extended under the Commission's Rules of Practice.

The motion was granted and the appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay serious charges against six police officers due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had attributed the 56-month delay primarily to the Crown's failure to make timely disclosure.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal for five of the officers, finding the trial judge erred in attributing the delay to disclosure issues rather than the inherent time requirements of a highly complex case.

A new trial was ordered for those five officers.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal regarding the sixth officer, finding the delay in his much simpler case was unreasonable because the Crown unnecessarily insisted his trial follow the complex trial of his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

Having regard to the submissions of counsel and an outstanding costs order, the court awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $12,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The Registrar appealed a Divisional Court decision that found the Board erred in law regarding a liquor licensee permitting drunkenness on its premises.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the Board misinterpreted the word 'permits' in section 45(1) of the regulation, holding that it requires proof the licensee knew or ought to have known of the drunkenness.

Although the Court of Appeal disagreed with the Divisional Court's assessment that the evidence could not support a finding against the licensee, it declined to order a new hearing.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant police officer appealed a finding of misconduct for insubordination after conducting CPIC searches on his wife's vehicle at her request.

The Toronto Police Service cross-appealed the Commission's decision to reduce the officer's penalty from a seven-day to a three-day forfeiture.

The Divisional Court dismissed both appeals, finding that the Commission reasonably concluded the CPIC searches were not exclusively for police business and that the Hearing Officer implicitly rejected the officer's defence of honest belief.

The Court also upheld the Commission's interpretation of the Police Services Act, confirming that prior informal discipline must be expunged after two years and cannot be considered in sentencing unless a new finding of misconduct is proven within that period.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed a finding of guilt for insubordination and the resulting penalty of forfeiture of seven days' pay.

The charges arose after the appellant was quoted in a newspaper article discussing ongoing disciplinary charges against him and making derogatory comments about the police service.

He subsequently refused to comply with five orders (four written, one verbal) to attend an investigative interview, acting on the advice of his legal counsel who argued the notices lacked sufficient detail.

The Commission dismissed the appeal, finding that the notices complied with the Police Services Act and constituted lawful orders.

The Commission held that reliance on legal advice does not provide a lawful excuse for a police officer to disobey a lawful order, and upheld the penalty as appropriate.

The appellant police officer appealed a finding of guilt for insubordination and the resulting penalty of a seven-day forfeiture.

The officer had conducted unauthorized CPIC inquiries on his wife and her vehicle for personal reasons, specifically to determine if his ex-wife had improperly searched for their new address.

The Commission upheld the finding of guilt, confirming that CPIC must be used exclusively for police business and that the officer's personal motivations did not justify the searches.

However, the Commission reduced the penalty to a three-day forfeiture, finding that the Hearing Officer erred in law by considering prior informal discipline that should have been expunged from the officer's record under section 64(16) of the Police Services Act.

The appellant licensee appealed a decision of the Board of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario finding it breached s. 45(1) of O. Reg 719/90 by permitting drunkenness on its premises.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Board committed an error of law by failing to make a specific finding that the licensee 'permitted' the intoxicated patron to be on the premises, which is an essential element of the infraction.

The finding of a violation was set aside.

The appellant, a senior police officer, appealed a finding of guilt for discreditable conduct and the resulting penalty of dismissal.

The officer had stopped a motorist and issued five summonses, but also prepared a second set of six summonses using the driving history of another individual with the same name.

The officer failed to serve the second set of summonses but later testified in court that he had, resulting in the innocent motorist being convicted in absentia, fined, and incarcerated for five days.

The Commission upheld the Hearing Officer's finding of guilt, noting it was well-supported by the evidence.

The Commission also upheld the penalty of dismissal, finding the officer's actions constituted egregious misconduct that caused a serious miscarriage of justice and irreparably damaged his usefulness to the police service.

The appellant police officer appealed a finding of guilt for discreditable conduct and the resulting penalty of dismissal.

The officer had issued two sets of summonses to a motorist but only served one set, leading to the motorist being convicted in absentia on the unserved charges and wrongfully incarcerated for five days.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission upheld the Hearing Officer's findings, concluding that the evidence supported the conviction and that the officer's deliberate dishonesty, lack of remorse, and the severe consequences to the innocent motorist justified the penalty of dismissal.

The appellant police officer was found guilty of neglect of duty for delaying a detainee's right to counsel for 90 minutes after the initial justification for the delay (officer safety) had passed.

The Hearing Officer imposed a reprimand, but the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services substituted a six-month reduction in rank.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the Commission's decision unreasonable, as it failed to consider mitigating factors and wrongly concluded that a reprimand was an unavailable penalty for a Charter breach.

The appeal was allowed and the reprimand restored.

The appellant police officer appealed convictions for discreditable conduct and deceit, as well as the penalty of dismissal, arising from a false affidavit she swore regarding a parking ticket.

The Commission found that the Hearing Officer lacked jurisdiction because the Notice of Hearing was served more than six months after the investigators had a sufficient body of factual information to support the allegations, violating the mandatory limitation period in s. 69(18) of the Police Services Act.

The convictions and penalty were quashed.

The Registrar of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario issued a Notice of Proposal to suspend the liquor licence of the Licensee for allegedly permitting liquor to be sold to intoxicated persons and permitting drunkenness on the premises on two separate dates.

The Board found no violation for the first date due to inconsistencies in the inspector's evidence and lack of proof of intoxication or sale.

However, based on unrefuted evidence from two undercover inspectors regarding the second date, the Board found that the Licensee permitted drunkenness on the premises.

The Board requested written submissions on the appropriate sanction.

The Registrar of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario issued a Notice of Proposal to suspend the liquor licence of Ridgelane Holdings Inc., operating as The Frog & Firkin, alleging the licensee permitted drunkenness on the premises.

The parties proceeded by way of an Agreed Statement of Facts and Joint Submission on Disposition, wherein the licensee admitted to the breach.

The Board accepted the joint submission and ordered a 7-day suspension of the liquor licence.

A police constable was acquitted of criminal charges and subsequently faced discipline proceedings under the Police Services Act for the same conduct.

The hearing officer, appointed by the Chief of Police, stayed the discipline proceedings as an abuse of process.

The Chief, who has no statutory right of appeal, sought judicial review of the decision.

The Divisional Court granted the application and quashed the stay.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Chief does not have standing to seek judicial review of a decision made by his own delegate, as the Chief and the hearing officer are synonymous under the Act.

The appeal was allowed and the hearing officer's decision was reinstated.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision to quash the respondents' convictions for assault and enter a stay of proceedings.

The respondents, two off-duty police officers, had been convicted at trial of assaulting a teenager during a wrongful arrest for car theft.

The summary conviction appeal judge found the trial judge erred by failing to explicitly advert to the dual purposes of character evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding the trial judge's treatment of the character evidence was adequate in the context of his credibility assessment.

The Court of Appeal restored the convictions and remitted the sentence appeals to a different summary conviction appeal judge.