Mark C. Halfyard

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in failing to provide a corrective instruction after the Crown's closing address invited the jury to engage in impermissible reasoning, specifically by linking the absence of a motive to fabricate with the reliability of the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's closing improperly invited the jury to equate the complainant's good relationship with the appellant and lack of motive to fabricate with the reliability of her evidence.

The court held that a corrective instruction was required, and its absence compromised the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, M.O., appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and break and enter.

The core issue on appeal was whether the trial judge gave undue weight to the complainant's videotaped statement, entered under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code, based on a misinterpretation of R. v. F. (C.C.).

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's reference to F. (C.C.)'s statement about a videotape reflecting a "more accurate recollection" was made in the context of explaining the purpose of s. 715.1, not to assign undue weight.

The Court concluded that the trial judge properly assessed the complainant's evidence, including inconsistencies, and found her credible and reliable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for five sexual offences, including sexual assault, human trafficking, and related material benefit and advertising charges.

The appeal raised four grounds concerning the trial judge's treatment of evidence: a misapprehension of a text message, exclusion of WhatsApp messages, refusal to permit cross-examination on prior "sexual punishment" and improper reliance on two text messages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding that the trial judge's mistake regarding the text message was not essential to the reasoning, the WhatsApp messages were properly excluded under s. 276 of the Criminal Code and Canada Evidence Act due to authenticity concerns and prejudice, the refusal to permit cross-examination on prior sexual punishment was correct as it related to impermissible "twin myth" reasoning, and the reliance on the two text messages was proper.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual interference and sexual exploitation, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility and reliability of child witnesses (his daughter S.R. and step-granddaughter S.R.D.) by improperly discounting inconsistencies and compartmentalizing evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of inconsistencies or his distinction between intentional and inadvertent tainting of evidence.

The court affirmed that the trial judge correctly applied the law regarding child witnesses and that his credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The applicant, B.B., sought release pending the determination of his appeal from convictions for sexual assault and assault.

The application was dismissed as the applicant failed to satisfy the public interest criterion under s. 679(3)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the enforceability interest significantly outweighed the reviewability interest, primarily due to the serious nature of the offences and the applicant's inability to provide a sufficiently complete record (missing trial transcripts) to demonstrate that the grounds of appeal clearly surpassed the 'not frivolous' threshold.

The appellant, Frank Marrone, appealed his conviction for possession of powder cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He raised three grounds: unreasonable verdict, conflict of interest of his original defence counsel, and reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first two grounds, finding the verdict was reasonable and no actual impairment of representation due to the alleged conflict.

However, the Court found that the trial judge's repeated, unjustified criticisms and characterizations of defence counsel's conduct, including accusations of "lulling" the Crown and misrepresenting facts, created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered for the possession for the purpose of trafficking charge.

The appellant, S.T., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal raised two grounds: the trial judge's findings regarding the appellant's sobriety were unreasonable and erroneous, and the trial judge's finding of partiality in a defence witness was not supported by evidence and led to an erroneous rejection of their testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material, reversible error.

The court held that the trial judge's assessment of the appellant's intoxication was within their purview and did not require expert evidence.

While the finding of witness partiality was problematic due to lack of opportunity for the parties to respond, it was deemed not material to the overall assessment of evidence or the trial's outcome, and did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellants, U.K. and R.P., appealed their convictions for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in jury instructions regarding fabrication as post-offence conduct and the application of the W.(D.) principles.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury on fabrication of trial evidence without independent evidence, and by providing a deficient fabrication instruction that failed to distinguish between disbelieved and fabricated evidence, explain independent evidence, or require consideration of alternative explanations.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred in the W.(D.) instruction by conflating the appellants' evidence and treating defence evidence as an all-or-nothing proposition.

These errors were deemed prejudicial, going to the heart of credibility assessment and the burden of proof.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso.

The appellants, C.I. and M.G., appealed their convictions for sexual assault.

The appeal raised four grounds: improper leading questions during examination-in-chief of the complainant, denial of cross-examination of a co-accused, failure to properly instruct the jury on the limited use of the complainant's prior consistent statements, and erroneous exclusion of video and photographic evidence under s. 278.92 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while some procedural errors occurred, they did not result in a miscarriage of justice, and the trial judge's exclusion of the video and photographs was proper given their minimal probative value and significant prejudicial effect on the complainant's dignity and privacy.

The appellants, Floriano Sylvester Daponte and Vivian Lee Hamilton, appealed their joint convictions for drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The convictions stemmed from a search of their farm property where a large quantity of drugs and cash were found.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in assessing an alternative suspect (Mr. Colpaert), finding his access to the residence speculative, and improperly using their failure to testify.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Daponte's appeal, finding the evidence against him cogent and the trial judge's conclusions reasonable.

However, Ms. Hamilton's appeal was allowed, and acquittals were substituted, as there was insufficient evidence to infer her knowledge or control of the buried drugs, and her connection to the drive shed was tenuous.

The appellant appealed his sentence for child abduction contrary to a parenting order and disobeying a court order.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in applying the R. v. Proulx analysis for a conditional sentence, treated an essential element of the offence as an aggravating factor, failed to account for R. v. Duncan credit for onerous presentence custody conditions, and imposed a demonstrably unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the custodial sentence, finding no reversible error in the sentencing judge's approach to deterrence, denunciation, and the application of presentence credit principles, despite acknowledging a minor error regarding aggravating factors.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession, accessing, and making child pornography available.

The central issue at trial was the appellant's knowledge and control over illicit material found on computers seized from his father's residence.

The trial judge relied on circumstantial evidence, including dates from a Digital Forensic Report that was not formally admitted into evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the verdict was not unreasonable based on admissible evidence, the trial judge's material reliance on the unadmitted report constituted a misapprehension of evidence, which was essential to the reasoning process and resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown sought to admit similar fact evidence from a prior sexual assault allegation (F.J.) against the accused (J.R.) in his current trial for sexual assault (D.F-H.).

The defence argued the evidence was inadmissible due to issue estoppel, abuse of process, or failure to meet the orthodox test for similar fact evidence.

The court found that a prior stay of proceedings for delay (s. 11(b) Charter) on the F.J. charges did not constitute a determination on the merits, thus issue estoppel and abuse of process did not apply.

The court further found that the F.J. evidence met the test for admissibility as similar fact evidence, demonstrating sufficient similarities in context and method, and that any prejudice was minimized in a judge-alone trial.

The Crown's application was allowed.

The appellant, R.R., appealed convictions for ten offences involving child pornography and counselling to commit sexual interference, arguing entrapment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that the police had reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigation based on the appellant's Craigslist ad and that the investigation did not constitute entrapment.

The court found the appellant's statements in the ad were sufficient to ground reasonable suspicion.

The appellant's appeal from sentence was abandoned.

The appellant, a police officer, was convicted of breach of trust, conspiracy, and attempting to obstruct justice after disseminating confidential police information.

He appealed, arguing that the London Police Service's investigation of its own officer created an inherent conflict of interest amounting to an abuse of process under the residual category.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the police service's conduct did not offend societal notions of fair play and decency, and that the failure to transfer the investigation to an outside force earlier did not undermine the integrity of the justice system.

The appellant, B.V., appealed his conviction for assault and intermittent jail sentence.

The appeal raised three grounds: the trial judge's alleged error in placing the burden on the defence to establish a motive to fabricate, the finding that the force used was not de minimis, and the rejection of the s. 43 Criminal Code defence of corrective force.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the de minimis doctrine did not apply given the context of inter-familial aggression and psychological harm, and that the force was not for corrective purposes but motivated by anger.

The court also found that any error regarding the burden of proof for motive to fabricate was harmless and did not affect the outcome.

This is an appeal from a conviction for sexual assault.

The appellant raised four grounds: improper use of a prior consistent statement to bolster credibility, error in reliability analysis regarding the complainant's detailed description, failure to adequately address the physical improbability of the touching as described, and misapprehension of evidence regarding the touched breast.

The court dismissed all grounds, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability, proper use of contemporaneous demeanor evidence, and a thorough consideration of the physical mechanics of the assault.

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant, Aamir Syed, appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, the verdict was illogical, and the judge misapprehended evidence, specifically regarding an expert's toxicology report, the complainant's alcohol consumption, and a potential motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were adequate, his credibility findings were entitled to deference, and there was no misapprehension of evidence.

The court affirmed that it was open to the trial judge to accept or reject parts of a witness's testimony and to find no evidentiary basis for a motive to fabricate.

The appellant, Nicholas Wong, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

He was convicted of two counts of attempted murder with a firearm and other related offences.

The Crown sought the dangerous offender designation based on a pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive behaviour, including prior firearm possession offences.

Wong argued the sentencing judge erred by considering firearm possession as part of the pattern and by admitting expert evidence on gang affiliation and prior gun use.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the sentencing judge's determination that Wong met the dangerous offender criteria, nor in the admission of the challenged evidence.

The appellant, Helder Sousa, appealed a 10-year sentence for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal considered three grounds: failure to consider potential immigration consequences, treating denial of the offence and lack of remorse as aggravating, and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The court dismissed the first two grounds, affirming that immigration consequences are discretionary and denial of the offence relates to rehabilitation, not aggravation.

However, the court found the 10-year sentence demonstrably unfit, particularly for a first offender, despite the egregious nature of the crime.

Applying principles of parity, proportionality, and restraint, and comparing it to similar cases, the court reduced the sentence to eight years' imprisonment (seven years, eight and a half months after credit for presentence custody).