Mark C. Halfyard

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder following a fatal shooting at a nightclub.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant killed the deceased in revenge for a prior stabbing incident.

At trial, the Crown relied on eyewitness identification and out-of-court statements made by the deceased to his mother, which were admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to give a Chartier instruction regarding eyewitness identification and by admitting the hearsay statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a Chartier instruction was not required as there was direct recognition and supporting evidence, and that the trial judge did not err in finding the hearsay statements met the threshold reliability criterion.

The appellant appealed her five-year sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to apply the principle of parity with her co-accused.

The Court of Appeal denied the Crown's adjournment request, noting the appeal would become moot if delayed.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge struck an appropriate balance and correctly concluded that the appellant's late willingness to cooperate put her in a different position from her co-accused.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge improperly restricted the Parks question during jury selection and misdirected the triers on the challenge for cause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the permitted question encompassed both the attitudinal and behavioural components of the Parks inquiry and the triers were not misled.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed because the trial judge erred by failing to give the appellant credit for her cooperation with the police.

The sentence was reduced to six years.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after drugs were found in his luggage trolley at the airport.

At trial, the Crown relied on an unrecorded inculpatory statement allegedly made to police, which the appellant denied making.

The trial judge refused to give a special jury instruction regarding the police's failure to audio or videotape the statement, and permitted the Crown to cross-examine the appellant on his prior drug convictions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in both failing to give the requested jury instruction on the unrecorded statement and in allowing cross-examination on the prior drug convictions, as their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence, gave insufficient reasons, and erred in admitting evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence were cogent and sufficient.

The Court also held that any Charter breach was minor and admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent was refused entry into the United States and directed to a secondary inspection upon returning to Canada.

A customs officer ordered him to empty his pockets, revealing counterfeit currency.

The trial judge found the pocket search violated s. 8 of the Charter and excluded the evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a pocket search is a routine, non-invasive screening procedure at a border crossing that does not engage s. 8 Charter protections or require reasonable grounds under s. 98 of the Customs Act.