Mark C. Halfyard

The appellant appealed his sentence for dangerous driving involving a police chase, arguing the trial judge erred in principle by using a three-year penitentiary term as a starting point.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that a lower penitentiary sentence was called for given the aggravating features of the conduct.

The appellant appealed his 7.5-year global sentence for sexual assault with a weapon, robbery, and threatening death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's analysis.

The court noted the extreme seriousness of the crimes, the appellant's commission of similar crimes while on bail, and psychiatric evidence indicating a moderate to high risk of sexually violent recidivism.

The court agreed that the protection of society was the overriding sentencing consideration.

The young person appealed a conviction, arguing that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence.

The appellant contended that the trial judge erred regarding the location of DNA on the complainant's underwear, the distinction between DNA and saliva, whether the complainant was fully clothed, and the extent of parental supervision in the bedroom.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's misstatements were not material and did not vitiate the key findings that supported the conviction.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to apply the Vetrovec principles to a witness's evidence and erred in presuming she had knowledge of materials from various civil suits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was alive to the witness's evidence and was not required to expressly refer to Vetrovec.

Furthermore, any error regarding the civil suits caused no prejudice as they were a minor aspect of the case and the appellant had the opportunity to provide an explanation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for cocaine trafficking and firearm offences, as well as his eight-year sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred by refusing to reopen the case to allow alibi evidence, and by improperly treating the evidence of an accomplice and a corroborating officer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary refusal to reopen the case or her credibility assessments of the witnesses.

The sentence was upheld as fit.

The Crown appealed a jury verdict acquitting the respondent of sexual offences against a young complainant.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by refusing to allow re-examination of the complainant on prior consistent statements and by failing to grant a mistrial following defence counsel's closing address.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the defence cross-examination did not implicitly allege recent fabrication, and the trial judge's refusal to declare a mistrial was well within his discretion.

The appellant appealed a finding that he breached his conditional sentences.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence concerning other employment undertaken by the appellant, which was central to the trial judge's reasoning.

The appeal was allowed, and on agreement of counsel, the remaining 72 days of the conditional sentence were reinstated under the same conditions and terms.

The appellant challenged his conviction as a party to a sexual assault with a weapon arising from a group sexual assault committed during a heavily intoxicated gathering, arguing that the trial judge failed to address intoxication and scrutinized defence evidence more harshly than Crown evidence.

The court held that the intoxication defence had an air of reality, but the trial reasons, read contextually, showed the trial judge was aware of the defence and rejected it, thereby permitting meaningful appellate review.

The court also rejected the complaint about uneven scrutiny, finding the credibility analysis thorough and balanced.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed because the custodial term was fit and parity with youth co-accused sentenced under a different statutory regime did not assist the appellant.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder following a shooting at a nightclub.

The Crown's theory was that the shooting was in retaliation for a previous stabbing incident.

At trial, the judge admitted out-of-court statements made by the deceased victim to his mother shortly before his death, which implicated the appellant's brother in a prior attempt on the victim's life.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the statements met the threshold reliability requirement under the principled approach to hearsay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the correct test and properly considered the relevant factors, including the absence of a motive to fabricate and the availability of the mother for cross-examination.

The appellant appealed his sentence of seven years for ten armed robberies and two unlawful confinements.

He argued that an arithmetic error was made in calculating his pre-trial custody and that he should receive credit for time spent in custody on a separate drug conviction that was subsequently quashed and stayed.

The Court of Appeal unanimously agreed to correct the arithmetic error, reducing the sentence by 70 days.

However, the majority held that the appellant could not receive credit for time spent serving a sentence for an unrelated offence, even though that conviction was later quashed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms and drug-related offences, arguing that evidence discovered during a police night search of his home under a telewarrant should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to a s. 8 violation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err in his Collins analysis.

The breach was not serious, the police did not act in bad faith, and the circumstances were urgent, justifying the admission of the non-conscriptive evidence.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, uttering a death threat, and unlawful confinement.

The trial judge granted a stay of proceedings, finding that the 30-month delay from the date of the charge to the scheduled trial date violated the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, concluding that the delay was not unreasonable given the mutual agreement to convert the case to a superior court trial with a preliminary inquiry, and the lack of significant prejudice to the accused.

The stay was set aside and the matter was directed to proceed to trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made unsupported findings regarding the appellant's memory and improperly enhanced the complainant's credibility by accepting bizarre and improbable allegations as probably true.

Combined with the Crown's failure to disclose evidence relevant to the complainant's mental state, these errors raised fairness concerns.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered on all counts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and related offences arising from a shooting in a high school gymnasium, as well as his 18-year sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing expert evidence on eyewitness identification, admitting in-dock identification, and in the jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 18-year sentence was manifestly fit given the aggravating factors, including the appellant's record and the danger posed to bystanders.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit to the appeal and concluding that the sentence imposed was entirely fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

Based on a concession by the Crown, which the Court of Appeal found to be proper and correct, the appeal was allowed, the conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing the sentencing judge erred by imposing a conditional sentence after finding the appropriate sentence was 36 months' incarceration.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that under s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code, a conditional sentence is unavailable when a sentence of two years or more is imposed.

However, because the respondent had complied with his conditional sentence for six and a half months and made significant rehabilitative efforts, the Court varied the sentence to 36 months' incarceration but stayed the remaining three and a half months to avoid reincarceration.

The appellant appealed his convictions for obstructing a police officer and possession of a prohibited weapon.

He argued the trial judge erred in the mens rea analysis for obstruction, misapprehended evidence regarding a suspected stolen vehicle, and erred in finding a buck knife opened by centrifugal force.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge applied the proper mens rea analysis, correctly understood the evidence, and was entitled to rely on the police officer's demonstration of the knife.

The appellants were convicted of forcible confinement and possession of a prohibited weapon following a jury trial, having been acquitted of robbery, assault, and pointing a firearm.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge failed to properly relate the defence theory to the jury and erred in the W.(D.) instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the jury was properly instructed.

However, the sentence appeal of one appellant was allowed, as the trial judge erred in principle by sentencing him based on an assault for which he had been acquitted.

His sentence was varied to time served.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a firearm while prohibited and breach of probation.

He argued he was arbitrarily detained and searched, and that the unloaded sawed-off rifle found on him should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal assumed an arbitrary detention occurred but held the evidence should not be excluded, finding the police acted in good faith in a high-crime area and the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.