COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
RE:
Her majesty the queen (Respondent) – and – Piotr Wlodkowski (Appellant)
BEFORE:
LASKIN, MacPHERSON and CRONK JJ.A.
COUNSEL:
Mark Halfyard
for the appellant
Sandra Caponecchia
for the respondent
HEARD:
February 23, 2007
On appeal from the convictions entered by Justice John M. Ritchie of the Ontario Court of Justice dated January 24, 2006.
E N D O R S E M E N T
1On his conviction for obstructing a police officer, the appellant submits that the trial judge erred in two ways: first, he erred in his analysis of the mens rea requirement of the offence; second, he misapprehended the evidence about whether the lead BMW was a stolen car. We disagree.
2Two passages in the trial judge’s reasons show that he applied the proper mens rea analysis and that he found that the Crown had proved the appellant had the necessary mens rea. In his reasons, the trial judge said:
The defence subsequently submitted that there was no evidence that the defendant had any knowledge that the suspect vehicle was allegedly stolen, and the defendant therefore had no motive to help the driver of that vehicle. I entirely agree that no such knowledge can be imputed to the defendant. However, I have concluded that the defendant was helping the suspect. The defendant could have had any number of reasons, such as believing that the suspect was prohibited from driving, but it is not appropriate to speculate on motivation. Also, the defendant’s motives are of no consequence. The important point is that the defendant deliberately impeded Officer Jackson and thereby assisted the suspect.
3The trial judge reiterated this finding later in his reasons:
I have found that the defendant wilfully placed his vehicle in front of a uniformed police officer in a marked police vehicle and blocked the officer from following a suspect with a view to arresting him. I am satisfied that the “knowledge” component was made out by the evidence and that mens rea was proven.
On the basis of these passages we are satisfied that the trial judge did not err in his mens rea analysis.
4The appellant complains that in his reasons the trial judge erroneously considered that the lead BMW was a stolen car and that this misapprehension of the evidence tainted his analysis. The appellant was acquitted of the theft charge and the Crown led no evidence that the other BMW was stolen. We do not think, however, that the trial judge misapprehended this evidence. Early in his reasons the trial judge correctly referred to the lead BMW as “a suspected stolen vehicle”. The trial judge’s later references to the “stolen car” were undoubtedly a short hand reference to a car the police thought had been stolen. Thus, we do not think that the trial judge made any error in his appreciation of the evidence. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal from the conviction for obstructing a police officer.
5On his conviction for possession of a prohibited weapon, the appellant argues that the trial judge erred in finding that the buck knife opened by centrifugal force. We disagree. The trial judge was entitled to rely on the officer’s demonstration: see R. v. Phillips (1978), 1978 CanLII 2434 (ON CA), 44 C.C.C. (2d) 548 (Ont. C.A.). Accordingly, the appeal from this conviction must also fail.
6The appeal is therefore dismissed.
“John Laskin J.A”
“J.C. MacPherson J.A.”
“E.A. Cronk J.A.”