Helena Gluzman

The accused was charged with procuring a complainant to become a prostitute and with exercising control, direction, or influence over her movements for the purpose of gain contrary to s. 212(1)(d) and s. 212(1)(h) of the Criminal Code.

The evidence showed the complainant worked as a stripper performing lap dances and later engaged in additional sexual services for payment while regularly consulting with the accused, who assisted her in obtaining work, set prices for sexual services, transported her, remained in frequent contact, and received large portions of her earnings.

The court found significant credibility concerns in the complainant’s testimony and concluded there was a reasonable doubt that the accused had persuaded or induced her to become a prostitute.

However, the court was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused exercised direction and influence that aided her prostitution for the purpose of financial gain.

The accused was acquitted of procuring but convicted of exercising control or influence for gain.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired care and control and excess blood alcohol arising from a six‑day trial.

He challenged the trial judge’s credibility findings, alleged a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter, and argued that his vehicle was inoperable such that he lacked care and control.

The court held that credibility findings by the trial judge were entitled to deference and disclosed no palpable or overriding error.

The appellant had not raised a s. 11(b) issue at trial and provided no evidentiary basis for such a claim.

The evidence supported the finding that the appellant had care and control of an operable vehicle while impaired.

During a criminal trial for procuring a person to become a prostitute and exercising control or influence over a person engaged in prostitution, the accused brought an application for directed verdicts of acquittal at the close of the Crown’s case.

The court applied the test of whether there was any admissible evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could convict if the evidence were believed.

The evidence included testimony that the accused encouraged the complainant to work as a stripper, instructed her in lap dancing, advised her regarding sexual services for payment, transported her, controlled the proceeds of her earnings, and directed aspects of her work.

The court held that lap dancing involving sexual contact for payment could constitute prostitution and that the evidence could support findings of procuring and exercising direction or influence for the purpose of gain.

The application for directed verdicts was dismissed.

The Crown sought to introduce a statement made by the defendant to Constable Foreman in the Intoxilyzer room for purposes of cross-examination.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with over 80 mgs. per cent blood alcohol.

The court conducted a voluntariness voir dire and found that the Crown failed to call all persons in authority who had dealings with the defendant, specifically the Staff Sergeant and booking officer who were observed in conversation with the defendant on video.

The court excluded the statement, finding that the Crown's failure to call these witnesses prevented it from satisfying the burden of proving the statement was voluntarily made.

The accused was charged with two counts of robbery, two counts of robbery with an imitation firearm, and one count of arson arising from incidents on February 19, 2014.

The Crown sought detention on primary and secondary grounds.

The accused, who is of Aboriginal descent, proposed his mother as surety with a house arrest plan.

The court found that the Crown satisfied its onus on both the primary ground (ensuring attendance in court) and the secondary ground (protection of the public).

The accused's extensive criminal history involving violence and weapons, combined with his demonstrated non-compliance with court orders and supervision, established that detention was necessary.

The court ordered the accused detained in custody.

The defendant, age 63, was convicted after trial of two counts of sexual touching, one count of sexual assault, and one count of invitation to sexual touching involving two young male victims (ages 8 and 10) over a six-month period in early 2011.

The defendant was a tenant in the home of the boys' grandmother.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 5-6 years, while the defence sought time served.

The court imposed a sentence of 3 years custody concurrent, less pre-trial custody of 26 months on an enhanced 1.5:1 credit ratio, resulting in a net sentence of 10 months, followed by one year probation with conditions including no contact with the victims and their family members, DNA sampling, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and lifetime registration on the Sexual Offender Registry.

The accused pleaded guilty to breaking and entering a dwelling house and committing assault therein, assault, and breach of recognizance.

The central issue was whether a causal nexus existed between the accused's chronic schizophrenia and his offending conduct.

Expert psychiatric evidence established that the accused's delusional beliefs regarding the victim were of delusional intensity and significantly drove his behaviour.

The court found the accused represented the lowest risk to community safety and imposed a suspended sentence with two years' probation, prioritizing rehabilitation over deterrence and denunciation.

The accused was charged with breach of recognizance, multiple counts of assault, and sexual assault arising from a turbulent domestic relationship.

The complainant alleged repeated physical assaults and non‑consensual sexual activity over a two‑year period.

The court accepted the complainant’s evidence regarding physical violence, finding it corroborated by witness observations of injuries and admissions contained in the accused’s letters and statements to a friend.

However, the court found reasonable doubt regarding the sexual assault allegation due to the timing of disclosure and credibility concerns.

The accused was convicted of breach of recognizance and several assault counts but acquitted of sexual assault.

The applicant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He brought a motion alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was violated.

The total delay from the date of the alleged offence to the scheduled trial dates was approximately 15 months.

The court found that while most of the delay was attributable to institutional resource limitations, there was also delay caused by the Crown's failure to provide police notes in a timely manner.

The court determined that the applicant had demonstrated a probable violation of his section 11(b) Charter rights and granted the application, staying the charge.

A 63-year-old defendant was charged with two counts of sexual assault, two counts of sexual interference, and one count of invitation to sexual touching against two young boys (ages 10 and 12 at the time of the alleged incidents) who lived in the same household between early 2011 and March 31, 2012.

The allegations involved unwanted touching of the boys' genitals and buttocks, exposure to pornography, and requests for sexual acts.

The defendant denied all allegations.

The court applied the W.D. test and found the defendant's evidence not credible and raising no reasonable doubt.

The court accepted the evidence of both complainants and found the Crown had proven all essential elements of each offence beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in convictions on all counts.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial involving historical intrafamilial sexual assault allegations by two complainants, the court first rejected the Crown’s similar fact application.

Applying the similar fact framework, the court found material inconsistencies, a realistic possibility of collusion, long temporal separation, generic rather than distinctive similarities, and an intervening medical event said to affect the proposed inference.

On the merits, applying the credibility framework in W.(D.), the court accepted the accused’s denial evidence as credible and held the Crown had not proved any of the six counts beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand on two Charter grounds: first, that the accused's initial statement was statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act, and second, that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make the demand, thereby infringing section 8 rights.

The defence also argued that evidence of the accused's alcohol consumption demonstrated her blood alcohol concentration was below the legal limit at the time of driving.

The court rejected all defence arguments, finding no statutory compulsion, that the officer had both subjective and objective reasonable suspicion, and that the accused's evidence was unreliable and did not raise a reasonable doubt.