Court File and Parties
COURT FILE NO.: CR-16-70000085-00BR DATE: 20160614 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Respondent – and – OMAR MCLEOD Applicant
Counsel: Rabinder Sidhu, for the Crown Marcel Buchler, for the Applicant
HEARD: April 28, 2016, at Toronto
Michael G. Quigley, J.
Reasons for Bail Review Ruling
Introduction
[1] On this application for judicial interim release, Omar McLeod asks that I vacate the order of J.P. Wassenaar that he be detained in custody pending his trial. He asks to now be released on the basis of a claimed material change in circumstances, and that he be kept at home under the supervision of his mother and step-father as sureties pending his trial under terms amounting to house arrest.
[2] The Crown agrees that there has been a material change in circumstances since the November 2015 bail hearing, but argues it is not one that favours Mr. McLeod’s release. Initially, Mr. McLeod was detained on the secondary ground. The Crown resists this application and now opposes the release of the applicant on both the secondary and the tertiary grounds in s. 515(10)(b) and (c) of the Criminal Code.
[3] Mr. McLeod is 25 years old. He does have a prior criminal record. He is now charged with a total of 22 charges of assault, sexual assault, threatening death, choking, forcible confinement, and similar charges relative to three separate complainants in three distinct time periods:
(i) Six charges relating to Ms. R.R. are alleged to have arisen in November 2015; (ii) Fourteen charges relating to Ms. J.M. related to the period between May 6, 2014 and July 30, 2014; and (iii) Five charges arising out of the complaint of Ms. D.K. are alleged to have occurred between February 28, and December 31, 2009.
None of the complainants know each other or have anything in common apart from their connection to this accused.
[4] The issue here is whether there has been a material change in circumstances that warrants the revisiting of the prior order of detention. If so, it requires consideration whether those materially changed circumstances call for the existing order of detention encompassing the first set of charges to be vacated and Mr. McLeod to be granted bail based on the new proposed plan of suretyship.
[5] In addition, however, the applicant also seeks leave under s. 515(10) of the Code for me to conduct a bail hearing in respect to all three sets of charges now before the court. Effectively, the review application brought on the basis of alleged material change of circumstances now applies to all charges. The Crown concedes that if the applicant is successful following this review in being released from the detention order given in respect of the first charges, then it will likely apply to all three sets of charges, including those laid after the initial bail review. The onus on and burden of persuasion on this application that asks for the initial detention order to be vacated rests on the accused.
[6] At the conclusion of the hearing held on April 28, I dismissed the application of the accused. These are my formal reasons for doing so.
Summary of Background Facts
[7] The first allegations relate to Ms. R.R.. They arise out of a three-month relationship she had with the accused. They met virtually on a dating website called Plenty of Fish, and then met formally in person three weeks later. During their brief relationship, the accused would berate the complainant who came to feel the relationship was no longer sustainable. She was trying to leave the relationship because she had concluded it could not succeed. That is what allegedly triggered the violence that she claims was directed against her.
[8] The allegations are that the accused and the complainant were on Blackberry Messenger on Thursday, November 12, 2015. It was a cell phone to cell phone messenger service sending so called ‘ping’ text messages back and forth. Ms. R.R. messaged the accused and said that she wanted to end the relationship and wanted no further contact with him. He did not accept that.
[9] On Friday, November 13 at 4:00 p.m., he went over to her apartment and they had another argument. She has two children, a son and infant daughter. He became irate after she mentioned the name of the father of her baby. He left the apartment but continued to text her over the course of the following days. She continued to tell him that the relationship could not proceed. Two days later, when she was entering her place of employment on Sunday, November 15, at 10:00 a.m., the accused followed her into the building, up the stairs and to her work table. She had not previously told him where she worked. Ms. R.R. confronted him and told him he should not be there. She escorted him from the building and spoke to him outside. When challenged about how he knew where she would be, Mr. McLeod told her that he followed her to work.
[10] He continued to leave messages for her even after leaving. She repeatedly told him to stop and leave her alone and she blocked his number from being able to send messages to her phone. He appears to have been undaunted. He sent the complainant a message from a new number. Once again she blocked that new number but he kept calling and messaging from other cell phone numbers.
[11] The next day, the complainant took her son to school and returned home at 9:30a.m. with her baby daughter. As she put her key into the door, she turned around to see the accused running directly towards her. He grabbed her by the throat and forced her up against the wall. She fell to the ground as he dug his hands into her neck. She could not scream or speak due to the force on her throat. He dragged her into the apartment to continue to choke her with his hands.
[12] When she got into the apartment, she saw the injuries on her face and neck. She went to the bathroom with her daughter. He followed her, entered the bathroom and locked the door behind them. She had injuries to her face and was feeling pain in her back from being dragged across the floor. He was preventing her from leaving the bathroom. He turned on the faucets and told her to pull her pants down because he was going to have intercourse with her right then and there. She refused and pulled her daughter close to her.
[13] The accused then forced her to delete all of her messages from her cell phone and all of his contact information. He allowed her to leave some time later after he was satisfied that all of his contact information was deleted from her cell phone. At the initial bail hearing it also emerged that Mr. McLeod had extensive information about Ms. R.R., her family and her mother and where she resides. He had this information because he had persistently but surreptitiously followed her to those locations.
[14] Ms. D.K., the second complainant, had previously been in a year-long relationship with Mr. McLeod. She previously complained about Mr. McLeod at that time relative to the period of February to December 2009. After she ended the relationship, again he would not accept that it was over. He followed her on one occasion into and out of the subway towards the bus. She told the bus driver she was being followed. The driver denied the accused entry to the bus.
[15] However, when she got home, he had already gotten there by other means and ran up behind her in a manner similar to what occurred with Ms. R.R., argued with her and berated her, struck her, and then grabbed her cell phone and fled. He was found guilty of having assaulted her in the charges laid arising out of that matter in 2011, but he was granted a conditional discharge and a charge of robbery relating to the cell phone was withdrawn. However, evidently, these new charges were not previously known or disclosed. They emerged when Ms. D.K. came forward in response to the police plea to the public more recently arising out of the complaints of Ms. R.R..
[16] The third complainant, J.M., makes allegations against the accused relative to the period of May to July 2014. She called police to complain about a sexual assault. When police attended she advised that the incident occurred a couple of months earlier. She had met a male online the year previous named Omar. She provided the police with the phone number, 647-621-1670; the same phone number police currently have as Omar McLeod's contact information. She told police that she was forcibly confined to the hotel across the street and he threatened to harm her and her roommate. She advised that she had met him on the Plenty of Fish website, again the same dating website where Ms. R.R. met Mr. McLeod. He allegedly called himself Nathan, however, she told police his mother and brother call him Omar.
[17] While she stayed with him at the Idlewild Inn on May 6, 2014, Ms. J.M. told the police that he was treating her like garbage. She told him to stop. He made her fall, dragged her into the bathroom, and allegedly forced her to do many sexual acts through the course of the night. As in the other cases, Ms. J.M. claimed that he would call her regularly and persistently followed her, repeatedly threatened to harm her, regularly snuck up on her, and at one point she felt the need to leave the city after he continued to be looking for and trying to follow her. She went to Sudbury and stayed away for three weeks, but after returning to the city he started calling again and she was afraid to have an altercation. She hopes to obtain a restraining order against him. Ms. J.M. told the police that she was scared of having him charged because she was afraid what he would do to her if he got out; much worse she feared than she had already endured.
[18] The address where these events allegedly took place was apartment […] at E[…], the same address where Omar McLeod currently resides. The physical description she provided was of a male black, with a medium complexion, short, buzzed hair, a muscular build, 5'10" tall, with tattoos on his arms; a “snowy owl” tattoo on his forearm, and a religious Saint tattoo on his upper arm. All of these descriptors apply to Mr. McLeod. His arms display those tattoos.
[19] At the time of his arrest, subsequent appearance and show cause bail hearing held before Her Worship, J.P. Wassenaar on November 27, 2015, the accused had been charged only with the offences against Ms. R.R.. However, the police had these other occurrence reports relating to the 2014 allegations and they were trying to locate that complainant, Ms. J.M.. Further, they posted a website plea for any women who may have been assaulted by Mr. McLeod to come forward. This in turn led to Ms. D.K. coming forward to provide the additional allegations.
[20] Thus, even if not known in full detail, there was at least a general awareness of all of these prior incidents at the time of the initial bail hearing before J.P. Wassenaar, but the actual charges have only been laid subsequently, and at the time of the original bail hearing, only the initial six charges had been laid. Now the total charges against the accused are 22 in number.
[21] The initial bail hearing was Crown onus. At that time other counsel was representing Mr. McLeod. He put forward a plan of suretyship that contemplated a pledge of $12,000 and that he would be released on bail and would reside with his mother, Fanny Donaldson, and her husband, Keizroy Donaldson under their supervision.
[22] J.P. Wassenaar had no detention concerns on the primary ground. She was focused at that time solely on the secondary ground and whether there was a substantial likelihood that the accused would commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice if released from custody. She noted, however, that the alleged index charges were committed while Mr. McLeod was on probation for prior offences. It was noteworthy in that regard that when she previously served as a surety for her son, Ms. Donaldson withdrew her suretyship and turned him in because he violated his probation and the terms of her supervision. While that is a credit to her responsibility and understanding of her role as surety, it raises other concerns about the willingness of the accused to adhere to what would inevitably have been strict terms of release.
[23] After outlining the horrific nature of the evidence alleged against Mr. McLeod, Crown counsel on the initial bail hearing summarized his submissions and opposed granting bail on the proposed plan put forward by Ms. Donaldson. While acknowledging at that time that Mr. McLeod might be releasable under a proper and solid plan, he contended that the difficulty with the plan put forward by the proposed sureties was that it did not ensure 24-hour supervision. That was necessarily the case since, at that time, both Mr. McLeod’s mother and step-father were out at work during the day. That meant he would effectively be left to own devices for 9 to 10 hours a day at the minimum. The plan put forward by his mother envisaged that she would monitor his presence at home by cellular telephone, but Crown counsel submitted that was not an assurance that the Court could trust or rely upon and consequently, that the Crown had met his onus to establish that Mr. McLeod should be detained on the secondary grounds.
[24] The Justice agreed. J.P. Wassenaar expressed her view that both of Mr. McLeod’s sureties were “great parents” who expressed their willingness to monitor Mr. McLeod, but she could not be satisfied that the plan of suretyship would ensure that the secondary ground concerns would be met. She could not be satisfied that monitoring Mr. McLeod's presence at home by cell phone was adequate, and given the extent to which cellular telephones are centrally involved in the allegations against him, she was concerned that he could not be prevented from using cellular phones to contact people that he would be prohibited from contacting. There would be no way of knowing because he obviously knows how to delete and eliminate tracing information from a cell phone. Further, the Court was plainly concerned about the protection of the complainant.
[25] At pages 77-78, the Justice of the Peace stated as follows:
Unfortunately, in this Court's opinion, the plan is not sufficient to monitor because you will be home during the day alone, completely on your own, free to come and go as you please and I fear for the safety of the complainant in the circumstance and given what Judge Trotter has said, contacts with the police, that is what the Court has heard about, uncharged conduct are important, under the circumstances, Sir, I believe there is a substantial likelihood that you can reoffend and therefore I am detaining you.
[26] New counsel for Mr. McLeod has now brought this application for judicial review and to put forward a revised plan involving the same two sureties. Defence counsel claims that it amounts to a material change in circumstances because now the supervision will be on a 24-hour basis. Ms. Donaldson will be able to provide that supervision because her employer is now prepared to allow her to work from home, thus ensuring that she will constantly be there to be able to personally supervise the accused and ensure that he would be in compliance with any terms upon which he might be released.
[27] Given the decision of J.P. Wassenaar to deny bail initially, that decision is only subject to review and reconsideration if the defence is able to establish a material change of circumstances from those present and upon which the initial decision to deny bail was made. Crown counsel remains opposed to this application and contends that the accused needs to continue to be detained in custody pending his trial.
[28] First, I observe that the Crown agrees that there has been a material change in circumstances. Even if the proposed new plan of supervision put forward by the sureties is otherwise adequate to ensure he stays out of trouble pending trial, the Crown contends that the additional 16 charges laid since the first bail hearing constitute a material change of circumstances, but not one that favours Mr. McLeod.
[29] Instead, unlike the initial bail hearing where only the secondary ground was argued, on this review application Crown counsel contends the further 16 charges and the seemingly disturbing and frightening circumstances of those charges, causing the complainants to fear for their lives and well-being, necessarily must engage the tertiary ground as well and require that this accused be detained pending his trial.
[30] In summary, the Crown is opposed to this application, and contends that the accused has not “shown cause” as to why the detention order should be vacated, arguing that the continued detention of the accused in custody is justified on both the secondary and the tertiary grounds in s. 515(10)(b) and (c) of the Code. The Crown argues that the bail review application should be dismissed.
The Governing Legal Principles
[31] Section 515(10) of the Criminal Code spells out the only statutory grounds for the pre-trial detention of an accused. It states:
For the purposes of this section, the detention of an accused in custody is justified only on one or more of the following grounds:
(a) where the detention is necessary to ensure his or her attendance in court in order to be dealt with according to law;
(b) where the detention is necessary for the protection or safety of the public, including any victim of or witness to the offence, or any person under the age of 18 years, having regard to all the circumstances including any substantial likelihood that the accused will, if released from custody, commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice; and
(c) if the detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, having regard to all the circumstances, including: (i) the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case; (ii) the gravity of the offence; (iii) the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, including whether a firearm was used; and (iv) the fact that the accused is liable, on conviction, for a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment or, in the case of an offence that involves, or whose subject-matter is, a firearm, a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of three years or more.
[32] As to the legal character of bail “review” applications such as this, they are often described as something of a “hybrid” proceeding, and an effective cross between: (1) an appeal on the record which involves a review of the legal propriety of the proceedings at first instance; and (2) a hearing de novo where fresh evidence may be adduced and new determinations reached. In this case, plainly both aspects are engaged.
Analysis and Conclusions
[33] Plainly, the accused presently faces very serious criminal charges in this matter. They involve a multiplicity of charges of assault, sexual assault, threatening death, choking, forcible confinement, and similar charges relative to three separate complainants in three distinct time periods. These are allegations which would necessarily entail a term of incarceration in the penitentiary where the accused ultimately to be convicted as charged. The question is whether there has been a material change of circumstances since the initial bail hearing that would justify releasing Mr. McLeod from detention at this time on a strict plan of house arrest bail under his mother and step-father’s supervision.
[34] The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. St. Cloud [1] is directly on point and the governing jurisprudence. In that case, after observing that ss. 520(7) and 521(8) of the Code provide for the tendering of new "evidence or exhibits", including “(c) such additional evidence or exhibits as may be tendered by the accused or the prosecutor”, Justice Wagner addresses what constitutes new evidence for this purpose and thus amounts to a material change in circumstances.
[35] As in this case, Crown counsel there argued that this evidence must be limited to facts that are truly new in the sense that they have come to light since the initial decision, and should not include facts that could have been alleged at the initial hearing or during a previous review. However, Wagner J. rejects that position at paragraph 127:
127 I am instead of the opinion that the reason why detained persons may not always tender all possible evidence at their first hearing lies in the generally expeditious nature of the release process and in the consequences of that nature, namely the short time between arrest and hearing, a lack of representation for accused persons, and incomplete evidence at this stage. The interests of justice would therefore be undermined if courts acting under ss. 520 and 521 Cr.C. were to adopt a narrow view regarding the "new evidence" that can be admitted under those sections.
[36] Instead, he adopted the "new evidence" on appeal criteria established in Palmer v. The Queen [2] as the test for a material change in circumstances. Those criteria establish that the evidence should generally not be admitted and thus will not be a material change if, by due diligence, it could have been adduced at trial. Further, it must be relevant in the sense that it bears upon a decisive or potentially decisive issue in the trial and be credible in the sense that it is reasonably capable of belief. Finally, it must be such that if believed it could reasonably, when taken with the other evidence adduced at trial, be expected to have affected the result. [3]
[37] Justice Wagner concludes at para. 129:
129 In my opinion, the four criteria from Palmer are relevant, with any necessary modifications, to the determination of what constitutes new evidence for the purposes of the review provided for in ss. 520 and 521 Cr.C. Given the generally expeditious nature of the interim release process and the risks of violating the rights of the accused, and since the release hearing takes place at the very start of criminal proceedings and not at the end like the sentence appeal, a reviewing judge must be flexible in applying these four criteria. I reiterate at the outset that the rules of evidence are relaxed in the context of the release hearing: s. 518 Cr.C.
[38] In these circumstances, where the accused bears the onus of having to “show cause” justifying his release, he must satisfy the court that his detention is not justified. In relation to the secondary ground, more particularly, the accused must establish that his detention is not necessary for the protection or safety of the public, and that there is no substantial likelihood that, if released from custody, the accused will commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice. The release plan devised by the accused must persuasively address these issues.
[39] Counsel for Mr. McLeod claims the Justice of the Peace considered Mr. McLeod to be releasable at the initial bail hearing, but then chose not to release him because of the supervision deficiency noted above. I do not think that that is an entirely correct characterization. Justice of the Peace Wassenaar did not actually state at any time that she regarded the accused as releasable. She simply focused on the inadequacy of the supervision plan relative to the concerns that existed about this offender, having regard to all of the circumstances of the allegations against him, and in particular, the inadequacy of a cell phone supervision plan given his evident ability to tamper with cellular telephones and interfere with the administration of justice by potentially tampering with evidence contained within such devices.
[40] Nevertheless, in accordance with the criteria established in St. Cloud, the willingness of Ms. Donaldson’s employer to permit her to remain 24/7 in her home to supervise her son, working out of the home, seems to qualify as a material change in the plan of release, and one that I accept was not available at the time of the initial bail hearing.
[41] Defence counsel also claims that there are two other circumstances that favour Mr. McLeod being released at this time. The first calls into question the ability of one of the complainants to physically identify the accused given her failure to identify him in a photo lineup conducted four days after she made a statement to the police in November 2015, seven days prior to the bail hearing held on November 20. Whatever the evidential value of that occurrence in the context of a failed identification test, accompanied by systemic failure since the audio did not record what was said as she was led through the photo parade and cannot be recaptured, it strikes me that it is premature in the context of this case to suggest that the complainant cannot identify the accused, given that she was intimately involved with him and in fact recognizes him from her relationship. That unsuccessful photo lineup ID session may weaken the Crown's case down the road, although I think it unlikely, but I regard it is premature to make that assessment such that it would weigh in favor of the release of this accused from detention.
[42] Second, there is a question relative to the reliability of the KGB statement Ms. R.R. gave on November 16, 2015, relative to the period of time during which she claims that the accused was blocking her calls. It is claimed that there is an irreconcilable set of times involved in her statement which undermines the reliability of her statement, and thus undermines the strength of the Crown's case against the accused. Defence counsel contends that if that had been known by J.P. Wassenaar at the time of the initial bail hearing, it could have affected her reasoning and weighed in favour of releasing Mr. McLeod on the secondary ground. Indeed, defence counsel goes so far as to suggest that not only does this amount to a material change of circumstance that should cause the vacation of the order of detention, but that he should simply be released on those charges.
[43] Crown counsel argues that the proposed change in the plan of suretyship and supervision by Ms. Donaldson, now being present at her home throughout the workday, is not new evidence of the kind contemplated in St. Cloud, but simply a change in the terms of an existing supervision plan and is not enough.
[44] More importantly, the court had one occurrence report before it, and now it has three sets of charges. Mr. McLeod previously had seven charges and now he faces 22. Crown counsel argues that is a material change of circumstances that not only validates the initial detention order of J.P. Wassenaar, but indeed adds significant weight to it given the presence of the two additional complainants who have now come forward, and the real concerns relative to their safety, a matter that goes directly to releasability under the secondary ground in s. 515(10)(b) of the Code. That material change of circumstance is indeed new evidence, new evidence of two additional complainants.
[45] This new evidence is plainly relevant on the secondary grounds. It suggests that Mr. McLeod is an aggressive sexual offender. The evidence now reveals persistence and extreme stalking conduct on his part for some years relative to three separate complaints. There is evidence of besetting. Those characteristics to the evidence suggest dangerous and predatory conduct. This is indeed new evidence that calls upon the court to look at the evidence that was in front of J.P. Wassenaar in a new light.
[46] The aggregate picture before the court is one of three separate women, none of whom know each other, all of whom complain he has stalked them. All three of them testified that he choked them during the commission of a sexual assault against them. The presence of the common phone numbers links the three matters together since the assailant used the same cell phone number in each of the three cases. Contrary to defence counsel's claim, in my view this is not an identification case, but rather one where the complainants recognize this individual. They recognize him because they were involved in intimate and frightening relationships and altercations with him.
[47] There is a further aspect to the material change of circumstances that I find to be present here, a further aspect that now engages the tertiary ground as the Crown argues. That is the predatory nature of this accused's conduct. The addition of a further 14 charges against him since the initial bail review causes the community’s stake in releasing him, with the risks that that might cause and given his evidently volatile personality, to increase materially.
[48] Looked at in totality, I agree there are materially changed circumstances now present before the Court on this bail review. One of those changed circumstances is the ability of the proposed surety, the accused’s mother, to now stay at home to work and thereby provide round-the-clock supervision of him as he is held in her house under terms amounted to house arrest pending his trial. But the other aspects of those materially changed circumstances do not favour the accused, and do not favour his release. It demonstrates that the scope of the charges laid against him is very broad, and it plainly increases the burden upon him given these substantially more egregious alleged circumstances. To discharge the onus lies upon him to show that he is properly releasable on the secondary ground contained in s. 515(10)(b) of the Code.
[49] Further, those accelerated and heightened circumstances and concerns would necessarily raise reasonable concerns relative to risks of release in the minds of reasonable members of the public. It was not in play on the initial bail hearing, but to my mind it is impossible to not take account of tertiary ground concerns as adding further weight to the need to continue to detain Mr. McLeod pending trial given what now appears to be the uncontrolled, potentially dangerous and predatory nature of his conduct, and the risks that would pose to the public. That is a high risk that I am not satisfied can be carefully or securely managed merely by him being under 24-hour house supervision by his mother, regardless of how well-intentioned and responsible she may be.
[50] There is a further point to this that also weighs in favour of his continued detention. Mr. McLeod has actually been apprehended on a prior occasion under the Mental Health Act for self-mutilation at home, a new fact that raises concerns about his predilection for violence towards himself as well as others. There are potential psychiatric issues here. It was a point that was raised in the cross-examination of Ms. Donaldson at the hearing before J.P. Wassenaar, but Ms. Donaldson effectively evaded the question as it related directly to Omar McLeod's risk. Hopefully, while he continues in detention before trial, he can be subjected to an assessment to determine whether there are mental health risk aspects to his personality that would also come into play in determining hereafter whether he is capable of being released.
[51] In my view, in summary, in light of all of the circumstances of this case, the accused has not shown cause as to why his detention does not continue to be justified on the secondary ground. I accept that there has been not only one, but several material changes in circumstances. I am similarly of the view that, on this bail review, notwithstanding the elements of the new release plan proposed on behalf of the accused and his mother’s claim that he will be under supervision 24-7, his prior conduct while on release suggests to me that he may not always realistically be under the supervision of his sureties, and those concerns, especially related to the use of cell phones, informs my continued fear that there is an opportunity for him to re-offend that presents a substantial risk given his prior conduct. Thus, the accused has still not shown cause as to why the prior detention order should now be vacated. In my opinion, his detention remains justified on the secondary ground.
[52] In this case, notwithstanding the sincerity of the plan and the best wishes of the sureties, I fear that they are putting themselves at inordinate risk in this plan. The circumstances here, including in particular all of the materially changed circumstances since the initial hearing and his prior failure to comply, suggests to me that Mr. McLeod is more likely to be ungovernable and I cannot be assured to the extent I require that the plan will succeed.
[53] In addition, I am also of the opinion that the detention of the accused is justified as well on the tertiary ground outlined in s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code, in that his detention is necessary to “maintain confidence in the administration of justice.”
Conclusion
[54] For these reasons, the application is dismissed. The detention order will remain in place. As time passes, more will be learned about this case. If it becomes apparent that the strength of the Crown’s case changes significantly, or other material circumstances change for the better, and in favour of release, rather than detention, such a change may permit a further bail review application pursuant to s. 520(8) of the Code. But, for the time being, the detention order will remain in place.
Michael G. Quigley, J.
Released: June 14, 2016
COURT FILE NO.: CR-16-70000085-00BR DATE: 20160614 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Respondent – and – OMAR MCLEOD Applicant
REASONS FOR BAIL REVIEW RULING M.G. Quigley, J.
Released: June 14, 2016
Footnotes:
[1] R. v. St. Cloud, 2015 SCC 27, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 328 [2] Palmer v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759, at p. 775. [3] R. v. Warsing, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 579, at para. 50.