Gail Glickman

The applicant sought access to police records concerning a youth (W.C.) under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) after being struck by a pellet from a BB gun.

The police had investigated but laid no charges, opting for extrajudicial measures.

The court found that the police records constituted records of extrajudicial measures under section 119(4) of the YCJA, which prohibits access to such records for individuals like the applicant.

Even if not considered extrajudicial measures, the records were inaccessible under the YCJA's statutory framework, as section 123, which allows access after certain periods, did not apply to records where no charges were laid and thus no access period was defined.

The court emphasized the YCJA's principles of youth privacy and diminished moral blameworthiness.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants in the main proceeding sought access to youth criminal records related to a sexual assault investigation for use in a civil action.

The Attorney General and the Chief of Police brought a preliminary motion seeking release of the records to them to determine if other young persons, such as witnesses or victims, should be given notice of the application due to privacy interests.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the Youth Criminal Justice Act's statutory scheme for access to records does not require notice to witnesses, and the court cannot effectively amend the legislation to create a new notice provision.

An appeal concerning jurisdiction to review a youth justice court decision regarding access to youth records under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Toronto Police Service and a police officer appealed a youth court judge's decision denying access to records.

The Superior Court judge allowed the appeal and ordered production of records.

The Court of Appeal found that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the youth court decision under section 40(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, as the YCJA is federal legislation.

While certiorari under Part XXVI of the Criminal Code provides an alternative review route, the Court of Appeal declined to determine the appeal on the merits due to the procedural irregularities and set aside the Superior Court decision.

The applicant brought a motion within an application for judicial review seeking an order to use only his initials.

Notice of the motion was not given to the media.

The court held that whenever a party seeks to restrict access to a court proceeding, including by requesting permission to use a pseudonym or initials, there is a presumption that notice must be given to the media.

The motion was adjourned to allow the applicant to provide such notice.

The appellant appealed an order allowing a broadcaster to broadcast a video with the identities of the individuals obscured.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the Dagenais/Mentuck test to balance the appellant's privacy concerns against freedom of the press.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal by the appellant regarding an order granting the media access to a video exhibit from the appellant's concluded bail hearing.

The moving party argued the matter was criminal in nature, meaning jurisdiction lay with the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that because the criminal proceedings were fully concluded and the order did not affect any ongoing criminal matter or the appellant's fair trial rights, the proceeding was civil in nature and properly appealed to the Court of Appeal under the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant appealed his sentence for impaired driving causing death and bodily harm.

His blood alcohol readings were over three times the legal limit, and this was his third drinking and driving offence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence fit and upheld the lifetime driving prohibition, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant appealed her sentence for offences involving the exploitation of young teenage girls.

The trial judge had rejected a joint submission, imposing a sentence that emphasized denunciation and deterrence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to give greater weight to those principles given the serious nature of capitalizing on the sale of children's sexual services.