Robert Valentine Wright

The Crown sought to quash the preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge the respondent, Justin Allison, on firearms and drug charges via a certiorari application.

The police found a loaded firearm, drugs, and Allison's identification in an apartment he was seen entering with a key.

The preliminary inquiry judge found the evidence of Allison's knowledge and control over the contraband to be speculative.

The Superior Court, reviewing for jurisdictional error, affirmed the preliminary inquiry judge's decision, emphasizing the limited scope of review and that occupancy alone is insufficient to establish knowledge.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant, Christopher Husbands, appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal raised four grounds: misapprehension of evidence, failure to consider mistaken belief in consent, insufficient reasons for rejecting the accused's evidence, and uneven scrutiny of evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence, no air of reality to the mistaken belief in consent defence given the accepted facts, sufficient reasons for rejecting the appellant's testimony based on inconsistencies, and no error in applying differential credibility findings as long as the same standard of scrutiny was applied.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for assault causing bodily harm, arguing the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, and the judge erred in finding his version of events did not afford a defence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and rejection of the appellant's exculpatory statement were logical and supported by the evidence.

The court held that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and did not misapprehend the evidence regarding the appellant's involvement in the swarming.

The self-represented appellant appealed his summary conviction for assault and his sentence of a conditional discharge with six months' probation.

The assault occurred during a parking dispute with a condominium security guard.

The appellant argued the trial judge's conduct created a reasonable apprehension of bias and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, that the trial judge's credibility findings and verdict were supported by the evidence, and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

On a summary conviction appeal alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, new Crown counsel sought an adjournment in order to cross‑examine the appellant on his fresh evidence affidavit, reversing the position taken by prior Crown counsel who had indicated cross‑examination would not occur.

The appellant opposed the adjournment and argued that the Crown had given an undertaking not to cross‑examine, and that costs should be awarded if an adjournment were granted.

The court held that the earlier Crown communication did not amount to a solicitor’s undertaking and that prosecutors retain discretion to revisit tactical decisions unless doing so constitutes abuse of process or causes real prejudice.

The court further held that an adjournment did not create substantial prejudice and that the circumstances did not justify the rare remedy of costs against the Crown.

The adjournment was granted and costs were refused.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and driving 'over 80' on the ground that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient.

At trial, the appellant and the arresting officer provided conflicting testimony regarding the appellant's driving and signs of impairment, which formed the basis of a Charter application challenging the breath demand.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter application and convicted the appellant without explaining how he resolved the contradictory evidence or why he preferred the officer's testimony.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons manifestly insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit following a summary conviction trial.

The sole ground of appeal alleged ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis that trial counsel decided the accused would not testify without advising that the decision ultimately belonged to the accused.

Fresh evidence on appeal demonstrated that counsel made the decision unilaterally and never discussed the option of testifying with the accused.

The court held that the right to decide whether to testify is a fundamental component of an accused’s control over their defence and counsel’s conduct constituted professional incompetence resulting in procedural unfairness.

Because the accused established that he would have testified had the decision been left to him, a miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing to comply with a bail condition requiring him to remain at his residence except for limited specified purposes.

He argued the trial judge shifted the burden of proof contrary to the principles in R. v. W.(D.), improperly relied on his failure to provide a detailed explanation to police, misapprehended the evidence, and improperly took judicial notice regarding evening traffic conditions.

The court held that the trial judge properly applied the presumption of innocence and the W.(D.) framework, permissibly assessed the credibility of competing testimony, and did not infringe the appellant’s right to silence.

The court also found no material misapprehension of evidence and concluded that the limited judicial notice regarding reduced evening traffic congestion was permissible.

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault, arguing his guilty plea was not voluntary or informed.

He suffered from Ankylosing Spondylitis and was denied his necessary medication while in custody, causing extreme pain.

He was also threatened and assaulted by another inmate.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the combination of lack of medical care, extreme pain, and threats deprived the appellant of the ability to make a conscious volitional decision to plead guilty.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for refusing to comply with a demand to provide breath samples contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued the police officer failed to make the approved instrument demand "as soon as practicable" as required by s. 254(3) due to an approximately 11‑minute delay after arrest.

The court held that the governing standard requires a reasonably prompt demand assessed in light of the entire chain of events and whether police acted reasonably.

Reviewing the audio‑video evidence and the trial judge’s findings, the court concluded the officer’s actions during the delay—including search incident to arrest, managing the scene, and advising the accused of rights—were reasonable.

The trial judge committed no error in concluding the demand was made as soon as practicable.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing or refusing to provide a breath sample under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code following a roadside demand during a RIDE program.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the credibility framework in R. v. W.(D.) and improperly relied on demeanour evidence when rejecting her explanation that nervousness prevented her from providing an adequate breath sample.

The appellate court held that the trial judge correctly applied the W.(D.) principles and reasonably preferred the officer’s testimony that the appellant repeatedly provided inadequate breath samples despite clear instructions and numerous opportunities.

The reasons demonstrated that the credibility assessment was based on the totality of the evidence, not solely on demeanour.

No error in law or misapprehension of evidence was established.

The applicant sought an order under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code assigning counsel to represent him on appeal from convictions for sexual assault and uttering threats.

Although the court accepted that several proposed grounds of appeal were arguable, it found that the appeal was relatively straightforward, based on a short trial record with limited evidence and uncomplicated legal issues.

The court concluded that the applicant was capable of presenting the appeal himself and that the appellate court would be able to properly determine the matter without the assistance of assigned counsel.

The application was therefore dismissed.

The young persons were charged with robbery with a firearm and disguise with intent in relation to a 2007 jewellery store robbery.

They brought a motion alleging a violation of their right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter, seeking a stay of proceedings.

The court analyzed the delay from the time the charges were laid in 2013 following DNA hits.

The court found the total delay of 14 months for one young person and 11.5 months for the other to be reasonable, attributing only 3.25 months to institutional and Crown delay.

The motion was dismissed.

Two young persons charged with robbery with a firearm and disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence in relation to a jewellery store robbery brought a motion alleging violation of their right to trial within a reasonable time under Section 11(b) of the Charter.

The defendants sought a stay of charges.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the defendants' Section 11(b) application, finding that the total delay from charge to trial was reasonable when properly allocated between Crown delay, institutional delay, and inherent time requirements of the case.

The court also adjourned the defendants' application grounded in Section 7 and Section 11(d) of the Charter to the trial dates.

A youth was convicted of robbery and use of an imitation firearm to commit robbery.

The Crown sought a serious violent offence (SVO) designation and a custodial sentence of 6-8 months.

The defence argued for open custody with substantial credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court found the SVO threshold met and imposed a sentence of 90 days custody followed by 45 days community supervision and 18 months probation, with the custody to be served in an open facility.

The court considered the offender's significant mental health issues, history of instability, lack of remorse, and the serious psychological harm to the victim, balanced against the offender's youth and the rehabilitation plan developed by his support team.

The offender, a 63-year-old first-time offender with severe medical issues, was convicted of defrauding a factoring company of over $75,000 US by using a false identity and a shell corporation.

The Crown sought 18 months' incarceration, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court weighed the significant aggravating factors of planning and deceit against the mitigating factors of the offender's poor health, genuine remorse, and lack of prior record.

The court imposed a 20-month conditional sentence with house arrest, followed by 12 months' probation, community service, and a DNA order, declining to order restitution due to the offender's inability to pay.

The accused was charged with fraud over $5,000 contrary to s. 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code after obtaining accounts receivable financing from a factoring company through false representations.

The Crown alleged the accused impersonated a purported majority shareholder and corporate officer to secure financing based on fabricated receivables and misrepresentations about corporate ownership.

Evidence included witness identification, banking records, ATM surveillance images, and testimony from a corporate signatory showing the accused controlled the company and received most of the advanced funds.

The court found the accused intentionally misrepresented his identity and corporate structure to induce the advance and diverted the funds for personal benefit.

The court concluded the Crown proved deceit, deprivation, and fraudulent intent beyond a reasonable doubt.

During a criminal trial for fraud over $5,000, the Crown sought to admit statements allegedly made by the accused to a police detective while in custody.

A voir dire was held to determine whether the statements were voluntary.

The accused testified that he only spoke after being told that his girlfriend had been arrested and could face jail if he did not cooperate.

Given the absence of a recording and conflicting evidence regarding what the officer said, the court found a reasonable doubt as to whether an inducement had been made.

The Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements were voluntary, and the statements were ruled inadmissible.

A witness subpoenaed in a murder trial refused to answer questions after being sworn, despite being warned that his refusal could result in contempt.

At a show cause hearing, the witness testified that he declined to testify because of concerns about his reputation in prison and potential consequences of being perceived as an informant.

The court reviewed the elements of contempt in the face of the court, including actus reus and mens rea, and considered whether the defence of duress applied.

The court found the refusal to testify was deliberate and interfered with the administration of justice.

The defence of duress was rejected because the evidence did not establish threats of death or serious bodily harm.

In a homicide prosecution, the Crown sought to introduce several hearsay statements attributed to a deceased victim and to unidentified bystanders during a fight.

The court considered whether the statements fell within the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule and whether they satisfied reliability requirements under the principled approach articulated in R. v. Khelawon.

The court admitted a statement reported by a witness that the victim said “Budja stabbed me” and described others holding him down, finding it spontaneous and proximate to the startling event and not so unreliable as to warrant exclusion.

However, statements allegedly shouted by unidentified bystanders during the fight were ruled inadmissible for the truth of their contents because the declarants were unknown and reliability could not be assessed.

Those statements were admissible only for the non-hearsay purpose of demonstrating what may have been audible to the accused during the altercation.