Maija C. Martin

The appellant challenged a conviction for importing cocaine under s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act after the intermediate appellate court affirmed the conviction over a dissent.

The central issue was whether the trial reasons adequately disclosed the factual basis for finding the required mental element beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court held that, read in context and as a whole, the trial reasons did not permit effective appellate review of the mens rea finding.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of importing 15 kilograms of cocaine.

On appeal, he challenged the conviction on two grounds: first, that the trial judge failed to properly apply the third part of the W.(D.) analysis regarding the burden of proof; and second, that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons explaining how the Crown proved the appellant's knowledge of the cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt.

The majority dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's reasons could have been clearer, they were sufficient when read in context and demonstrated proper application of the legal principles.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the combination of the trial judge's misstatement of the onus of proof and failure to make explicit findings on the critical issue of knowledge to be fatal to the conviction.

Five appellants convicted of drug-related offences appealed their convictions, challenging the application judge's admission of evidence obtained pursuant to wiretap authorizations under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellants argued that the application judge erred in his s. 24(2) analysis by failing to adequately recognize the impact of prior police misconduct and by not giving appropriate effect to findings of serious carelessness in the affidavits.

Ba Tuan Tran also appealed his sentence of 15 months imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals and the sentence appeal, finding the application judge's analysis fair, balanced, and correct.

The accused, Sean Gellvear, faced 14 counts of arson and mischief related to two fires in Kensington Market.

The Crown relied on surveillance videos, witness identification, and similar fact evidence to prove identity.

The defence challenged the identification, arguing the video quality was poor and witness descriptions were inconsistent.

The court found that the video evidence was insufficient for positive identification beyond a reasonable doubt, even with non-expert recognition evidence from acquaintances.

The court emphasized that "similar" clothing or circumstances are not enough to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

Consequently, the accused was found not guilty on all counts.

The accused was committed for trial on charges including manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm after providing cocaine laced with heroin to two women, resulting in one death and one coma.

The accused brought a certiorari application to quash the committals, arguing there was no evidence he intended to traffic heroin specifically, nor evidence of objective foresight of bodily harm.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, holding that the mens rea for trafficking does not require knowledge of the specific drug, and there was sufficient evidence of objective fault given the inherent dangers of street drugs and circumstantial evidence of the accused's knowledge.

A police officer was convicted of sexually assaulting a complainant by performing searches of her while transporting her to a police station.

At trial, the trial judge admitted a prior consistent statement made by the complainant to a female officer at the police station, in which the complainant stated she had already been searched three times.

The summary conviction appeal judge quashed the conviction, finding the trial judge erred in admitting and relying on the prior consistent statement.

The Crown appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the prior consistent statement was admissible under the narrative as circumstantial evidence exception to the rule against prior consistent statements, and that the trial judge properly used the statement to assess the complainant's credibility by considering the context, timing, and spontaneous nature of the complaint.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of threatening and fined.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the grounds of appeal raised legal issues showing particularly strong grounds.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge applied well-settled legal principles and the arguments were not strong.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of uttering threats entered in the Ontario Court of Justice.

He argued that the trial judge misapplied the third branch of the W. (D.) credibility framework and effectively reversed the burden of proof by treating the case as a credibility contest and by improperly favouring police evidence.

The court held that the trial judge’s reasons, read as a whole, demonstrated an understanding and proper application of the W. (D.) analysis and that the judge was entitled to prefer the officers’ testimony.

Minor inconsistencies in the officers’ evidence were not material, and credibility findings were owed deference.

The appellate court found no palpable and overriding error or misapprehension of the evidence.

Two young persons charged with robbery with a firearm and disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence in relation to a jewellery store robbery brought a motion alleging violation of their right to trial within a reasonable time under Section 11(b) of the Charter.

The defendants sought a stay of charges.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the defendants' Section 11(b) application, finding that the total delay from charge to trial was reasonable when properly allocated between Crown delay, institutional delay, and inherent time requirements of the case.

The court also adjourned the defendants' application grounded in Section 7 and Section 11(d) of the Charter to the trial dates.

The young persons were charged with robbery with a firearm and disguise with intent in relation to a 2007 jewellery store robbery.

They brought a motion alleging a violation of their right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter, seeking a stay of proceedings.

The court analyzed the delay from the time the charges were laid in 2013 following DNA hits.

The court found the total delay of 14 months for one young person and 11.5 months for the other to be reasonable, attributing only 3.25 months to institutional and Crown delay.

The motion was dismissed.

Two accused were charged with possession of cocaine, marijuana, and hashish for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at an apartment and discovered drugs and alleged trafficking paraphernalia hidden throughout the unit.

Both accused denied knowledge of the drugs and asserted that a third individual, who allegedly lived in the apartment and was known by the nickname “Stinky,” was responsible.

The court considered whether the Crown had proven knowledge and possession under s. 4(3) of the Criminal Code through circumstantial evidence, applying the principles in R. v. W.(D.).

Given that the drugs were concealed, not in plain view, and that multiple individuals had access to the apartment, the evidence did not establish knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The testimony of the accused and supporting witness raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused knew of the drugs or trafficking activity.

The accused, charged with firearms and drug offences, brought applications to cross-examine the affiant and sub-affiants of an Information to Obtain (ITO) a wiretap authorization, and a Garofoli application to exclude the intercepted communications.

The applicants argued that the ITO relied heavily on confidential informants and lacked sufficient detail to establish reasonable and probable grounds.

The court dismissed the application to cross-examine, finding no evidentiary basis to suggest it would elicit testimony discrediting the statutory preconditions.

The court also dismissed the Garofoli application, concluding that the redacted ITO and judicial summary provided sufficient evidence to establish reasonable and probable grounds to believe the interceptions would afford evidence of the offences.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and attempted murder following a drug transaction where the victims were shot.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by denying an adjournment to retain new counsel, forcing him to self-represent, failing to put an alternative suspect theory to the jury, and leaving speculative evidence of planning and deliberation with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion to deny the adjournment due to the appellant's manipulative delay tactics, and that the jury instructions on the alternative suspect and planning and deliberation were correct.

Following a traffic stop, police discovered marijuana in a pouch and a loaded handgun on the accused during a search incident to arrest.

The accused argued that the initial detention, questioning, and search violated his Charter rights and sought exclusion of the evidence.

The court held that the traffic stop and extended detention were lawful and that the search of the pouch and subsequent arrest were valid.

Although the court found that police improperly asked about drugs without grounds during the traffic stop, no evidence flowed from that breach.

The firearm and drug evidence were therefore admissible, resulting in multiple convictions for firearm offences and simple possession of marijuana.

The accused applied to quash a telewarrant and exclude evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant relating to firearm and drug offences.

The challenge argued that the Information to Obtain relied too heavily on a confidential informer, contained careless drafting errors, and failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds.

Applying the principles from Garofoli and Debot, the court assessed the reliability of the informant’s tip, the credibility of the source, and the extent of police corroboration.

The court found the informer’s information detailed and credible, supported by prior reliability and partial police corroboration through database checks and surveillance.

Despite drafting errors in the ITO, the totality of the circumstances provided a sufficient evidentiary foundation for the issuing justice to grant the warrant.