COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO CITATION: R. v. Khan, 2026 ONCA 359[1] DATE: 20260519 DOCKET: COA-25-CR-1366 Paciocco, Sossin and Madsen JJ.A. BETWEEN His Majesty the King Respondent And Kristopher Khan Appellant Deniz Sarikaya, for the appellant Maria Anghelidis, for the respondent Heard: May 14, 2026 On appeal from the convictions entered by Justice Catriona Verner of the Superior Court of Justice on February 27, 2023. REASONS FOR DECISION [ 1 ] The appellant, Kristopher Khan, appeals his convictions for sexual offences he committed against children between 2013 and 2017. These convictions arose from his February 27, 2023, guilty pleas and resulted in him receiving a three year sentence. In this appeal, he seeks to have the pleas struck and the convictions set aside. He claims that the pleas were involuntary as the result of the pressure he was under after the denial of the adjournment request he made because his trial counsel was released from the record six days prior. He claims that he was left with no realistic choice but to plead guilty after it was made plain to him that the trial was going to go ahead immediately and that he would have to represent himself, something he claimed not to be equipped to do. [ 2 ] During the appearance before us, Mr. Khan abandoned his appeal from the decision denying the adjournment request but argues in aid of his conviction appeal that the sentencing judge erred by denying the motion to strike his guilty pleas that he brought before her on April 21, 2023. The sentencing judge became involved in pretrial resolution discussions on February 27, 2023, after Edwards J. denied Mr. Khan’s adjournment request. She is the judge who received Mr. Khan’s guilty pleas after conducting a comprehensive plea inquiry. For ease of reference, we refer to Edwards J. as the pretrial judge throughout these reasons, and the sentencing judge as such, notwithstanding that she also presided over pretrial resolution discussions. We dismissed Mr. Khan’s appeal at the end of oral argument for reasons to follow, which we now provide. [ 3 ] A plea is voluntary if it is the product of “the conscious volitional decision of the accused to plead guilty for reasons which he or she regards as appropriate.”: R. v. T. (R.) (1992), 1992 CanLII 2834 (ON CA) , 10 O.R. (3d) 514 (C.A.), at p. 520. There is a strong presumption that guilty pleas made in open court are voluntary: T. (R.), at p. 520. We dismissed his appeal because Mr. Khan failed to overcome that presumption. [ 4 ] We do not accept Mr. Khan’s claim that the events leading to the plea were procedurally unfair, adding to the pressure he was under. Close to five years of delay had occurred by the time this adjournment request was denied in a case involving sexual assault allegations involving young complainants. Although a material part of that delay arose from disruptions caused by emergency orders in force during the pandemic, much of it occurred so that Mr. Khan could secure counsel. Several attempts to secure counsel fell through, but Mr. Khan had assistance during most appearances from either amicus or lawyers assisting him in the expectation of pending retainers. As the result of ongoing uncertainty about his representation, previous trial dates that were ultimately adjourned were set to proceed with or without counsel, and Mr. Khan had been alerted to the need to be ready to represent himself if he was unrepresented and was provided with guidance on what that would entail. [ 5 ] After his counsel had been released from the record on February 21, 2023, the matter was held over so that resolution discussions could occur, with Mr. Khan’s concurrence if not at his request. Section 486.3 counsel, who had been appointed to handle the cross-examination of complainants during his pending trial, agreed to assist him with those resolution discussions. Six days later, on February 27, Mr. Khan’s adjournment request was denied. Resolution discussions followed later that day, with Mr. Khan being represented by s. 486.3 counsel acting as amicus. Those resolution discussions ultimately culminated in a judicial pretrial before the sentencing judge. Later that afternoon, Mr. Khan pleaded guilty before the sentencing judge, who was well aware of the procedural history leading up to the adjournment request. Although this is no longer an appeal of the adjournment decision, we defer to the decision of the pretrial judge to deny the adjournment. We appreciate on the record before us that the denial of the adjournment was a reasonable and appropriate decision in the circumstances and reject the suggestion of unfairness. [ 6 ] We accept that Mr. Khan was afraid when he made the decision to plead guilty, but we are far from persuaded that his decision was involuntary. Emotional pressure, such as fear of the ability to defend oneself or fear of the consequences of a post-trial conviction is not enough to undermine voluntariness. As Doherty J.A. wrote in T. (R.), “Absent credible and competent testimony that those emotions reached a level where they impaired the appellant’s ability to make a conscious volitional choice, the mere presence of these emotions does not render the plea involuntary”: at p. 520. No such evidence was presented in this case. [ 7 ] We also reject the suggestion that improper pressure was being exercised by placing him in a cruel dilemma of deciding whether to plead guilty or defend himself and face a longer sentence if convicted at trial. Mr. Khan knew his options and made a tactical choice. We see no error in the decision of the sentencing judge, who had personal knowledge of the circumstances when the plea unfolded, to refuse to strike the plea. [ 8 ] We therefore dismissed the conviction appeal without having to consider the admissibility of the fresh evidence proposed by the Crown. “David M. Paciocco J.A.” “L. Sossin J.A.” “L. Madsen J.A.” [1] This appeal is subject to a publication ban pursuant to s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46.
minicounsel