Antonio Skarica

This voir dire ruling addresses the admissibility of inculpatory statements made by Joshua Barreira to police following his arrest for first-degree murder.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary due to police oppression (cold, sickness, hunger, exhaustion, denial of right to silence) and inducements related to his wife and brother's arrests.

The court found no oppression, noting Barreira was a "savvy and experienced individual" who understood his rights and repeatedly attempted to negotiate a deal.

The court also determined that the idea of a false confession to protect family members was self-generated by Barreira, and the police officer's actions did not constitute improper inducements.

Consequently, the statements were deemed voluntary and admissible at trial, subject to editing out references to Barreira's criminal record.

The parties separated after a 16-year relationship.

The applicant husband sought to enforce a 1997 cohabitation agreement that waived spousal support and dictated the division of the matrimonial home proceeds.

The respondent wife argued the agreement was invalid due to lack of financial disclosure and independent legal advice.

The court upheld the agreement, finding the wife had a general awareness of the husband's assets and chose not to seek independent legal advice despite having ample time.

Applying the Miglin framework, the court upheld the spousal support waiver, noting the wife was deliberately underemployed and imputing income to her.

However, the court found the husband breached the agreement regarding the matrimonial home proceeds by attempting to deduct monies advanced by his mother, which the court characterized as gifts to the husband rather than joint debts.

The husband was ordered to pay child support based on an income of $73,000.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following a collision and brought a Charter motion seeking exclusion of statements and breath test results.

She argued police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest, that her roadside statements were compelled under statutory accident‑reporting obligations, and that her rights under ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter were violated.

The court held the accused failed to prove her statements were compelled and found the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on observations of impairment, witness information, and the unexplained collision.

The court further found no breach of the right to counsel or the informational component of detention.

The Charter application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

In a medical malpractice jury trial, the court determined whether long‑term disability (LTD) and Canada Pension Plan (CPP) disability benefits should be deducted from damages for past and future income loss.

The plaintiff suffered a stroke after being discharged from hospital and claimed permanent inability to work.

The court held that CPP disability benefits are not deductible from income loss awards.

However, applying the Supreme Court of Canada’s guidance in IBM Canada Limited v. Waterman, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s employer‑funded LTD benefits functioned as indemnity for wage loss and should be deducted from any jury award to avoid double recovery.

The jury was therefore instructed to deduct LTD payments from both past and future wage loss damages.

The applicant sought to set aside a separation agreement on grounds of duress, inadequate disclosure, and lack of independent legal advice, and sought greater property equalization, spousal support, and increased child support.

The court found the applicant knew the family business finances, had been advised of her disclosure and support rights, received independent legal advice, and was not under duress when she signed.

Applying s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act and the Miglin framework, the court upheld the agreement as fair, valid, and enforceable, except for child support.

The court imputed higher income to the respondent based on business-paid personal expenses and gross-up principles, varied child support retroactively and prospectively, and otherwise dismissed the applicant's claims.

The defendant estate moved to stay or dismiss an Ontario action arising from a New York motor vehicle accident for lack of jurisdiction.

Applying the presumptive connecting factors in Van Breda, the court held that none of the recognized factors connected the dispute to Ontario, and declined to recognize a new factor based on the existence of a separate Ontario action arising from an earlier accident.

The court distinguished authority involving multiple defendants with Ontario connections and held that the defendant estate had no real relationship with Ontario.

The forum of necessity doctrine was also rejected because the plaintiff could have commenced a timely New York action before the limitation period expired.

The action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, with partial indemnity costs to the defendant.

The accused was charged with possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at an apartment.

The police testified the accused arrived carrying a bag containing the drugs, while the accused testified he arrived empty-handed for a sexual encounter and the police mistook him for his brother, the target of the warrant.

The court acquitted the accused, finding the police investigation severely flawed—including missing notes, failure to secure video surveillance, and inconsistent testimony—and concluding the accused's evidence raised a reasonable doubt under the W.(D.) framework.

The applicant moved to quash an amended preferred indictment adding a sexual assault count extending beyond the complainant's eighteenth birthday, and sought a stay for abuse of process.

The court held that evidence at the preliminary inquiry, particularly cross-examination about the pool incident chronology, could support a finding that the alleged assault occurred when the complainant was an adult, thereby permitting the added count under s. 574(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

While the defence established some potential prejudice because questioning had proceeded on the premise that only underage conduct was in issue, the court found no improper Crown motive and no basis for the exceptional remedy of a stay.

The availability of further cross-examination and a renewed third party records application adequately addressed any prejudice.

Following a nine-day trial in which the self-represented applicant's claims were dismissed, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicant had significantly protracted the proceedings by making outrageous, unsubstantiated allegations of fraud, conspiracy, and human trafficking against the respondent, her daughter, and numerous lawyers.

Finding her conduct to be an abusive attack on innocent parties without any factual foundation, the court awarded full indemnity costs of $34,674.05 against the applicant.

The applicant wife and respondent husband separated after a long, toxic marriage.

The wife, self-represented, claimed she was a victim of human trafficking, that her daughter was immaculately conceived, and that she was defrauded of her interest in the matrimonial home by a vast conspiracy involving her former lawyers, the bank, and the husband.

The court rejected all of the wife's claims as preposterous and found her to be an abusive and controlling predator who had recklessly depleted the family's assets through failed mining ventures.

The court determined the separation date was in 1996, making the wife's equalization claim statute-barred.

Furthermore, the court held that even if the claim was not barred, an equal division of the remaining $53,000 from the sale of the home would be unconscionable under s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act.

The entire remaining proceeds were awarded to the husband, and a divorce was granted.

During a criminal trial for two robberies, the Crown sought to admit a co-participant witness's prior sworn agreed statement of facts after the witness recanted and refused to adopt it in cross-examination under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court held that necessity was established by the recantation and that threshold reliability was satisfied both procedurally and substantively under the K.G.B. framework.

The statement had been sworn during guilty plea proceedings, prepared with counsel, and the witness was available for full cross-examination.

The contents were also strongly corroborated by the witness's earlier video statement and other trial evidence.

The prior sworn statement was admitted as substantive evidence for the truth of its contents.

The accused was charged under s. 243 of the Criminal Code with disposing of the dead body of a child with intent to conceal its delivery.

The remains of a 36-week fetus were found in a bag on a balcony.

The forensic pathologist could not exclude the possibility that the fetus died in utero due to a self-induced abortion.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's interpretation of s. 243 in a previous appeal of this case, the court found that the Crown could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the child was likely to have been born alive, as the law does not apply to miscarriages or abortions.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicant provided funds to purchase a condominium but placed the title in the respondent's name to avoid capital gains taxes, based on an oral agreement that the respondent would hold it in trust.

The respondent later claimed he purchased the condominium with his own funds and refused to transfer title.

The court found the applicant's evidence credible and supported by banking records, while the respondent's evidence was contradictory and lacked documentary support.

The court held that a purchase money resulting trust arose, which was not rebutted.

The court also found that the doctrine of part performance applied, overcoming the Statute of Frauds requirement for a written contract.

The court declared the applicant the legal and beneficial owner of the condominium and ordered the respondent to transfer title and pay outstanding amounts.

The appellant brought a summary conviction appeal from convictions for assault and sexual assault following a trial.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence arising from a later civil discovery in which the complainant made statements inconsistent with her trial testimony regarding whether she worked the day after the alleged sexual assault.

Applying the principles governing fresh evidence under s. 683(1) of the Criminal Code and the Palmer test, the court held the inconsistent statements were admissible and had significant impeachment value concerning the credibility of the key Crown witness.

The court also found the trial judge’s reasons were deficient, particularly in addressing the third step of the W.(D.) analysis and in failing to grapple with major inconsistencies and evidentiary conflicts.

The convictions were therefore set aside and a new trial ordered.

During a criminal jury trial involving allegations including kidnapping and extortion, the Crown sought to introduce oral statements attributed to one accused that differed from the version summarized in an earlier pre‑trial ruling on voluntariness.

The updated police testimony suggested that the accused named co‑accused as involved in the offence.

The trial judge held that the credibility of the differing versions of the statement was a matter for the jury and that the earlier ruling on voluntariness could not be revisited mid‑trial based on a changed evidentiary landscape.

Applying the discretionary exclusionary framework for prejudicial evidence, the court concluded that the probative value of the “new” version was not outweighed by prejudice to the co‑accused.

The statement would therefore be admitted without editing, with appropriate limiting instructions to the jury that it could only be used against the declarant accused.

A condominium corporation brought a motion seeking an order requiring a unit owner to sell her condominium unit due to persistent and serious misconduct in the building.

Evidence established repeated violent incidents and intolerable behaviour affecting residents, many of whom were senior citizens.

The respondent failed to appear despite being served multiple times.

Applying the principles governing enforcement under the Condominium Act, the court found a breach of s. 117 and concluded that the respondent’s behaviour was incorrigible and unmanageable.

The court ordered the forced sale of the unit under s. 134 and awarded full indemnity costs to the condominium corporation.

The accused brought Charter applications seeking exclusion of statements and physical evidence and a stay of proceedings in a prosecution involving kidnapping, extortion, and forcible confinement.

The court considered the voluntariness of statements made before and after arrest, alleged breaches of ss. 8, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter, and the impact of lost evidence including a wallet and driver’s licence.

Applying the confessions rule and the framework in R. v. Grant, the court held the statements were voluntary and admissible, finding the accused had sufficient English comprehension and had knowingly waived counsel.

A brief s.10(b) breach occurred when an officer asked for identification immediately after arrest, but the statement about the location of the accused’s pants was admitted under s.24(2).

The court also held the accused lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment where the pants were seized and therefore had no standing for a s.8 challenge.

The request to stay proceedings based on lost evidence was adjourned until the conclusion of the trial evidence.

The accused brought a voir dire seeking exclusion of statements made to police following his arrest for offences including kidnapping and extortion.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter due to investigative detention without timely access to counsel.

The court rejected claims of language barriers, intoxication, coercion, and police oppression, finding the accused understood English, had an operating mind, and spoke voluntarily in the hope of improving his situation.

Although a brief 10‑minute breach of s. 10(b) occurred before counsel rights were given, the impugned statement was spontaneous and the breach was minor.

Applying the framework in R. v. Grant, the court held admission of the statements would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

During a criminal trial, the Crown sought to admit the accused’s police statement and initiated a voir dire to establish voluntariness.

The issue was whether the Crown could meet its burden where it failed to call one of the arresting officers who had contact with the accused prior to the statement.

The court held that the Crown must call all persons in authority who had legally meaningful investigative or custodial contact with the accused or who were in a position to influence the giving of the statement, unless their absence is satisfactorily explained.

Because an officer present during the arrest spoke with the accused’s distraught mother within the accused’s earshot and was not called to testify, a material evidentiary gap existed.

The Crown therefore failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt and the statement was excluded.

The applicant brought a Garofoli application to set aside a search warrant and exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained material non-disclosures and inaccuracies, particularly regarding a flawed photo line-up and the police's failure to investigate the applicant's alibi.

After excising the erroneous information, the court concluded there was insufficient reliable evidence to support the warrant, resulting in a s. 8 Charter breach.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence, finding that the police's lack of diligence and the serious impact on the applicant's privacy interests meant admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.