S. Williams

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to set aside a separation agreement and a subsequent Corollary Relief Order of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia.

The court held that it had no jurisdiction to set aside the Nova Scotia order, as the separation agreement had been incorporated into the Corollary Relief Order and any challenge must be brought before the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia.

The defendant Ivan Frisken's cross-motion for summary judgment was granted, as the court found he was not the estate trustee, caused no damages, and there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The plaintiff's motion was dismissed and costs were ordered on a partial indemnity basis.

The accused sought an adjournment of a sexual assault trial to pursue a third party records application for the clinical files of a psychiatrist who had previously testified that the complainant was medically unable to testify due to severe PTSD and suicide risk.

The court considered the balancing of the accused’s right to make full answer and defence against the need for timely trial management.

The defence had possessed an updated psychiatric report for approximately ten months but did not pursue the records until days before the scheduled trial.

The court found the request untimely and characterized the proposed third party records application as a speculative fishing expedition unlikely to meet the threshold of likely relevance under the Criminal Code.

Given the extensive procedural history and prior adjournments, the interests of justice favoured proceeding with the trial.

During a criminal trial for two robberies, the Crown sought to admit a co-participant witness's prior sworn agreed statement of facts after the witness recanted and refused to adopt it in cross-examination under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court held that necessity was established by the recantation and that threshold reliability was satisfied both procedurally and substantively under the K.G.B. framework.

The statement had been sworn during guilty plea proceedings, prepared with counsel, and the witness was available for full cross-examination.

The contents were also strongly corroborated by the witness's earlier video statement and other trial evidence.

The prior sworn statement was admitted as substantive evidence for the truth of its contents.

The applicant brought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code following a prior unsuccessful bail review.

The court noted that the applicant failed to obtain a judicial order for his attendance and filed an unsworn affidavit.

The materials largely duplicated those from the earlier bail review and did not demonstrate a material change in circumstances.

Additionally, the applicant failed to file the required transcript of the prior detention review proceedings as mandated by the applicable rules.

The application was adjourned sine die until the record is properly perfected and scheduled before the judge who heard the initial bail review.

The Crown brought a motion to remove defence counsel for the accused McCreath from the record due to an alleged conflict of interest.

The Crown argued that counsel had a prior relationship with the principal Crown witness, Henry, when she acted as duty counsel approximately five years earlier.

The court held a voir dire to determine whether a solicitor-client relationship had existed between counsel and the witness.

The court found that no such relationship arose, as counsel merely acted as a messenger between the witness and his family while serving as duty counsel, without providing legal advice or being engaged in her professional capacity as a lawyer.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused was charged with threatening death, threatening a justice participant, and breaching a bail condition by communicating with a complainant during a courthouse break while a sexual assault preliminary inquiry was ongoing.

The Crown alleged that the accused yelled a threatening phrase toward the complainant as he re-entered the courthouse.

The court found significant credibility and reliability concerns in the complainant’s evidence, including shifting accounts about her location, inconsistencies with surveillance video, and an implausible allegation of a subsequent in-court threat.

The supporting witness did not observe the accused speaking and relied largely on inference.

Considering the totality of the evidence, including surveillance footage and investigative gaps, the court concluded the Crown failed to prove the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.