Kristen Dulysh

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application following the offender's convictions for sexual assault and assault committed against young women on public transit.

The offender had a lengthy record spanning decades for similar offences.

The court designated the offender as a dangerous offender, finding that his chronic toucherism and intractability established a likelihood of future harm.

The court concluded an indeterminate sentence was not required and imposed a determinate sentence approximating time served plus 60 days, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter following a mistrial on a first-degree murder charge.

The 19-year-old offender, who had significant mental health and substance abuse issues, shot and stabbed the victim in an unprovoked and brutal attack outside the victim's home.

The court accepted a joint submission for a 14-year penitentiary sentence, finding it proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the offender's high degree of moral blameworthiness, while accounting for his guilty plea and mental health challenges.

The accused, having been convicted of sexual assault, was subject to a Crown application for a dangerous offender assessment.

The defence sought to retain a forensic psychiatrist to conduct a separate assessment, but the expert refused to work at the standard Legal Aid rate of $200 per hour, requiring $400 per hour.

The defence brought a Fisher/Peterman application for state funding at the enhanced rate.

The court granted the application, finding that requiring the accused to exhaust Legal Aid appeals or find another expert would cause undue delay and compromise his right to a fair trial, particularly given his lengthy pre-sentence custody and the disparity between Legal Aid rates and Crown expert rates.

A young person admitted shooting the victim in the back of the head inside a bar, but disputed first-degree murder and argued that the killing and related firearm offence were excused by duress.

The court held the Crown proved murder but not planning and deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt, given doubt about whether a threat from the drug supplier may have affected the accused's ability to deliberate; a conviction for second-degree murder was entered instead.

Assuming duress was legally available, the court found the Crown disproved essential elements of the defence, particularly the absence of a safe avenue of escape and the criminal-association limitation, because obvious lawful alternatives existed and the accused knowingly remained in a violent drug-trafficking enterprise.

The court declined to decide the constitutional challenge to s. 17 of the Criminal Code as moot and convicted on the firearm counts that remained in issue.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine and hydromorphone for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime after a traffic stop led to his arrest on an outstanding warrant.

A subsequent search of his vehicle yielded significant quantities of drugs and cash.

The accused brought Charter applications alleging arbitrary detention, unreasonable search and seizure, and right to counsel violations.

The court found the investigative detention and search incident to arrest were lawful, but concluded the accused's section 10(b) rights were breached due to police failure to promptly inform him of his rights and facilitate contact with his counsel of choice.

Applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2).

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The court sentenced Spiro Tsakopoulos for manslaughter after a guilty plea, following the shooting death of Bryson Murle.

The sentencing reasons review the circumstances of the offence, the impact on the victim’s family, the offender’s background, and the aggravating and mitigating factors.

The court found the case fell within the mid-range for manslaughter with a firearm and imposed a 10-year sentence before credit for pre-sentence custody, with appropriate statutory orders.

The court found Tekele Ogbamichael guilty of sexual assault in four counts and guilty of the lesser included offence of assault on one count, following a series of incidents on public transit in the Greater Toronto Area.

The decision details the evidence of each complainant, the police investigation, and the application of cross-count similar fact evidence to establish identity.

The court found the similarities between the incidents—modus operandi, description, and circumstances—were so striking as to make coincidence highly improbable.

The judge also addressed the frailties of eyewitness identification and the use of circumstantial evidence, ultimately concluding that the Crown had proven identity and the elements of the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The offender pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, unlawful confinement, uttering a death threat, and use of an imitation firearm.

The offences involved a prolonged, sadistic torture session of a former intimate partner over a perceived debt.

The court weighed the severe aggravating factors, including the brutal nature of the assault and the vulnerability of the victim, against mitigating factors such as the offender's youth, lack of prior record, guilty plea, and troubled background.

The offender was sentenced to a total of 6.5 years in custody, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Crown sought to introduce expert evidence from a cellphone Health App to show the accused was pacing at home shortly after a fatal fire.

The defence opposed, arguing the underlying science was unreliable.

The court applied the White Burgess framework and found that the Health App data was not reliable for forensic purposes in this case, as there was no independent evidence the accused was walking or running with the phone, and the app could register false positives.

The evidence was ruled inadmissible.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of hearsay statements made by a deceased victim, Alan Rutherford, identifying his assailant in a first-degree murder case.

The Crown sought to admit these statements as dying declarations and spontaneous utterances.

The defence challenged their reliability due to inconsistencies among witnesses and a minor factual error by the declarant.

The court found that the statements met the criteria for both traditional hearsay exceptions and the principled approach, concluding that the defence's objections went to the weight of the evidence rather than its threshold admissibility.

The Crown's application to admit the statements was granted.

This ruling addresses an application by an accused, charged with two counts of first-degree murder, to sit at counsel table during trial.

The court outlines twelve principles governing such applications, emphasizing a balance between the accused's right to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence, and courtroom security.

The court rejects the notion that the defence bears an onus to show exceptional circumstances.

Applying these principles, the court grants the application, permitting the accused to sit at counsel table, subject to being restrained by silent ankle shackles and appropriate security placement.

The accused was found guilty of trafficking in cocaine and possession of the proceeds of crime following a dial-a-dope undercover investigation.

He brought an application to stay the proceedings on the basis of entrapment, arguing the police lacked reasonable suspicion before offering to buy drugs.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the accused's use and understanding of drug subculture slang during two phone calls with the undercover officer established the requisite reasonable suspicion before the opportunity to commit the offence was provided.

The accused, a masseur, was charged with sexual assault arising from a massage session with a client during which his hands entered the complainant’s clothing while massaging near a cesarean scar and hip flexor area.

The Crown alleged that touching just above the complainant’s pubic bone constituted sexual assault or an attempt to reach her genitals.

Applying the objective test for sexual assault from R. v. Chase, the court held the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the touching occurred in circumstances of a sexual nature or that it was intentional rather than accidental during therapeutic massage.

The court also found insufficient proof that the accused knew or was reckless as to any lack of consent for purposes of simple assault in the context of a massage therapy relationship.

The accused was acquitted of both sexual assault and simple assault.

The accused was charged with two separate first-degree murders in Toronto and Brampton.

During a pre-trial motion, the court previously ruled that the accused's confessions to undercover officers were admissible.

In this motion, the court determined how to edit the confession for the Toronto trial to prevent the jury from hearing overly prejudicial evidence about the Brampton homicide.

The court ruled that explicit references to the Brampton shooting must be edited out, but circumstantial evidence linking the accused to the car and gun used in both incidents remained admissible due to its high probative value regarding identity.