Lindsay L. Daviau

A 35-year-old female offender was subject to a dangerous offender application following guilty pleas to aggravated assault and breach of probation.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation under section 753(1)(a)(i) and/or (ii) of the Criminal Code with an indeterminate sentence.

The court found the offender met the threshold for a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour demonstrating substantial indifference to foreseeable consequences under section 753(1)(a)(ii), establishing dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court declined to impose an indeterminate sentence, finding a reasonable expectation that a determinate sentence with a long-term supervision order would adequately protect the public.

The court imposed 7 years imprisonment (less pre-sentence custody credit of 3 years 9 months, leaving 3 years 3 months to serve) followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

This addendum addresses the appellant Ronald Cyr's request for clarification regarding the court's refusal to allow him to advance a new Charter argument on appeal.

The appellant sought to argue that sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms required that clause 6 of section 3(1) of the Juries Act be expanded to exclude former auxiliary police officers from jury service.

The court declined to permit this new argument, finding no air of reality to the suggestion of bias and noting that sections 670 and 671 of the Criminal Code provided a complete answer to this ground of appeal.

Three accused were convicted of first-degree murder following a trial involving an undercover police operation.

The appellants challenged the conviction on multiple grounds including: (1) the trial judge's refusal to sever the trial; (2) the admissibility of statements made to an undercover officer; (3) jury management issues during sequestration; and (4) various trial procedure matters.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that joint trial was appropriate despite cutthroat defences, the undercover operation did not violate Charter rights, and jury management issues did not constitute a miscarriage of justice.

The defendant was convicted of injuring or destroying a tree growing on the boundary between adjoining lands without the consent of the land owner, contrary to section 10(3) of the Forestry Act.

The sentencing hearing addressed the appropriate penalty under the Act, which provides for a maximum fine of $20,000 and/or imprisonment for up to three months.

The court considered mitigating factors including the defendant's lack of criminal record, his receipt of a municipal permit of exemption identifying the tree as hazardous, and his cooperation through an agreed statement of facts.

The court also considered aggravating factors including the impact on the neighbours and the delay in removing the tree despite knowledge of its hazardous status.

The court imposed a fine of $5,000 and declined to impose a probation order.

A private information was brought against the defendant for injuring or destroying a tree growing on the boundary between adjoining lands without the consent of the land owner, contrary to section 10(3) of the Forestry Act of Ontario.

The defendant, a property owner, had instructed a tree removal company to cut down a Norway maple tree located on the property line between his property and the plaintiff's property.

The defendant had obtained a Confirmation of Exemption from the City of Toronto identifying the tree as imminently hazardous and requiring its removal.

The defendant argued that no conflict existed between the provincial Forestry Act and the City of Toronto's municipal code regarding hazardous trees, and that he was entitled to remove the tree based on the city's determination.

The court found that the defendant had failed to obtain the consent of the co-owners before removal, despite the exemption document explicitly stating that the applicant must resolve ownership issues.

The defendant was convicted of the offence.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge gave insufficient weight to his rehabilitative efforts and that his sentence was disparate compared to another person convicted in the same police operation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle in the trial judge's assessment of the rehabilitative efforts alongside the appellant's lengthy record.

The Court also rejected the disparity argument, noting differences between the offences and offenders justified the different sentences.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, firearms offences, and drug trafficking, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting the complainant's videotaped statement under the KGB framework and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his lawyer agreed to an Agreed Statement of Facts that undermined his testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the videotaped statement was properly admitted and there was no miscarriage of justice regarding counsel's conduct.

The sentence appeal was allowed to the extent of setting aside the probation order, as a subsequent sentence made the total a penitentiary sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing phone records evidence and the credibility of a complainant regarding an assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions on the unreliability of the phone records and the credibility of the complainant were open to her and warranted no interference.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of second degree murder, seeking to strike his guilty pleas based on fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the proposed fresh evidence incredulous, contrived, and unworthy of belief.

The Court concluded the pleas were fully informed and voluntary, and that the appellant was manipulative and attempting to deceive the court.