Richard Blouin

The accused was charged with driving over 80 following a police investigation.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample readings of 170 mgs obtained at a police station.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the breath evidence on three grounds: (1) the time of driving was not accurately recorded to satisfy the two-hour requirement; (2) the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable; and (3) the accused's right to counsel under the Charter was violated.

The court found no violations regarding the timing of the breath samples.

However, the court found that a police officer interrupted and curtailed the accused's consultation with duty counsel by making hurry-up gestures through a window, thereby violating s. 10(b) of the Charter.

Applying the s. 24(2) analysis from R. v. Grant, the court excluded the breath evidence as the seriousness of the Charter breach and its impact on the accused's protected right outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample following a three-vehicle motor vehicle accident.

The Crown alleged the defendant refused to comply with a lawful demand under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the demand on four grounds: lack of subjective reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol consumption, lack of objective reasonableness, absence of evidence of driving within three hours, and failure to convey the mandatory nature of the demand.

The court found the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect based on the defendant's statement regarding his G-2 driver's licence jeopardy and that the defendant was driving within the relevant timeframe.

However, the court found the officer's presentation of the demand created ambiguity regarding its mandatory nature, leaving reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant actually refused or misunderstood his obligations.

The defendant was charged with 14 counts arising from a two-month period of criminal conduct directed at his former intimate partner and her three children, including attempted murder, uttering death threats, criminal harassment, and breach of probation.

The defendant pleaded guilty to nine counts and was tried on the remaining five.

He was acquitted of three counts of attempted murder but convicted of attempted possession of a prohibited firearm.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application under section 753 of the Criminal Code.

The court found the defendant met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation based on a pattern of repetitive criminal harassment involving intimate partners spanning approximately 25 years across two countries.

The court imposed a four-year sentence for criminal harassment followed by a maximum ten-year long-term supervision order, finding that this lesser measure would adequately protect the public, rather than imposing an indeterminate sentence.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood following a motor vehicle collision on January 15, 2015.

The trial involved a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the arrest and the admissibility of breath sample evidence.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for arrest, having only reasonable suspicion, and that the officer's credibility and reliability were seriously compromised by inadequate notes, failure to use required recording equipment, and evasive testimony.

The court concluded that the defendant's s. 9 Charter rights against arbitrary detention were violated.

Under s. 24(2) analysis, the court excluded the breath sample evidence obtained after the arrest, finding that the seriousness of the state misconduct outweighed other considerations.

The Crown alleged that the defendant, a long-serving office administrator of the Ontario Psychological Association, embezzled a significant amount of money between 2003 and 2013 through various methods including cheques payable to herself, cash withdrawals, debit card purchases, and electronic transfers.

The defendant contended that the organization operated as a family-run business with intermingled personal and business expenses that were accounted for and approved by executive directors and auditors.

The court found that while the volume of undocumented cash transfers appeared suspicious, the investigation was conducted unprofessionally and incompletely, and the defendant's evidence, combined with the inadequate investigation, raised a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case was based on observations by paramedics of erratic driving, police observations at the scene, and breath sample readings.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of his arrest, the demand for breath samples, and his detention.

The court found Charter violations: a breach of s. 8 regarding the "as soon as practicable" requirement for obtaining breath samples, and a breach of s. 9 regarding arbitrary detention (overhold).

The breath sample evidence was excluded as a remedy.

However, the court found the defendant guilty of impaired operation based on the paramedics' and officers' observations of the defendant's driving and physical condition.

The defendant was acquitted of the Over 80 charge due to exclusion of the breath readings.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault and failing to comply with a recognizance.

Both the defendant and complainant resided in a group home for individuals with cognitive disabilities.

The complainant, who suffers from Down's Syndrome and is mostly non-verbal, could not testify.

The defendant spent 5.5 months in custody awaiting trial while a supervision plan was arranged.

The Crown's case required expert evidence regarding the complainant's capacity to consent.

The defendant brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay.

The court found the total delay of approximately 21 months exceeded the presumptive ceiling of 18 months established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances beyond its control.

The court granted a stay of proceedings.

The defendant pleaded guilty to three counts arising from a domestic violence incident: possession of a prohibited weapon (butterfly knife), uttering death threats, and assault.

The victim suffered significant physical injuries and psychological trauma during a violent attack in their shared residence.

The court balanced aggravating factors (severity of the attack, spousal abuse, significant victim impact) against mitigating factors (guilty plea, remorse, rehabilitation efforts, mental health and addiction treatment, stable employment, and family support) to impose a sentence of 15 days incarceration for assault, 4 months conditional sentence for uttering death threats, and 2 years probation for possession of a prohibited weapon.

The accused pleaded guilty to possessing a prohibited firearm (Glock 26 pistol) with readily accessible ammunition contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought 21 months incarceration; the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day with house arrest and 200 hours of community service, along with a DNA order and a 15-year s. 109 prohibition.

The court found that while the offence was serious and near the "true crime" end of the s. 95 spectrum, exceptional mitigating factors—including the accused's youth (just 18 years old), first-offender status, genuine remorse, cooperation with police, psychological counselling, and family support—justified a community-based sentence that could still achieve denunciation and general deterrence.

The defendant was charged with three offences—Robbery, Disguise with Intent, and Administer Noxious Substance—arising from a home invasion at a basement apartment on Dupont Street, Toronto on September 4, 2015.

The Crown's case relied on cell phone records placing the defendant in the area and evidence that he had rented the vehicle used by the perpetrators.

The defendant testified that he was merely providing transportation to acquaintances and was unaware of their criminal intentions.

Despite circumstantial evidence suggesting the defendant's involvement, including items found in the vehicle proximate to the driver's seat, the court found that a reasonable doubt had been raised regarding his participation in the robbery.

The defendant applied for production of third-party records held by the Ontario Psychological Association, specifically emails and accounting records (AccPac) for the period January 10, 2003 to June 13, 2013.

The defendant was charged with theft and fraud related to alleged diversion of organizational funds over a 10.5-year period.

The court applied the O'Connor test for third-party record production and determined that the requested documents were likely relevant to the proceedings.

The court found that emails and accounting records could assist in establishing the chronology and narrative of events central to the allegations.

The court ordered the third party to review the records for privilege before production to the court.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL.

The Crown relied on breath readings of 140 and 130 obtained through an approved screening device and an intoxilyzer.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath evidence, alleging four Charter violations under section 8.

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make the initial demand under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The objective evidence from an in-car video contradicted the officer's testimony regarding slurred speech and manner of driving.

The court concluded that the smell of alcohol alone from a vehicle with another occupant was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.

The breath evidence was excluded under section 24(2) as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and the defendant was acquitted.

The defendant pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000 for submitting false expense claims, misusing a corporate MasterCard, and misdirecting vendor refunds over an eight-year period (2004-2012), resulting in losses of $232,566 to her employer.

The Crown sought a 10-month jail sentence with restitution and a DNA databank sample.

The defence argued for a conditional sentence of two years less one day with monthly restitution payments.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day with house arrest, monthly restitution of $1,000 throughout the conditional sentence and three-year probation period, a stand-alone restitution order for the balance, and 200 hours of community service.

The defendant was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL of blood and acquitted of impaired driving.

This was his fourth drinking-driving conviction, with prior convictions in 1992, 2005, and 2007.

The Crown sought nine months incarceration and a five-year driving prohibition.

The defence argued for a non-custodial sentence based on the defendant's substantial rehabilitation efforts, including completion of withdrawal management and residential treatment programs, stable employment, and strong community support.

The court imposed a 90-day intermittent sentence, two years' probation, and a four-year driving prohibition, finding that while custody was necessary for deterrence and denunciation, the defendant's comprehensive rehabilitation warranted a sentence equal to his third conviction rather than a more severe penalty.

The defendant pleaded guilty to five offences arising from a shooting incident: possession of a firearm without a licence, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, aggravated assault, reckless intentional discharge of a firearm, and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The victim was shot in the face and suffered permanent scarring, disfigurement, and post-traumatic stress disorder.

The court imposed a total sentence of 7 years, 10 months, and 7 days, after crediting 13.75 months of pre-trial detention.

The sentence reflected the serious nature of the offence, the defendant's significant criminal history, and aggravating factors including the public nature of the shooting and proximity to family members, while considering mitigating factors including the guilty plea, remorse, and Gladue considerations regarding the defendant's Aboriginal status and intergenerational trauma.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal on a charge of First Degree Murder.

The defendant was charged with the murder of Brent Gartner on January 10, 2015.

The sole issue was whether there was evidence of planning and deliberation to support committal on First Degree Murder, or whether committal should be on Second Degree Murder only.

The court found circumstantial evidence capable of supporting an inference of planning and deliberation, including the defendant's stated intention to "deal with something" his request for money from the deceased, multiple phone calls between the parties on the day of the incident, and the defendant's possession of a knife with the victim's blood on it.

The defendant was committed for trial on First Degree Murder.

The defendant was charged with six offences arising from a police search of his residence: five counts of unsafe storage of non-restricted firearms and one count of ammunition storage.

The defendant challenged the validity of the search warrant under section 8 of the Charter.

The court conducted a blended trial and Charter voir dire.

The court found the search warrant was validly issued based on reliable information from a complainant regarding the defendant's firearm possession and concerns about safe storage.

The defendant was found guilty on three counts (unsafe storage of a .22 calibre rifle, unsafe storage of an SKS rifle in an unlocked case, and unsafe storage of a loaded Chiappa shotgun) and not guilty on three counts (two rifles stored in a glass cabinet and ammunition storage).

The defendant was found guilty of mischief for video recording women's buttocks at Woodbine Beach without consent and acquitted of voyeurism and criminal harassment.

At sentencing, the court imposed seven days intermittent incarceration and 24 months probation with conditions including non-attendance at Woodbine Beach and no contact with the victims.

The court rejected a conditional discharge despite mitigating factors, finding that the defendant's prior 2009 conditional discharge for identical conduct, combined with the significant impact on victims and the defendant's lack of insight, warranted a custodial sentence to protect the public interest and deter similar offences.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood (Over 80).

The Crown's case relied entirely on breath samples obtained at a police RIDE checkpoint.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of her detention and the admissibility of the breath samples under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the defendant was arrested without lawful authority because the police officer failed to conduct a mandatory roadside screening test before making the arrest, contrary to section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant was acquitted.

Additionally, the court found that the defendant's right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter had been violated due to Crown and institutional delay spanning nearly 15 months.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and over 80 operation of a motor vehicle on April 13, 2014.

The Crown's case relied on eyewitness testimony from two neighbours who identified the defendant as the driver of the truck, and police observations of impairment.

The defence argued that the defendant did not drive the vehicle and that a paid stranger drove it instead.

The court found the defendant guilty of over 80 operation, finding that the defendant operated the vehicle within two hours of the breath test, satisfying section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was acquitted on the impaired operation charge due to insufficient evidence of impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.