Erika Chozik

The appellant challenged both conviction and sentence following a jury trial for assault causing bodily harm.

He argued that the jury charge inadequately addressed the burden on the Crown to disprove accident and that the trial judge improperly prevented the defence from calling five witnesses concerning a later incident involving the complainant.

The court held that the charge made clear that the Crown had to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt and that the jury could not convict if left with a reasonable doubt on accident.

The court also found no prejudice and no reviewable error in the exclusion of the proposed defence evidence.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but both the conviction appeal and sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant appealed conviction and sentence arising from offences involving choking used to facilitate a sexual assault, while the Crown also appealed sentence.

The court held the trial judge was entitled, on the evidence including forensic evidence, to find that the choking facilitated the sexual assault notwithstanding inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.

Although the trial judge misstated the law on corroboration in sexual assault cases, that error could only have benefited the appellant.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted to both sides, but no error in principle or demonstrable unfitness was shown, and all appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed sentences imposed at the conclusion of three separate trials arising from three discrete sets of criminal acts occurring within roughly two weeks.

The Court of Appeal considered the aggregate 18-year sentence, functionally equivalent to 20 years with pre-trial custody, through the lens of the totality principle.

Given the combination of firearm, drug trafficking, forcible confinement, assault, and attempted murder offences, including planning and deliberation in the most serious incident, the court held the overall sentence was fit and within range.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a restricted weapon and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, improperly relied on his failure to testify, and lacked evidentiary support for a trafficking-purpose finding.

The Court of Appeal held that it was permissible for the trial judge to note the absence of evidence supporting any inference other than guilt.

The court found sufficient circumstantial evidence linking the appellant to the motor vehicle in which the weapon and drugs were found.

Any misapprehension as to the location of the drugs in the vehicle did not amount to reversible error, and the conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and related weapons offences following a jury trial.

He argued that the trial judge erred in the charge to the jury regarding the complainant’s credibility, the burden of proof, a corrective instruction addressing an improper defence comment, and a comment on identification evidence.

The court held that the charge, read as a whole, fairly and adequately presented the defence theory and did not mislead the jury on burden of proof.

The trial judge’s comments were either proper or adequately qualified.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for aggravated assault arising from a violent neighbour dispute involving an iron bar.

The main issue was whether the trial judge properly instructed the jury on self-defence.

The Court of Appeal held that, although the trial judge charged the jury under s. 34(1) of the Criminal Code, the evidence also required an instruction under s. 34(2) because the appellant's version raised a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm.

The court further held that the jury should have been told that a mistaken belief about the degree of danger could still support the defence if based on reasonable grounds.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The police received a disconnected 911 call from the appellant's apartment.

Upon arrival, the appellant answered the door, stated there was no problem, and attempted to close the door.

The police forced entry to investigate the call and found the appellant's wife crying with a swollen eye, stating the appellant had hit her.

The appellant was arrested and charged with assaulting a police officer with intent to resist arrest after a struggle ensued.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police have a common law duty to protect life and safety, which justifies a forced entry into a dwelling to ascertain the health and safety of a 911 caller when the call is disconnected.

The appeal was dismissed.