Carolyne G. Kerr

The Crown appealed an acquittal after the trial judge excluded blood-sample and hospital-record evidence obtained under a valid warrant because police failed to report the seizure to a justice as soon as practicable under s. 489.1(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that s. 8 Charter protection extends beyond the initial taking to the continued detention of lawfully seized items, and the delayed report compromised the judicial oversight contemplated by ss. 489.1 and 490.

However, the court found the trial judge erred in the s. 24(2) analysis by failing to consider that the original seizure was warrant-authorized, the items were used only for the authorized purpose, continued detention would inevitably have been ordered, compliance was delayed rather than wholly absent, and the accused's residual privacy interest was minimal.

Balancing the Grant factors afresh, the court held admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's refusal to set aside his guilty plea to aggravated assault, arguing the plea was not unequivocal and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The trial judge had found the plea was voluntary, informed, and unequivocal, and that trial counsel was effective.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge and finding that the appellant failed to demonstrate any prejudice amounting to a miscarriage of justice arising from his trial counsel's conduct.

The applicants were charged with dangerous driving on April 14, 2013, and brought a motion to stay the proceedings for unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The information was sworn on May 9, 2013, with the first trial date set for May 30, 2014 (over one year later).

An adjournment was granted on April 11, 2014, because a Crown witness needed to be in England.

The second trial date was set for November 28, 2014.

However, on the trial date, the Crown advised that it would not be calling the witness whose unavailability had prompted the adjournment.

The court found that the delay exceeded the Morin guidelines of 8-10 months for provincial courts and that the adjournment was unnecessary.

The charges were stayed.

In a sentencing proceeding following a guilty plea to importing heroin, the Crown sought to qualify an RCMP officer as an expert on heroin trafficking, consumption, and user behaviour to support an aggravating inference that the drugs were imported for trafficking rather than personal use.

The defence challenged several areas of the proposed expert evidence, arguing the officer lacked qualifications in pharmacology, toxicology, and behavioural science.

Applying the framework for admissibility of expert evidence from R. v. Mohan and R. v. Abbey, the court carefully delineated the permissible scope of the officer’s expertise.

The officer was qualified to testify regarding observable effects of heroin use, typical methods and rates of consumption, habits of users, drug pricing, packaging, purity, and trafficking practices based on extensive police experience.

However, the court excluded opinions requiring medical, pharmacological, or toxicological expertise, including assertions about physiological consequences of prolonged heroin consumption.

The ruling permitted limited expert evidence but restricted the officer from offering medical or scientific conclusions outside his demonstrated expertise.

The appellants were convicted of unlawful confinement and firearms offences following a home invasion.

During closing addresses, the Crown improperly suggested to the jury that the complainant's prior statements to police and at the preliminary inquiry, which were not in evidence, were consistent with her trial testimony and therefore proved she was telling the truth.

The trial judge refused a mistrial application and failed to provide a limiting instruction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the Crown's comments invited the jury to make erroneous use of the evidence and the trial judge's failure to correct the error was fatal.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm following a fight outside a high school.

At trial, the judge rejected the testimony of an independent defence witness who corroborated the appellant's claim of self-defence, finding her unreliable and not impartial.

The majority of the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge misapprehended the witness's evidence, as the reasons given for rejecting her testimony were flawed.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.