Caroline Carrasco

The appellant was convicted of drug-related offences following a search of his residence that yielded cocaine, marijuana, crystal methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and cash.

The appellant appealed his conviction, challenging the validity of the search warrant on Charter grounds.

The trial judge upheld the warrant based on the Debot criteria, finding the confidential informant's information compelling and credible, with moderate corroboration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, rejecting the appellant's arguments that the trial judge misstated the legal test and misapplied the Debot factors.

The accused pleaded guilty to three drug trafficking offences involving the trafficking and possession of cocaine and crack cocaine for the purposes of trafficking.

The offences occurred in February 2012 while the accused was on bail for similar charges.

Police conducted surveillance and observed the accused selling cocaine to customers and subsequently seized approximately 1.04 kilograms of cocaine from two locations.

The accused was a commercial-grade trafficker operating a criminal enterprise.

The court imposed a sentence of 5.5 years consecutive to the sentence the accused was already serving, with concurrent sentences on the other two counts.

The offender, a pharmacy assistant with no criminal record, pleaded guilty to one count of theft over and three counts of trafficking in Schedule I substances (oxycodone, hydromorphone, and fentanyl).

She stole prescription drugs from her employer and provided them to an associate.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 4-5 years, while the defence sought a 2-year conditional sentence.

The court imposed a 30-month penitentiary sentence, finding that while significant mitigating factors existed, the serious nature of the drugs, the substantial quantities involved, the breach of trust, and the ongoing course of conduct warranted incarceration.

The court rejected a conditional sentence despite the offender's remorse, family support, and efforts to address her addiction.

In a sentencing proceeding following a guilty plea to importing heroin, the Crown sought to qualify an RCMP officer as an expert on heroin trafficking, consumption, and user behaviour to support an aggravating inference that the drugs were imported for trafficking rather than personal use.

The defence challenged several areas of the proposed expert evidence, arguing the officer lacked qualifications in pharmacology, toxicology, and behavioural science.

Applying the framework for admissibility of expert evidence from R. v. Mohan and R. v. Abbey, the court carefully delineated the permissible scope of the officer’s expertise.

The officer was qualified to testify regarding observable effects of heroin use, typical methods and rates of consumption, habits of users, drug pricing, packaging, purity, and trafficking practices based on extensive police experience.

However, the court excluded opinions requiring medical, pharmacological, or toxicological expertise, including assertions about physiological consequences of prolonged heroin consumption.

The ruling permitted limited expert evidence but restricted the officer from offering medical or scientific conclusions outside his demonstrated expertise.

Following a jury conviction for possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, a document was discovered in the jury room containing excerpts from an online article criticizing a high-profile acquittal and model jury instructions from the Canadian Judicial Council.

The accused sought a mistrial or stay of proceedings, alleging juror misconduct and a violation of their Charter rights after it appeared that at least one juror had consulted external legal materials contrary to the trial judge’s instructions.

The court held it lacked jurisdiction to grant a mistrial or stay after the jury had been discharged, as the trial judge was functus officio except in narrow circumstances not present here.

However, relying on appellate authority recognizing the ability to create an evidentiary record for appeal, the court concluded it retained jurisdiction to conduct a limited post-verdict inquiry into extrinsic influences affecting the jury.

Because the document suggested independent legal research and potential dissemination among jurors, an inquiry was ordered while preserving the jury secrecy rule.