ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COURT FILE NO.: CR-25-1000001000-AP
DATE: 20260305
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
Appellant
- and -
NOXROY REID
Respondent
J. Balgopal, for the Appellant Crown
Self-represented Respondent
HEARD: October 8, 2025
AKHTAR, J.
REASONS FOR DECISION – SUMMARY CONVICTION APPEAL
[1] The Crown appeals from the sentence imposed on 16 January 2025 by Justice Brock Jones of the Ontario Court of Justice.
Factual Background and Overview
Background Facts
[2] On 4 November 2023 the respondent was charged with impaired operation and driving a vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood (Over 80) after he was involved in an accident. He was released on a Form 9 appearance notice.
[3] On 3 March 2024 the respondent was arrested and charged with additional offences including three instances of assault; point firearm; carrying a concealed weapon; criminal harassment; uttering threats; and driving under suspension. He was remanded into custody pending trial.
[4] On 3 April 2024 the respondent was released on a global bail governing all offences. This bail carried a restriction on his ability to operate a motor vehicle.
[5] On 16 January 2025, the first day set for trial, the respondent entered the plea of guilty to the Over 80 offence. The Crown and defence agreed that the sentence would be the mandatory minimum fine. However, there was no agreement on the length of the mandatory driving prohibition.
[6] The Crown submitted that a 15-month driving prohibition was appropriate whilst the defence argued that the strict bail conditions borne by the respondent - which prevented him from driving - should operate to reduce the length of the prohibition ordered by the sentencing judge.
[7] The sentencing judge agreed with the defence and reduced the one-year prohibition mandated by section 324.24 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, to 162 days.
[8] One of the Crown’s grounds of appeal is the length of the prohibition. It argues that the judge had no power to reduce the mandatory minimum prohibition period. The Crown points to the recent statutory amendments to the Criminal Code which provide a start date for all driving prohibitions. This amendment, says the Crown, removes any judicial discretion to reduce the prohibition based on pre-sentencing bail conditions.
[9] For the following reasons, I agree with the Crown and find that the sentencing judge erred in reducing the period of prohibition on the basis of strict bail conditions. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
The Grounds of Appeal
[10] The Crown appeals on two grounds:
The sentencing judge failed to provide sufficient reasons; and
The trial judge committed an error by reducing the driving prohibition as a result of the respondent’s bail conditions.
In light of the disposition of this appeal on the second ground, I do not need to address the first ground.
ANALYSIS
The Trial Judge Erred by Reducing the Length of the Prohibition
[11] The dispute in this case arises over the effect of new statutory amendments passed by Parliament in 2018.
Sections 719(1) and 259(2) of the Criminal Code
[12] Section 719(1) of the Criminal Code, states:
719 (1) A sentence commences when it is imposed, except where a relevant enactment otherwise provides.
[13] Prior to 2018, the driving prohibition imposed in relation to offences of impaired driving and Over 80 offences were contained in s. 259(2) of the Criminal Code. It read as follows:
(2) Where an offender is convicted or discharged under section 736 of an offence under section 220, 221, 236, 249, 250, 251, 252 or this section or subsection 255(2) or (3) committed by means of a motor vehicle, vessel or aircraft, the court that sentences the offender may, in addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for that offence, make an order prohibiting the offender from operating a motor vehicle on any street, road, highway or other public place, a vessel or an aircraft, as the case may be,
(a.1) during any period that the court considers proper, plus any period to which the offender is sentenced to imprisonment, if the offender is liable to imprisonment for life in respect of that offence and if the sentence imposed is other than imprisonment for life;
[14] In R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, the Supreme Court of Canada considered s. 259 to override s. 719(1) because it specifically provided for the imposition of a prohibition for a period that the court considers proper “plus any period to which the offender is sentenced to imprisonment”.
[15] Using this phrase, the court held that the driving prohibition imposed — 11 years — began on the release from imprisonment and deducted the term served by the offender — a six and a half year stint — from the driving prohibition imposed. This brought the prohibition term to four and a half years. However, the court also indicated that because the prohibition was part of the sentence “the length of the pre-sentence driving prohibition must be subtracted from the prohibition imposed in the context of the sentence.”: Lacasse, at para. 113. The court accordingly reduced the prohibition to account for the terms of the recognisance under which he was not permitted to drive from his release on bail to his sentencing date.
The New Amendment: s. 320.24(5.1)
[16] In 2018, Parliament enacted s. 320.24(5.1) of the Code which dealt with driving prohibitions imposed following a conviction for impaired driving and Over 80 (s.320.14(1)). This specified that a prohibition order made in relation to those offences takes effect on the day it was made.
[17] The question to be answered is whether this statutory change now precludes the reduction of a driving prohibition to reflect pre-sentence conditions imposed on the offender prior to sentence.
[18] In R. v. Basque, 2023 SCC 18, 482 D.L.R. (4th) 203, the court drew a distinction between “punishment” and “sentence”. The court said, at para. 62, that:
In this appeal, in light of the distinction reiterated by Arbour J. in Wust, it is therefore important to determine whether s. 259(1)(a) requires that a minimum punishment be imposed or that a minimum sentence be handed down. This interpretative exercise is what will decide the outcome of the appeal. If the minimum driving prohibition in s. 259(1)(a) is a minimum punishment, this section will not affect the applicability of the common law rule. Ms. Basque’s pre-sentence driving prohibition can then “reduce” the ultimate length of her sentence in a manner consistent with Parliament’s direction that the minimum punishment must be for one year. Conversely, if s. 259(1)(a) provides for a one-year minimum sentence, Ms. Basque will have to serve an additional one-year driving prohibition since this mandatory sentence will necessarily be prospective (s. 719(1) Cr. C.). [Emphasis added.]
[19] In other words, a minimum punishment would allow a sentencing judge to reduce the length of the prohibition whilst a minimum sentence would not. In Basque, the court took the view that the prohibition set out in s. 259 of the Criminal Code was a punishment and not a sentence: Basque, at paras. 74-76.
[20] Importantly, the court cited an example apposite to this case, at para. 67, when it stated:
With regard to the context of this provision, I note that Parliament used different language in s. 109(2)(a) Cr. C., which deals with a prohibition against the possession of firearms. This latter provision states that “[a]n order made under subsection (1) shall . . . prohibit the person from possessing . . . any firearm . . . during the period that (i) begins on the day on which the order is made, and (ii) ends not earlier than ten years after the person’s release from imprisonment after conviction for the offence or, if the person is not then imprisoned or subject to imprisonment, after the person’s conviction for or discharge from the offence” (emphasis added). In enacting s. 109(2)(a), Parliament chose to specify the date on which the order ends in the plainest of terms, thereby limiting the court’s discretion to “reduce” the prohibition period going forward to less than the minimum period referred to in s. 109(2)(a). Moreover, the underlined passage shows that when Parliament wishes to impose a prospective prohibition for a specific length of time, it expresses this intention in clear language. However, there is nothing of the sort in s. 259(1)(a), which sets out neither a start date nor an end date for the one year minimum driving prohibition. [Emphasis added.]
[21] The use of wording to impose a prospective prohibition applies in the instant case because the amendments to the Criminal Code added words absent in s. 259(1)(a) of the Code.
[22] Section 320.24(5) sets out the prohibition periods to be imposed by the court and subsection (5.1) states that “a prohibition order takes effect on the day that it is made”. In other words, the section almost mirrors the wording of s. 109(2) which the court, in Basque, used as an example of a prospective prohibition.
[23] The effect of this change has been recognised by the appellate courts: R. v. Boily, 2022 ONCA 611, 163 O.R. (3d) 161, at para. 27; R. v. Sideen, 2024 SKKB 79, at paras. 34-37.
[24] In Sideen, at para. 36, the court explicitly stated that because of the new sub-section (5.1), “Parliament intends mandatory driving prohibitions imposed under s. 320.24 to be prospective only”.
[25] Accordingly, the amendment means that a driving prohibition is prospective only and cannot be adjusted or reduced to reflect pre-sentence conditions.
[26] It follows that the sentencing judge erred by reducing the respondent’s driving prohibition in this case.
[27] I accept that in this case the sentencing judge believed that he was bound, through the horizontal stare decisis described in R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 460, to follow the decisions of R. v. Turcic, [2024] O.J. No. 4697 and R. v. Walker, 2024 ONSC 3403. However, in those cases there was no assessment of the effect of s. 320.24(5).
[28] Indeed, in Walker, at para. 16, the court said that it was following Basque because, “though Parliament may, through legislation, displace the common law discretion, they have not done so in s. 320.24(2)(a)”.
[29] However, as described above, Parliament had done so. The decision in Walker was, in my view, reached per incuriam, one of the conditions identified in Sullivan in permitting another court to depart from previous jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
[30] The imposition of a driving prohibition contained in s. 320.24 of the Criminal Code is made prospective by virtue of subsection (5.1). There is no power to reduce the length of the prohibition as a result of any pre-sentence conditions borne by an accused.
[31] Accordingly, I conclude that the sentencing judge erred in reducing the period of driving prohibition as a result of the respondent’s bail conditions. I would also add that there is no power to reduce the prohibition on the basis that an offender has been prevented from driving through an administrative driver’s licence suspension through provincial legislation: Sideen, at para. 43.
[32] The appropriate driving prohibition in this case was a period of the minimum of 12 months starting on the date that the respondent was sentenced. However, that 12-month period has already expired, rendering the decision in this case moot.
[33] The appeal is accordingly allowed. However, as the 12-month prohibition period has expired, the respondent is not subject to any further period of driving prohibition.
Akhtar J.
Released: March 5, 2026
COURT FILE NO.: CR-25-1000001000-AP
DATE: 20260305
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E EN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
Appellant
- and -
NOXROY REID
Respondent
REASONS FOR decision – SUMMARY CONVICTION APPEAL
Akhtar J.
Released: March 5, 2026