Suhail A.Q. Akhtar

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and sexual interference, sought a stay of proceedings due to a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling set by R. v. Jordan.

While both the Crown and defence contributed to the delay through inaction, the court found the Crown bore a higher onus to ensure the case stayed on track, especially after preferring a direct indictment.

Despite the defence's failure to bring the application in a timely manner, the court attributed the greater portion of the delay to the Crown, finding the ceiling breached, and reluctantly stayed the proceedings.

This case concerns a motion by the Crown and the Ministry of Children, Community, and Social Services to summarily dismiss a habeas corpus application brought by a youth accused of murder, M.J. M.J. was initially detained in an open custody facility, then transferred to a secure facility to facilitate an in-person bail review.

After being released on bail, M.J. continued her habeas corpus application, seeking Charter costs and damages for alleged unlawful detention.

The court granted the summary dismissal, finding that habeas corpus is not available for a person no longer detained and that claims for Charter damages and compensation should be pursued in civil courts, not joined with criminal habeas corpus applications.

The court also declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot application, emphasizing judicial economy and the proper function of criminal courts.

This is a sentencing decision for O.S., a youth offender who pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and attempted murder.

The Crown sought an adult sentence, arguing that O.S.'s actions, motivated by incel ideology and deemed terrorism, demonstrated a level of maturity and sophistication rebutting the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

The defence argued for a youth sentence, citing O.S.'s age and mental health challenges.

The court found that O.S.'s meticulously planned and deliberate attack, his deep research into extremist ideology, and his lack of genuine insight or responsibility (blaming the incel culture) rebutted the presumption.

Furthermore, O.S.'s refusal to participate in rehabilitative programs rendered a youth sentence insufficient for accountability and public protection.

Consequently, the court imposed an adult sentence.

Following a judge-alone trial, the defendant was found guilty of multiple serious offences including use of an imitation firearm, robbery, forcible confinement, and several counts of sexual assault with a weapon and with a co-accused.

The offences involved a planned, violent gang assault on a vulnerable victim.

The Crown sought a 12-year sentence, while the defence requested time served (equivalent to 5.5 years).

The court considered aggravating factors such as the planned nature of the assault, the use of a weapon, the victim's vulnerability, and the defendant's lack of remorse, which indicated poor rehabilitation prospects.

Mitigating factors included the defendant's mental health and learning difficulties, family support, and credit for restrictive pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a global sentence of 10 years imprisonment, deducting 5 years and 5 months for pre-sentence credit, leaving 4 years and 7 months to be served.

Ancillary orders for DNA, a lifetime weapons prohibition, SOIRA registration, and a non-communication order were also made.

Duplicate counts were stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on "over 80" charges, where the trial judge excluded breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding a s. 8 breach due to police delay in taking samples "as soon as practicable." The Superior Court found the trial judge erred in law by holding that s. 320.28(1) of the Criminal Code imposes a Charter-protected requirement for samples to be taken "as soon as practicable." The court clarified that this phrase relates to an evidentiary shortcut, not a Charter right.

Even if such a requirement existed, the police complied.

The court also found the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis insufficient and incorrect, concluding that the seriousness of the state conduct was low, the impact on the accused's Charter rights was minimal, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits favored admission.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered for the "over 80" charge.

The applicant, charged with two counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder, challenged a judicially authorized wiretap warrant, arguing it violated his s. 8 Charter rights due to alleged material omissions and misrepresentations in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

Specifically, he contended that the ITO failed to disclose his home address and house arrest status, which would have provided an innocent explanation for his mobile phone's location near the crime scenes.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's address was in fact present in the ITO, albeit not explicitly referenced in the mobile phone section, and that any omission was not deliberate.

The court concluded that even considering the omitted information, the totality of the evidence, particularly the coordinated movement and contact between the applicant's and a co-perpetrator's phones, provided sufficient grounds for the warrant's issuance.

The media applicants sought certiorari to quash a Youth Court judge's decision regarding access to youth court records in a high-profile murder case, arguing the judge erred in applying the Dagenais/Mentuck/Sherman Estates test and requiring a formal application.

They also sought to bring a constitutional challenge to the Youth Criminal Justice Act's access provisions.

The court dismissed the certiorari application, finding the Youth Court judge correctly applied the test by balancing the open court principle with the YCJA's privacy protections for young persons, and that a formal application is required for media access under s. 119(1)(s)(ii).

The court also declined to hear the constitutional challenge, stating it should first be heard in Youth Court where a full record is available and which has exclusive jurisdiction over YCJA access issues.

The applicant, Donald Riggs, brought a motion to exclude evidence obtained via search warrants, arguing a violation of his Section 8 Charter rights due to an initial warrantless search of his mobile phone.

The Crown contended that the warrants were valid even if information gleaned from the initial search was excised.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the information provided by the reporting party alone was sufficient to establish reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant, and that the 'three Cs' test from R. v. Debot was not applicable to this type of information.

The court also noted the conflicting jurisprudence regarding police actions when private citizens report criminal activity on electronic devices but did not need to resolve it for this decision.

The Crown sought a declaration that the respondent's admitted offences of first-degree murder and attempted murder, committed in the name of involuntary celibate ("incel") ideology, constituted terrorist activity under s. 83.01 of the Criminal Code.

The court examined the statutory definition of terrorism, specifically the "ideological purpose" and "intention to intimidate" clauses.

The court found that incel culture is an ideology and that the respondent's actions were motivated by this ideology and intended to intimidate the public, particularly women.

Consequently, the court granted the Crown's application, ruling that the offences met the definition of terrorism.

The accused, Shane Codrington, was charged with multiple offences including robbery, sexual assault with an imitation firearm, unlawful confinement, and sexual assault with a weapon, stemming from an incident on July 10, 2019.

The Crown presented evidence including the complainant's testimony, video surveillance, and forensic DNA evidence linking a co-accused.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming an alibi and that evidence was planted.

The court found the complainant's testimony credible and corroborated by video and medical evidence.

The court rejected the accused's alibi and claims of planted evidence, finding his testimony untruthful.

The accused was found guilty on all counts except one related to the co-accused's participation in the elevator assault.

Jevor Brown, co-accused in a sexual assault case, brought a motion under s.11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial end was 46 months and 29 days, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling for indictment cases.

Brown argued that only a four-month period was attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic, and that the Crown should have severed his case from his co-accused, Shane Codrington, whose actions caused significant delay.

The Crown contended that a longer period of delay was due to the pandemic's "ripple effect" on court capacity, resulting in a net delay below the Jordan ceiling, and that severance was not in the interests of justice given the nature of the charges and potential for a cut-throat defence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the majority of the delay was attributable to the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic and its systemic impact, and that the Crown's decision not to sever the trials was justified by the interests of justice.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of a police interview conducted with the accused, Donald Riggs, who was charged with voyeurism and other offences.

The accused opposed admission, arguing he lacked an operating mind due to his mental state.

The court, after a voir dire, found the statement to be made voluntarily, noting the absence of police impropriety, the accused's awareness of his rights, and his ability to selectively answer questions, despite his emotional distress.

The statement was deemed admissible.

Michael Roberts sought certiorari to quash his committal for first-degree murder, arguing the preliminary inquiry judge erred by finding evidence of planning and deliberation where none existed, and requested committal for second-degree murder instead.

The Superior Court reviewed the preliminary inquiry judge's decision for jurisdictional error, applying the "scintilla of evidence" test.

The court found that the cumulative circumstantial evidence, including the applicant's actions before and after the shooting, was sufficient to support a reasonable inference of planning and deliberation, even if other inferences were possible.

The application for certiorari was dismissed, upholding the committal for first-degree murder.

The Crown appealed a lower court's decision to stay criminal proceedings against the respondent, Herbert Meawasige, due to an alleged violation of his section 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The application judge had found the total delay of 18 months and 22 days to be unreasonable.

The Superior Court found that the application judge erred in her analysis of defence-attributable delay and failed to adequately consider the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

The court re-evaluated the timeline, attributing significant periods of delay to the defence's marked inefficiency and indifference, including failure to diligently obtain disclosure and schedule pre-trials.

After deducting defence-attributable delay, the net delay fell below the Jordan ceiling.

The appeal was allowed, the stay of proceedings was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The applicants sought certiorari and mandamus to overturn the Public Prosecution Service of Canada's (PPSC) decision to terminate a private prosecution against Sar-El Canada under the Foreign Enlistment Act.

The applicants alleged the termination was influenced by partisan interests and constituted an abuse of process, arguing there was a reasonable prospect of conviction.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicants lacked standing to challenge the Crown's exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

The court affirmed that prosecutorial discretion, including the decision to withdraw charges based on no reasonable prospect of conviction, is reviewable only for egregious abuse of process, which was not demonstrated in this case.

Brian Luckman was convicted by a jury of trafficking in methamphetamine.

The Crown sought an 8-year sentence, while the defence requested a conditional sentence of 2 years less one day.

The court found Luckman to be a principal offender in a high-level commercial drug trafficking operation involving 4 kilograms of methamphetamine intended for export to Australia.

Considering aggravating factors like the gravity of the offence and mitigating factors such as his lack of a criminal record and prospects for rehabilitation, the court imposed a sentence of five years imprisonment, rejecting the conditional sentence.

The applicant, Anh Chiem, charged with first-degree murder, sought to quash a production order compelling the Law Society of Ontario (LSO) to disclose her complaints against the deceased lawyer.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant lacked standing under s. 487.0193 of the Criminal Code, as only the party ordered to produce (the LSO) could initiate such a challenge.

The court also held that the Criminal Code provisions for production orders operate independently of the Law Society Act's disclosure criteria, and that issues of privilege or incrimination are addressed within the Code's framework or at the admissibility stage.

This ruling addresses a Section 276 Criminal Code application in a sexual assault case, where the accused, Habtamu Kebede, sought to cross-examine the complainant on prior sexual activity and communications.

The court dismissed the application for certain utterances (race-based sexual preferences and sexual inactivity) due to lack of relevance and high prejudicial effect.

However, it granted the admission of video evidence showing flirtatious behaviour at a bar and evidence of a goodbye kiss at the complainant's Airbnb, finding these relevant to the complainant's credibility and the surrounding circumstances of the alleged offence, with their probative value outweighing any prejudice.

The accused, Ubaidullah Patel, facing charges including sexual assault, applied under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant, C, about a prior incident where C was allegedly discovered viewing pornographic material and masturbating in a place of worship.

Patel argued this evidence was relevant to show C's motive to fabricate the allegations, fearing disclosure of his own conduct.

The Crown and complainant argued the evidence was irrelevant due to a one-month delay in reporting and potential prejudice.

The court found the evidence relevant to the issue of motive to fabricate and that its significant probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice, allowing the cross-examination but limiting it to the specific incident.

This ruling addresses a renewed severance application brought by David Obregon Castro, who, along with co-accused Sarai Lopez-Iglesias, is charged with First Degree Murder.

Both accused intend to present "cut-throat" defences, blaming the other for the victim's death.

The application for severance was renewed after a prior ruling allowed Ms. Lopez-Iglesias to admit evidence of Mr. Obregon Castro's prior discreditable conduct.

The court dismissed the severance application, reaffirming the presumption that jointly charged accused should be tried together, especially when antagonistic defences are present.

The judge found that a single trial would promote efficiency, the truth-seeking function, and reduce the risk of inconsistent verdicts, relying on the jury's ability to follow limiting instructions regarding the use of prior discreditable conduct evidence.