Lucy Katharine Rasmussen

This decision concerns a complex auto theft and revinning scheme involving ServiceOntario employees and a body shop operator.

The court found that Eric Johnson and Tonisha Baird conspired to traffic stolen vehicles and conceal their true ownership by using fraudulent or cloned VINs.

The evidence was largely circumstantial, including wiretaps, documents, and items seized during police searches.

Baird was found guilty of conspiracy, possession of property obtained by crime, and breach of trust.

Johnson was found guilty of conspiracy, trafficking, and possession of property obtained by crime.

The court analyzed the circumstantial evidence, the conduct of the accused, and the legal standards for each offence, ultimately finding that the only reasonable inference was guilt.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8 (unreasonable search/seizure) and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, dismissing the section 8 claim.

Regarding section 10(b), the court determined there were no special circumstances requiring an interpreter, as the defendant demonstrated sufficient English comprehension and understood his rights.

The Charter application was dismissed, and the defendant was found guilty of both impaired driving and over 80 charges.

The defendant, Joshua Kowal, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay in his trial for impaired driving and refusal to provide a bodily sample.

The total post-charge delay was 27 months and 22 days.

The court applied the Jordan framework, deducting periods of delay solely attributable to the defence, including inaction in seeking disclosure, delays in scheduling pre-trials, and errors in trial scheduling.

The court found 330 days of defence delay, reducing the net delay to 16 months and 27 days, which is below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial courts.

The court further found that the defendant did not demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite proceedings and that the case had not taken "markedly longer" than it reasonably should have, considering the pandemic.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, Gurpreet Singh, charged with dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to a violation of his s. 11(b) right to trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 52 months, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling for Superior Courts.

The Crown conceded presumptive unreasonableness but argued for exceptional circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found the total defence delay to be 273 days, resulting in a net delay of 43 months.

Even if the Crown's claimed exceptional circumstances (COVID-19 administrative adjournments and ripple effect) were accepted, the remaining delay would still be 35 months, exceeding the threshold.

The court granted the stay of proceedings, finding a violation of the applicant's Charter right.

Richard Stewart was charged with aggravated assault against Salina Parkinson following a physical altercation in his home.

The incident occurred after Stewart discovered money missing from his safe, leading to a confrontation with his wife's son, Dhillon.

Ms. Parkinson intervened in the fight between Stewart and Dhillon and was stabbed.

The court assessed the credibility of the testimonies from Stewart, his wife Shauna Scott, and Ms. Parkinson, applying the R. v. W.(D.) framework.

Significant inconsistencies and exaggerations were noted across all accounts.

While Ms. Parkinson testified that Stewart was the only other person in the room when she was stabbed, the court found her account of removing Dhillon to be implausible and noted that neither she nor Ms. Scott saw Stewart with a weapon.

Evidence suggested Dhillon had a weapon and inflicted injuries on Stewart.

The court concluded that another reasonable inference from the totality of the accepted evidence was that Dhillon may have caused Ms. Parkinson's injuries.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove Stewart's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and he was found not guilty.

The accused pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography contrary to s. 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

Police executed a search warrant at the accused's residence and seized a hard drive containing 41,888 still images and 630 video files of child pornography, obtained over a four-month period from March to July 2014.

The materials consisted primarily of pubescent and early adolescent children in sexually provocative poses, with very few depictions of explicit sexual activity.

The accused had no prior criminal record, cooperated with police, and underwent psychiatric assessment and therapy.

The Crown sought one year imprisonment; the defence sought eight months.

The court imposed eight months imprisonment, finding that while the size of the collection was aggravating, the nature of the materials was less depraved than in comparable cases, and significant mitigating factors were present.

The defendant was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood following a RIDE program stop.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath sample evidence under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the approved screening device (ASD) demand and reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand.

The court found the officer had reasonable suspicion for the ASD demand based on the defendant leaving a bar and admitting to consuming alcohol.

However, the court rejected the officer's evidence that she had asked the defendant about the timing of his last drink, finding this critical fact was not reliably recalled and was not documented.

As a result, the court found the officer lacked subjective reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand, constituting a Charter breach.

Nevertheless, the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breach was mid-range in seriousness, the impact on the defendant's Charter-protected interests was minimal given the reliability of the evidence, and there was a strong societal interest in a trial on the merits.

The defendant was convicted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of s. 8 (unreasonable search) and s. 9 (arbitrary detention) in relation to the taking of breath samples.

The central issue was whether the arresting officer could reasonably rely upon an Approved Screening Device (ASD) fail result to make an approved instrument demand.

The court found that the officer held an honest and objectively reasonable belief that the ASD device was in proper working order, and therefore the search was reasonable.

The accused was found guilty.